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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to ask whether the Japanese state was capable of responding to a 
challenge from international labour migration as a force of globalisation. and to 
consider the significance of the subsequent change in the relation between state 
transformation and the realisation of social justice within the context of 
globalisation. The focal point of the study is Japan's criminal justice system in 
the 1990s, with particular attention to the `language barrier', namely legal and 
political problems that affect foreigners and state officials. The study analyses 
how the language barrier emerged in Japan, how it influenced the state, and how 
state and civil society actors reacted to address the problem. This theoretical and 
empirical study in International Relations and International Political Economy 
takes an interdisciplinary approach, drawing insights from Sociology and Gender 
Studies concerning international labour migration. Documentary research on 
secondary and tertiary documents of Japan's state and civil society actors has been 
complemented by sixteen semi-structured interviews with those who were 
involved in the process of tackling the language barrier. The study argues that, by 
introducing judicial interpreters over the decade and with inputs from civil society 
actors, the Japanese state was able to reduce the extent of constraints posed by the 
language barrier on its ability to control crime. This indicates that an internal 
sector of the Japanese state that is in charge of political matters, namely law 
enforcement, has been able to largely solve the challenge of the language barrier, 
which is a manifestation of international economic force. This study thus 
counters the claim of the Hyperglobalist thesis of globalisation concerning loss or 
decline in capability of the state, and extends the plausibility of the 
Transformationalist thesis in terms of geographical area and the issues analysed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Aim, Objective and Background of the Study 
The aim of this theoretical and empirical study in International Relations (IR) and 
International Political Economy (IPE) is to investigate and explain the way the 
Japanese state responded to a challenge from international labour migration as a 
force of globalisation, or its international structure in the 1990s. Towards the 
above aim, the objective of this study is to consider whether the Japanese state 
was in retreat or not during the above period with regard to a particular problem 
arising from globalisation. As will be explained later in this chapter, 
contemporary world politics has been, in particular since the 1990s, characterised 
as undergoing the process of globalisation. Whereas several different issues are 
described as a manifestation of globalisation, this study looks at international 
labour migration. The reason for this focus is because migration connects distant 
places in the world in an unprecedented way and renders different economic, 
social and political consequences to different states, societies and people in an 
uneven manner, parallel to other forces of globalisation. Out of various 
challenges that arise from international labour migration, this study investigates 
one of the challenges that emerged in Japan's criminal justice process, namely 
what this study calls 'the language barrier': it refers to the difficulties in 
communication and the subsequent problems between investigators, defence 
CHAPTER 1 
counsel, and judges in Japan's criminal justice system on the one hand, and 
foreigners as suspects, defendants or witnesses on the other. The study chooses to 
enquire into this problem as a manifestation of a challenge from globalisation for 
the following reasons: (i) it is an expression of interconnectedness between 
international and economic force on the one hand, and domestic and political 
force on the other; such interconnectedness is significant to world politics because 
it affects territoriality of the state, which is one of the basic assumptions about the 
modern nation state as will be explained in Chapter 2. (ii) The language barrier 
depicts, as will be shown later in this chapter as well as in Chapter 5, the contest 
between international economic force (often led by non-state actors) and the 
sovereignty of the state, namely a migrant receiving country in the case of this 
study. (iii) The language barrier problem casts light on issues relating to social 
justice in terms of striking the balance between authority and responsibility, as 
well as obligations and entitlements, within the context of globalisation where 
territoriality and the constituent population of the state are changing. 
Having scrutinised the above problems, this study will inform our 
understanding of globalisation, migration and the state in the following ways. 
First, concerning globalisation, the study should be able to tell us about the impact 
of globalisation, in terms of distribution among the relevant actors, and of 
frequency of such impact over time. Regarding migration, this study will shed 
light on: what the state's role is in international labour migration today; whether 
the migration contradicts the way world politics is organised; and whether the 
migration is more politically influential than other forces of globalisation. Third, 
as for the Japanese state, the current study will explain whether theories on the 
CHAPTER 1 
relation between globalisation and the state, which have often been developed 
within the context of the West, are applicable to contemporary Japanese state. 
(1) Contemporary World Politics and Globalisation 
The term globalisation has been used in the mass media, policy making and 
academia since the 1990s, in order to describe and analyse how the contemporary 
world works, but also to justify the compilation and implementation of new 
policies, be they public or private. Though a heavily contested concept, 
globalisation can be defined in this study as `transterritorialisation of economic 
and social impact, ' ' or "the growth of `supraterritorial' relations between 
people. "2 The following definition also clearly illustrates developments in current 
international structure: `the process of increasing interconnectedness between 
societies such that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on 
peoples and societies far away. '3 This study takes the view that the core issue of 
globalisation is that, in recent decades the mode of operation of economic force in 
the world has been changing substantially from the previous one. As will be 
explained in more detail in the next chapter, economic force used to operate 
normally within the state border (except for inter-state armed conflict, 
colonisation and trade), until around the 1970s. Since then, the extent to which 
economic force could operate in a foreign territory without the political control of 
The author would like to thank Dr. Christopher W. Hughes for this definition. 
2 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization. - a critical introduction (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 46. 
Steve Smith and John Baylis, `Introduction', in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), The 
Globalization qfII'orld Politics: An introduction to world politics (Second Edition) (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001 ), pp. 1-12, p. 7. 
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the state of its origin or that of where it operates has increased, at least temporarily. 
Such economic force is capable of affecting the society where it works, often in 
the South but also to an increasing degree in many parts of the North as well. 
Consequently our lives are affected by globalisation today, but the reasons 
for such effects may not immediately be comprehensible for those who are under 
their influence. Mittelman described that the impact of globalisation appears as a 
`historical transformation [... ] of livelihoods; in politics, a loss in the degree of 
control exercised locally [... ] such that the locus of power gradually shifts in 
varying proportions above and below the territorial state. ' 4 The impact of 
globalisation can be puzzling, because the key decisions to use such economic 
force that drives the globalisation process are made in places that are distant from 
where such impact manifests. Because of the above distance between the origin 
of the economic force and the geographical location where the result of the 
working of the economic force emerges, there can be (and often is) a discrepancy 
between the capability to exercise economic force on the one hand, and 
accountability and responsibility for the use of such force. Within the previous 
mode of operation of economic force, the aforementioned distance between the 
capability of and the responsibility for the economic force has been thought to be 
more manageable, as the state was (at least supposedly) able to supervise the 
working of the economic force. However, since the state's ability for the above 
management appears to be decreasing (if not for every state), a new way of 
James H. Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 6. 
4 
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managing world politics that entails more than just nation states is much more 
required today. 
In order to investigate how the force of globalisation operates and what are 
the consequences of the working of such force, this study analyses the process of 
globalisation at the levels of the state, non-state actors and the migrants as 
individuals. 5 The reason for this analytical approach is as follows. The force of 
globalisation can be enabling and constraining, but benefits and detrimental 
effects of globalisation are unevenly distributed. 6 Analysis of the distribution of 
the benefits or detrimental effect of globalisation at the state or civil society levels 
will be inevitably in aggregate terms. The entire amount of gain (or the entire 
extent of detrimental effects) in society is certainly important, but how it is 
distributed between the people with different attributes is equally pertinent. An 
analysis at the level of individuals should be able to depict the uneven character of 
the distribution of benefits and the detrimental effects of globalisation. The 
benefits and detrimental effects arising from international labour migration 
include: economic gain, maintenance of domestic order in the migrant receiving 
country through law enforcement, and striking the balance between the exercise of 
state power and justice. Therefore, this research examines the following five 
types of interactions between the above three levels of actors, which are possible 
within the process of globalisation. This classification, which is partly inspired by 
the cob-web view of the world that Burton advanced, exhibits a contrast to the 
s 'Individuals' will be treated in 'neutral' terms up to Chapter 5. Chapter 6 is going re-assess this 
assumption briefly in relation to gender and ethnicit\. 
' Smith and BaN lis, 'Introduction', p. 10. 
S 
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billiard-ball view of the world which reflects the state-centric view of the Realist 
school of International Relations. 7 
Table 1-1. Interactions of the state, civil society and the individuals within international 
labour migration' 
Actors involved Example of interactions 
(i) State - State Trade and financial liberalisation 
(ii) State - Civil society Imported capital creates conditions for labour 
mobility; international labour migration affects 
the political economy of the migrant receiving 
country 
(Increased influence of international market 
force on national economies) 
(iii) Civil society - Individuals Contract between migrants and migration 
brokers 
(Employment contract; commercial contract) 
(iv) Civil society - Civil society Contract between migration brokers; between 
brokers/employers and migrant workers 
(Commercial transactions; trafficking of goods) 
(v) State - Individuals Immigration control and citizenship politics 
(Migrant receiving country 
and migrant workers) 
(Compiled by the author from various sources referred to in this study) 
In order to study the impact of globalisation empirically, this study pays 
attention to East Asia, in particular, the relation between Thailand and Japan. The 
reasons for this analytical orientation are twofold: (i) the impact of globalisation 
forces may be more easily gauged in East Asia than in Western Europe or North 
America, because the increase in the degree of interconnectedness between 
political economies in the region increased only after the end of the Cold War. 
(ii) Economic linkage with East Asia and Japan, particularly between Thailand 
John Burton, World Societe' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). 
In addition to the above five, an `individual-individual' relation is possible. This one is excluded 
from the table, however, because such relationship reflects any one of these five types of 
interactions. 
6 
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and Japan, is extensive, since the former country has received ODA and FDI from 
the latter in the last two decades. 9 For the reasons explained in Chapter 2. such 
economic linkage is likely to create structural conditions for international labour 
migration. 
(2) Globalisation and International Labour Migration 
a. Oversight in the existing literature 
The extent of attention that international labour migration has drawn in IR and 
IPE has been minimal until recently as will be demonstrated below, and especially 
in the case of Japan, as referred to later in this chapter. Nevertheless, this study 
discusses the formation of international population mobility and its impact on the 
state, society and individuals concerned because of the following reasons. First, 
international labour migration renders a politico-economic challenge to all the 
parties involved, as Goldstein puts it: `[a]s within any trade issues, migration 
creates complex patterns of winners and losers. ' 10 In other words, international 
labour migration demands the following core question of IPE posed against it: 
'Who gets the opportunities and who is denied an opportunity - whether for goods 
and services or more fundamentally a share of all the values, not only wealth, but 
also security, the freedom to choose for themselves, some measure of, justice from 
Glenn D. Hook; Julie Gilson; Christopher W. Hughes; and Hugo Dobson, Japan's International 
Relations: Politics. economics and securi v (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 188, p. 210. 
10 Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations (Second Edition) (New York: HarperCol I ins, 1996), 
p. 495. 
7 
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the rest of society? T '1 As will be shown later in this chapter, out of international 
labour migration, the migrant receiving state often gets more, where the migrant 
sending state gains less, while the migrants themselves are less advantaged. 
Second, an investigation into international labour migration from an IPE 
perspective will hopefully be able to bridge IR and the Sociology of citizenship, 
by making the former more `political' in terms of the interests of the migrants 
themselves in contrast to those of the migrant receiving country, and also by 
making the latter more dynamic through presenting the process of population 
mobility which is sometimes assumed as given. 
As for the areas discussed in the studies of globalisation, trade and 
financial liberalisation, environmental problems and telecommunication have 
often drawn attention as manifestations of globalisation, among other issues. 
However, migration has received relatively limited attention in comparison to the 
above. One possible reason for this relative infrequence of recognition can be that 
the rise in migrations in the last few decades, in quantitative terms, is less 
substantial compared with that of trade, capital or information. Though a crude 
comparison, the following figures show the above tendency. Between 1965 and 
1985, the number of immigrant populations in the world increased by 1.38 times 
(less than twice), 12 whereas turnover within the foreign exchange market 
multiplied by 15 times between 1979 (US$100 billion a day) and 1998 ($1,500 
billion a day), while foreign direct investment grew by 61 times between 1960 
Susan Strange, States and Markets (Second Edition) (London: Pinter, 1994), p. 18. 
122 World Bank, World Development Report 1995: !t orkers in an Integrating World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995). p. 65. 
8 
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($66 billion) and 1999 ($4,000 billion). 13 In the meantime, the amount of 
immigrants compared with share of total migrants against the entire human 
population was approximately 2.5 percent at the end of the twentieth century. 14 
But, as will be shown later in this chapter, the above relative slow growth of 
migrations would not cancel out its political significance for the relevant actors, in 
particular the receiving country and the immigrants themselves. 
The following brief survey of some of major works in the IR, IPE and 
globalisation studies suggests that the degree of academic interest in international 
population movements, in particular labour migration, varies among the authors. 
It is possible to characterise the extent of their interest as: (i) indifference; (ii) 
limited interest; and (iii) positive interest. First, there are those works whose 
research simply excluded the issues of immigration, labour, migration or 
population from their scope of research. 15 Second, there are those works in which 
the authors were aware of the importance of migration to world politics, but 
excluded contemporary migration from their focal point of analysis. One reason 
for this is that the amount of migration worldwide in the twentieth century was 
13 These figures are taken from Table 24.1 in Jan Aart Scholte, `Global Trade and Finance', in 
Baylis and Smith (eds), op. cit., pp. 519-539, p. 523. 
14 Castles and Miller, leading scholars on migration in Australia (now in UK) and the US, reported 
an estimate of total number of international migrants at around 120 million (based on the 1994 
figure by International Organisation for Migration), which was `equivalent to less than 2 per cent 
of the world's population' (Steven Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International 
Population Movements in the Modern World (Second Edition) (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 
4-5); in 2001, lyotani, a leading Japanese scholar on international labour migration estimated the 
figure at 150 million (lyotani Toshio, Guröbarizeshon to imin (Globalisation and Migration) 
(Tokyo: Yüshind6 köbunsha, 2001), p. 53), which would constitute approximately 2.5 per cent of 
the world's population of 6.1 million (United Nations Population Division, World Population 
Prospects, The 2000 Revision Highlights, ESA/P%W P. 165,28 February 2001, 
http: //www. un. org/esa/population'publications/wpp2000/highlights. pdf (cited 13 March 2003). p. 
v). 
j5 For example, Robert Jackson. Robert and Georg Sorensen, Introduction to International 
Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; the volume edited by Baylis and Smith (Baylis 
and Smith (eds), op. cit. ) contains a limited degree of reference to population movements, despite 
its otherwise extensive coverage of issues in contemporary world politics. 
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less then the flow to the US in the nineteenth century. ' 6 Another example of this 
approach, though more serious about the significance of the impact of 
international labour migration on contemporary politics than the above example, 
is to claim that citizenship politics of people who are already in the territory of the 
receiving state is relevant to the studies of globalisation, but nevertheless to argue 
that a significant scale of migration that creates causes of such citizenship politics 
was over before the 1990S. 17 That may be the case in Western Europe and North 
America, but not necessarily so in East Asia, where international mobility of 
population increased since the 1970s. 
The above dismissal of international migration from globalisation forces 
can be questioned in respect to the following: (i) the status of economic 
development in the countries concerned in the nineteenth century (the US was in 
the midst of state building during this century); and (ii) the fact that the amount of 
labour migration today is low because of receiving country's restrictive 
immigration policies. In other words, whereas `[t]he old liberal regime, assuming 
relatively free movement of labour across frontiers, one that lasted from the early 
nineteenth century through to the 1960s, has collapsed, '' 
8 border control against 
population mobility has `rarely been as tight' as the current practice. 
19 This is in a 
16 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., 'Introduction', in Nye, Joseph S. Jr. and John D. 
Donahu (eds), Governance in a Glohalizing World (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 
2000), pp. 1-4 1, p. 3. 
1' Richard Higott and Anthony Payne, 'Introduction: Towards a New Political Economy of 
Globalisation', in Richard Higgott and Anthony Payne (eds), The New Political Econom}. of 
Glohalisation (Volume I) (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), pp. ix-xxiv, p. xii. 
18 Fred Halliday, 'Global Governance: Prospects and Problems', in David Held and Anthon% 
McGrew (eds), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction of the Globalization Debate 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2000), pp. 431-141, p. 437. 
'`' Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: a critical introduction, p. 140. Similar points are made bý the 
following: Fred Halliday, The World at 2000: Perils and Promises (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). 
p. 88; Dani Rodrik, 'Has Globalization 
Gone Too Far? ', in David Held and Anthony McGrew 
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sense contradictory to the argument of neo-liberalism. 20 as underlined by the 
following point that Pronk has raised: there is a lack of international agreement 
concerning population mobility, in contrast to other issues within the international 
political economy such as trade liberalisation and capital transaction. 21 
Third, the above shows that, it is less than persuasive to dismiss 
international labour migration from the force of globalisation just because its 
volume has been insignificant in recent decades in comparison to other economic 
forces. Hence this study finds it appropriate to investigate international labour 
migration and consider its significance to the world today. This third analytical 
standpoint is becoming increasingly common in IR and IPE literature, as can be 
seen in the following points: (i) international population movements deserves 
serious analysis as an issue in world politics, because there are links between 
economic development and migration; 22 (ii) population mobility is indeed an issue 
in IR and IPE, because it matters to the management of state border, 23 and also is 
`one of the biggest issues affecting North-South relations' ; 24 (iii) international 
(eds), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction of the Globalization Debate 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2000), pp. 323-327, p. 326; and Jan Aart Scholte, `Global trade and finance', 
in Baylis and Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics (Second Edition), pp. 519-539; p. 
524,535-6. 
2" Scholte, Globalization: a critical introduction, p. 34. 
2' Jan Pronk, `Globalization: A Developmental Approach', in Jan Nederwen Pieterse (ed. ), Global 
Future: Shaping Globalization (London: Zed, 2000), pp. 40-52, p. 43. 
22 Brian White; Richard Little; and Michael Smith, `Issues in World Politics Reviewed', in Brian 
White, Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds), Issues in World Politics (Second Edition) 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 252-269, p. 255. 
23 Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations (Second Edition) (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2001), pp. 248-252. 
'' For example, Goldstein, International Relations, p. 494; Charles W. Kegle} . 
Jr. and Eugene R. 
Wittkoppf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation (Eighth Edition) (Boston: Bedford St. 
Martins, 2001), p. 330; and Charlotte Bretherton, 'Contemporary Sources of Armed Conflict', in 
Charlotte Bretherton and Geoffrey Ponton (eds), Global Politics: An Introduction (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996), pp. 100-125, pp. 122-123). Meanwhile, Suhrke is cautious about the validit, of 
the claims that emerged after the ending of the Cold War, which characterised population issues as 
one of 'traditional security matters' by connecting the environment, migration and development, 
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population movements constitute a source of external pressure (in particular, but 
not limited to, the states of the North), similar to such other sources of pressure as 
the world economy, environment and health, and security: 25 (iv) international 
migration reveals an `interconnectedness' between the international and 
domestic, 26 and `[t]he connection of economics and security'; 27 and (v) migrant 
issues pose `a fundamental challenge ... [to] governance in contemporary 
societies. ' 28 All of the above five points indicate that international labour 
migration does matter to world politics. But the last two are in particular related 
to the essence of globalisation studies, and this is why international labour 
migration deserves serious analysis. 
h. The international political economy of international labour migration 
This study analyses international labour migration from two different directions. 
The first is to show migration as a manifestation of the process of integrating 
national political economies. 29 This will be dealt with in Chapter 4. In addition, 
thus giving the readers an impression that migrants are primarily `enemy' and the object of 
'defense' against it. The reasons for her assessment are as follows: first, it is implausible to 
assume 'population growth [as] both a necessary and sufficient cause of migration'; second, 
contrary to the above characterisation, it is also the case that the migrants can be `victims or 
assets. ' (Astri Suhrke, 'Environmental Change, Migration, and Conflict: A Lethal Feedback 
Dynamic? ', in Chester A. Crocker; Fen Osler Hampson with Pamel Aall (eds), Managing Global 
(. 'haos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, D. C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 113-127, pp. 115-116). 
2 Halliday, The World w 2100, p. 88. 
'`' Eleonore Kofman, 'Feminism, Gender Relations and Geopolitics: Problematic Closures and 
Opening Strategies', in Eleonore Kofman, and Gillian Youngs (eds), Globalization: Theory and 
Practice (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 209-224, p. 215. 
27 Goldstein, op. cit., p. 496. 
2' Ahmet lcduygu, `Citizenship at the Crossroads: Immigration and the Nation-State', in Kofman 
and Youngs (eds), Globalization: Theory and Practice, pp. 150-162, p. 150. 
29 Saskia Sassen, The Mobility q/ Labour and Capital. - .4 Stuck' in international investment and 
labour flow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 36-39; Castles and Miller. The 
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this study also examines international labour migration from a micro perspective 
in the following terms. This study adopts an IPE approach to analyse and discuss 
international labour migration. Reasons for the above are as follows. There is a 
tendency in the existing literature on international labour migration to discuss its 
implications from the perspective of the receiving country, and in particular, the 
state of the migrant receiving country. 30 However, international labour migration 
involves both sending and receiving countries, and the migrants themselves. As 
such, considering the costs and benefits of international labour migration, 
including the ones shown in the following table, for example, could provide a 
fuller understanding of the causes and consequences of the migration. 
Table 1-2. Benefits and costs of international labour migration 
Benefits Costs 
Individual migrants Increased income; working Injury; disease; difficulties 
skills; personal connections; in reintegrating into the 
self-confidence home society; abuse by the 
employer and customers 
Civil society actors of the Increased income for the Injury; disease; family 
sending country family; for the migration disintegration 
industry 
State of the sending country Foreign exchange revenue Brain drain; social welfare 
costs 
Civil society actors of the Low and flexible labour Cultural conflicts; contests 
receiving country supply; over low-paid jobs between 
Inexpensive products and the indigenous and the 
services migrant workers 
State of the receiving Low and flexible labour Social costs; `security 
country supply; concerns'; transformation of 
Inexpensive products and national identity 
services 
(Compiled by the author from various sources referred to in this chapter) 
Age 00/ Migration, p. 142, Yoko Sellek, Migrant Labour in Japan (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 
'" Icduygu, 'Citizenship at the Crossroads', p. 150. 
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First, to the migrant sending country, international labour migration brings 
economic benefit through the generation of remittance by those working abroad. 3 
But social costs of their nationals' stay in foreign countries are not negligible and 
tend to be longer lasting than the above benefits. These costs include: lack of 
return from the investment in human resource development (namely, education 
and vocational training) of those who migrated after such investment; disruption 
to familial and social relations; difficulties in reintegration after their return home; 
and social welfare costs in particular when the returned migrant workers are 
injured or infected with disease during employment overseas. Though from the 
perspective of the receiving country, Sassen described these costs of labour 
migration as the `externalisation of renewal cost,, 32 and `savings on social 
services and infrastructure'. 33 The above mismatch between the economic benefit 
and the social cost is just one example of the problems of globalisation raised 
earlier in this chapter, namely the discrepancy between the use of power and 
accountability/responsibility for such use of power. 
Second, for the receiving country, one of the benefits from international 
labour migration is the supply of cheap and `flexible, labour. 34 However, the 
presence of foreigners, particularly those who are not registered with the 
government, raises concerns about the probable influences on national identity, 
Alan Dupont, East Asia Imperilled: Transnationul Challenge to Security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 2001), p. 160. 
Sassen, The Mobility of Labour and Capital, p. 37. 
Sassen, op. cit., p. 38. 
Dupont, East Asia Imperilled, p. 160. There are arguments that there will be contest over the 
low-paid jobs between the indigenous and the migrant workers. For example, Goldstein. op. cit., p. 
495. 
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internal cohesion and domestic stability. 35 Third, for individual migrants, the 
benefits include possibilities for better income in comparison to these available at 
home, and obtaining new skills. In the meantime, the costs include the 
possibilities of being exploited by the migration brokers, employers, and 
customers; differential treatment by state officials; injury and diseases; disrupted 
familial relations, difficulties in readjusting themselves on their return home, 
among others. Costs and benefits to civil society actors at both ends of the 
population flow are also presented in the table. 
c. International labour migration and criminal justice administration 
The focal point of this study on international labour migration can be any part of 
the interactions shown above that render both costs and benefits, but the central 
area of this study is the response of the migrant receiving state, and its 
implications to the individual migrants affected by such response. To consider the 
response first requires identifying the characteristics of the impact of international 
labour migration on the receiving country. From the perspective of the migrant 
receiving state, international labour migration renders contradictory forms of 
impact: whereas migration is indispensable for the sustained operation of the 
domestic economy where the economic actors' capital is often internationally 
immobile, the presence of migrant workers is seen by the state (and some parts of 
the society) as posing potential problems. This second point can be elaborated as 
follows. Existing studies on the effect of migration to the receiving states have 
35 Dupont, op. cit., pp. 22-2-3). 
15 
CHAPTERI 
identified that the state would see the presence of migrants as a threat in at least 
the following four terms: (i) to domestic order or internal security; 36 (ii) to social 
cohesion and cultural integrity; 37 (iii) to economic impact of the migration on 
domestic labour market and public welfare; 38 and (iv) as an indication of the 
state's inability to maintain complete control of borders, as if the legal-territorial 
assumption of state sovereignty is eroding. 39 
In connection with this, the criminal justice system of a migrant receiving 
state demands careful analysis in this study, because it carries important 
implications to the issues relating to international migration as a force of 
globalisation. Maintenance of domestic order is one of the major roles of criminal 
justice institutions of a country, in particular the control of crime. State laws 
authorises criminal justice administration to perform the following tasks. 
Criminal justice system operates `as an agent of the state' responding to reports of 
; `' Myron Weiner, `Introduction: Security, Stability and International Migration', in Myron Weiner 
(ed. ), International Migration and Security (Oxford: Westview, 1993), pp. 1-35, p. 11; Jonas 
Widgreen, 'International migration and regional stability', International Affairs, 66(4), pp. 749- 
766, p. 749; Astri Suhrke, `The "High Politics" of Population Movements: Migration, State and 
Civil Society in Southeast Asia', in Weiner (ed. ), International Migration and Security, pp. 179- 
200, p. 179. 
3' Myron Weiner, `Introduction', p. 11; Sita Bali, `Migration and Refugees', in White, Little and 
Smith (eds), Issues in World Politics (Second Edition), pp. 171-190, p. 172. 
3" Bali, 'Migration and Refugees', p. 172. Myron Weiner, op. cit., p. 11. In addition to the above 
three points, Weiner also identified potential problems with refugees and labour migrants for the 
receiving state: (i) threats to interstate relations when refugees/migrants are opposed to the ruling 
regime of the sending country; and (ii) refugees/immigrants could be used as hostages in the 
receiving country (Weiner, op. cit., p. 11). 
Bali, op. cit., p. 189. Zolberg's view reflects a statist position towards migration issues, and 
merits attention here to be aware of a view on one end of the analytical spectrum. Zolberg argued 
that in the sovereign state system, the right of the state 'to restrict the entry of foreigners' has been 
accepted in order to maintain political sovereignty and social cohesion. He went on to contend 
that international migration was 'a deviance from the prevailing norm of social organization at the 
world level' (Aristide R. Zolberg, 'International Migration 
in Political Perspective', in M. Kritz. C. 
Kell,, and S. Tomasi (eds). Global Trends in ; t/igration: Theory and Research on International 
Population Ilovements (Ness York: Center for Migration Studies. 1981), pp. 3-27, pp. 6-7). 
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suspected crime, recognising them as an `offence against the state. ' 40 In this 
respect, successful crime control means 'realization of sovereignty. ' 41 
Meanwhile, the courts, as `guardians of law and order', 42 make legal decisions on 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the alleged offence, and whether 
and to what extent she or he should be punished. However, it must also be noted 
that the driving forces of the criminal justice system are manifold: in addition to 
crime control, they must ensure due process of law, maintenance of legitimacy, 
and rehabilitation of offenders. 43 
In line with the legal and territorial assumption on the state, the criminal 
justice system is usually expected to function within its territory (as against the 
military which primarily operates abroad unless there is substantial internal 
disturbance), and its task is `political', in the sense that it applies domestic law to 
individual cases. However, international labour migration destabilises the above 
assumption in the following sense: whereas the criminal justice administration 
continues to operate primarily within the state border, 44 the domestic population 
now consists of both the nationals and non-nationals such as labour migrants. The 
above developments mean that, through operating to control crime committed by 
foreigners, criminal justice administration of the migrant receiving state tries to 
tackle the consequence of international labour migration as a force of 
globalisation. This is where the `domestic' and `political' sector of the state 
30 C. M. V. Clarkson, Understanding Criminal Law (Third Edition) (London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
2001), pp. 269-270. 
4' Rod Hague; Martin Harrop; and Shaun Breslin, Comparative government and politics: an 
introduction, 4th edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 249. 
Loraine Gelstrope, 'Critical Decisions and Processes in the Criminal Courts', in Eugene 
McLaughlin and John Muncie (eds), Controlling Crime (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 107-156, p. 1 l2. 
'? Gelstrope, 'Critical Decisions and Processes in the Criminal Courts', pp. 1 11-112. 
44 Inter-state cooperation of criminal justice administration is beyond the scope of this stud`. 
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encounters, while in its own geographical territory, a consequence of international 
labour migration as an `international economic' force. 
The above encounter is a manifestation of blurring of migrant receiving 
state's border. Significance of the above blurring of the border is explained in the 
remainder of this section. As has just been noted, the state border has become 
blurred, but such crossover takes place within the geographical territory of the 
migrant receiving state. This study takes the view that modern nation states have 
implicitly assumed that, in the criminal justice system, both the investigators and 
the investigated would speak the same national language. However, the above 
assumption does not hold for nation states undergoing globalisation. When the 
investigators and the investigated speak different languages, there are 
considerable possibilities where legal decisions, in particular conviction, could be 
made on false grounding. This causes problems for both of the above parties, 
namely injustice and questions arise about the legitimacy of the state: the former 
is one manifestation of the detrimental effects of globalisation on individual 
migrants; the latter could be an indication that the state was unable to respond 
effectively to the impact of globalisation. This is why the language barrier 
problem merits study within the context of globalisation. Consequently, this 
study examines to what extent the border of the migrant receiving state blurred, 
and for whom that rendered benefit or detrimental effects. In the meantime, 
examining whether and in what way the use of power was checked would 
demonstrate how the rights of those who had been subjected to the state"s 
sovereign power were protected. It is at this juncture where the issues of 
18 
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citizenship rights and human rights demand attention in a study of globalisation 
such as this research. 
The above interaction between international labour migration and the 
criminal justice administration within the process of globalisation could be studied 
in various contexts. However, this study pays particular attention to the case of 
the migration from East Asia, in particular from Thailand to Japan since the 1970s 
for the following reasons: first, the language barrier problem clearly reflects the 
shift in Japan's international relations in recent decades. Post-war Japan had 
assumed that its society was ethnically homogenous. 45 As such, foreigners' 
involvement in crime was deemed to have been limited in its extent. In contrast, 
as will be shown in this study, the increase in the number of migrant workers 
since the 1980s was accompanied by a rise in the number of crimes committed by 
foreigners. In other words, one of the reasons for the emergence of the language 
barrier problem in Japan is because, since the mid-1970s, migrant workers have 
originated from places where there were no effective colonial linkages in the first 
half of the twentieth century. Because the acceptance of international migrant 
workers in Japan was delayed by about three decades in comparison to other 
developed countries in Western Europe and North America, the challenge that 
Japan has been facing from migration constitutes an important test case for the 
relation between migration and the state within globalisation process. 
Second, trade and capital mobility between the North and South can 
contribute to the creation of structural conditions for international labour 
45 For the detailed analysis of implausibility of this assumption, see Michael Weiner (ed. ), Japan's 
; 1.1jnoritie's: The illusion of 
homogeneihy (London: Routledge, 1997). 
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migration, for the reasons that will be explained in Chapter 2. Because such a 
relation does exist between Thailand and Japan, it is possible to expect that there 
will be international labour migration between these two countries. 
Third, the language barrier could emerge most starkly between Thailand 
and Japan because of the language used in those countries and the characteristics 
of Thai migrant workers. In the case of Thai migrant workers, it is less likely that 
they would have command of the Japanese language, in comparison to the 
workers of other origins. In addition, a considerable amount of Thai migrant 
workers were, at least up to the early 1990s, women. Dealing with women poses 
yet another challenge to the receiving state, because, as will be shown in Chapter 
2, the state has been thought to be patriarchal in its character, and not necessarily 
always fully capable of addressing the various interests of women. 
Fourth, the language barrier problem will continue to be an important 
challenge for Japan in the near future, considering the fact that international 
labour migration is expected to sustain in the region in the coming few decades, 
due to (i) the potential for demographic46 and economic growth, 47 both of which 
could provide structural conditions for labour mobility for the sending countries. 
(ii) The indigenous labour supply in Japan is expected to decline in the coming 
few decades because of the aging of the society. Thus issues relating to 
international labour migration continue to be relevant in the region, in particular 
for Japan. Because discussing the language barrier problem involves considering 
the above-mentioned issues, this study will hopefully be able to extend the 
46 Graeme Hugo, The Demographic Underpinnings of Current and Future International Migration 
in Asia', a. v'ian and Pacific Migration Journal, 7(l), 1998, pp. 1-25. 
4' T. J. Pempel, 'Transpacific Torn', in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (eds), Network 
Power, Japan and Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 47-82, p. 47. 
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understanding on the relation between globalisation and Japan, and also the 
relations between globalisation, migration and the state. More specifically, such 
relations refer to state's capability to: (i) transform its form and function in the 
face of challenges from international labour migration as a force of globalisation: 
and (ii) realise justice among those of the population with different attributes, 
including nationals and non-nationals, within the territory of the state, during or 
after the above transformation. 
2. Strength and Weakness of the Literature on 
Globalisation, Migration and Japan 
Having confirmed the relevance of current international labour migration to 
contemporary Japan within the context of globalisation, the following presents the 
areas relating to recent labour migration to Japan that have been discussed by the 
existing works in English. In terms of focal points of the study, these existing 
works have covered proposals for Japan's immigration policy, reports on the 
formation of migrants" identities in Japan, and accounts of the attempts to extend 
citizenship rights to migrant workers and their family. In the meantime, for 
analytical purposes, it is possible to classify the existing works in terms of the 
notion of the citizenship rights that T. H. Marshall advanced, namely civil rights, 
political rights and social rights. 
48 Such classification is possible. because 
Japan's response (be it by the state or civil society actors) to the increase in 
411 T. H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', in T. H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore. 
('iti: enship and Social ('lass (London: Pluto, 1992), pp. 1-51, p. 8. 
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migrants directly affects the status of those migrants already in Japan. From this 
viewpoint, the existing works have discussed the economic and social rights of 
citizenship, as will be shown below. 
The main point of the work by Shimada, 49 one of the leading labour 
economists in Japan, was to present a new legal framework to allow semi-skilled 
migrant workers to find fixed-term temporary employment, under which the 
migrant workers would be supposedly free from exploitation by migration brokers 
and illegal employers. In contrast to Shimada, who was cautious against 
accepting large numbers of migrant workers, Oka50 claimed that an increased 
degree of acceptance of migrant workers would be unavoidable for Japan in the 
near future due to its demographics, namely the aging of the society. He then 
proposed the following points to be included in Japan's migration policy: granting 
amnesty to those overstaying on their visa; protecting human rights of foreigners, 
including undocumented workers; reclassification of `unskilled' worker status; 
migration-prevention in the sending country through development assistance; and 
the compilation of an overall plan on migration,, learning from the experiences 
of the other migrant receiving countries of the North. Komai's work 51 was one of 
the earliest works that has described in detail the challenges that migrant workers 
faced in Japan since the 1980s, namely labour conditions, housing and living 
conditions, from the perspective of a Sociologist. 
4 `' Haruo Shimada, Japan 's "Guest {Workers ": Issues and Public Policies (Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1994). 
50 Takashi Oka, Pr: t'ing Open the Door: Foreign It'orker, 5' in Japan (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie 
I ndowment for International Peace, 1994). 
s' Hiroshi Kornai, , 1lirant Itorkers in 
Japan (London: Kegan Paul International, 1995). 
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The chapters in the volume edited by Douglass and Roberts52 collectively 
show that a multicultural society arrived in Japan. Issues covered in this volume 
include the working and living conditions of migrant workers and their families. 
In addition, the volume documented that, in the early 1990s, there was a clear 
distinction between the policy response of local governments and central 
government towards legal migrant workers. Problems that arise from the lack of 
coordination between labour law or civil law on the one hand, and the 
Immigration Control Act on the other, were also reported in this volume. 
Meanwhile, Papademetriou and Hamilton53 argue that, due to the demographical 
trend in the coming decades, the Japanese economy will have to accept an 
increasing number of migrant workers in order to sustain its operation, including 
social welfare provision to the rapidly aging population. Citing the two 
documents published by the government in 2000 ('The Frontier Within: 
Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium' by the 
Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century) and `Basic 
Plan for Immigration Control (2nd edition)' by the Ministry of Justice, the authors 
identified an indication of policy change (though not the actual practice) towards a 
greater acceptance of migrant workers in Japan. They also called for introducing 
transparent and flexible immigration policies for successful labour immigration in 
the future. 
52 Mike Douglass and Glenda S. Roberts (eds. ), Japan and Global , tligration: Foreign xorker. ý 
and the advent (? I 'a multicultural soeievv (London: Routledge, 1997). 
S. 11 Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kimberly A. Hamilton, Reinventing Japan: Immigration 's 
Role in Shaping Japans Future (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2000). 
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Having outlined extensively the demography and attributes of migrant 
workers in contemporary Japan, Sel lek, 54 the leading scholar in UK on recent 
labour migration issues in Japan, accounted for the principles of Japan's 
immigration control policy, including the informal mechanisms for accepting 
unskilled foreign labour. Her study then finds that, contrary to Japanese 
government's initial expectations in the early, migrant workers are not staying 
temporarily but in fact, some are settling down in Japan. Thus foreign workers 
are changing from `workers' to `social beings. '55 In this context she examined the 
impact of the presence of migrant workers on Japanese society, with particular 
attention to problems related to social welfare and medical care, education of 
foreign children, and international marriage between Japanese nationals and 
foreign partners. The roles that local governments and NGOs played in 
addressing the above issues are also reported. Identifying an indication that 
central government appears to be preparing for a change in immigration policy, 
Sellek argues that Japan will have to transform its policy to accept an increasing 
number of migrant workers to sustain its economy and society. 
As has already been shown above, the existing literature covers the issues 
of extension and application of economic and social rights to the migrant workers 
and their families in Japan. However, the matters related to civil rights, such as 
the right to a fair trial, or fair treatment before the law, have been less frequently 
discussed. For example, Kornai remarked that `high-handedness' of Immigration 
Bureau officials against undocumented migrants `betray[s] any pretension of 
51 Sellek, IfigranI Labour in Japan. 
55 Sellek, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
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respect for human rights', 56 but the criminal justice process proper was out of the 
scope of his research. Terasawa reported the cases where the lack of command of 
Japanese caused a problem for migrant workers: for example, there were reports 
of Japanese men who took advantage of women migrant workers' illiteracy in 
Japanese to carry out `fake' divorce. 57 Roberts recorded a case in which staff of a 
women's shelter in Japan negotiated with the city social welfare office to allow 
foreign women's children into day-care facilities even if the women are 
overstayers. '58 The above accounts by Terasawa and Roberts are certainly related 
to the language barrier and the extension of citizenship rights to foreigners, but 
these are related to civil cases rather than criminal cases, in which the roles of the 
state are substantially different, namely whether it operates as an arbitrator of 
contending interests, or exercises penal power against convicts. 
As far as this study has managed to identify, the following three works in 
English discussed the language barrier problem. While developing his argument 
that the notion of `foreigner crime' was socially constructed and exaggerated, 
Herbert 59 referred to the language barrier problem as one aspect of issues related 
to crime committed by foreigners. Drawing on an example of rather primitive 
confusion that the police officer made during an investigation concerning a 
migrant worker who was suspected of a crime, Herbert argued that `interpreting is 
56 Kornai, Migrant 61'orkers in Japan, pp. 14-15. 
57 Katsuko Terasawa, `Labor law, civil law, immigration law and the reality of migrants and their 
children', in Douglass and Roberts (eds), Japan and Global Migration, pp. 219-243, p. 237. 
5' Glenda S. Roberts, `NGO support for migrant labor in Japan, in Douglass and Roberts (eds), op. 
cit., pp. 275-300, p. 292. 
s" Wolfgang Herbert, Foreign Workers and Law Enforcement in Japan (London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1996). 
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the most demanding problem in criminal procedure for foreigners. ' 60 Tsuda6' 
discussed the status of the language barrier problem in Japan's criminal justice 
system, and called for close monitoring of the practice in judicial interpretation. 
He also advocated improving practices to comply with international human rights. 
The focal point of Hanami's discussion on the language barrier62 was broader than 
the above two works, in that he made it clear that the language barrier existed in 
prison, in addition to the investigation and public trial phases. He also reported 
that a certain degree of effort had been made by the courts towards reducing the 
extent of the language barrier problem. 
The above existing works provide this current study with invaluable 
insights into the language barrier problem. As far as the analysis of the language 
barrier problem is concerned, however, this study is going to fill the existing 
analytical gaps concerning the language barrier in the following three respects. 
(i) Characterisation of the language barrier problem: whereas the existing 
studies characterise the language barrier solely as a challenge for migrant 
workers, this study also sees the problem as a challenge to the basic function 
of the Japanese state, namely the administration of justice. 
(ii) Actors responded: whereas the existing studies have investigated into 
some parts of policy process, such as the reaction of the police and the 
courts, this study examines other relevant actors, namely public prosecutors, 
defence counsels and parliament. 
60 Herbert, Foreign 11'orkers and Law Enforcement in Japan, p. 247. 
61 Mamoru Tsuda, 'Human Rights Problems of Foreigners in Japan's Criminal Justice System', 
Migration II'orld A>aga: ine, 25(1-2), 1997, pp. 22-25. 
`'' Tadashi Hanami, 'Japanese Policies on the Rights and Benefits Granted to Foreign Workers, 
Residents, Refugees and Illegals', in Myron Weiner and Tadashi Hanami (eds), Temporary 
{Porkers or Future Citi=cns": Japanese and U. S. , 'Migration Policies (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1998), pp. 211 -2 3 7. 
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(iii) Period of research: whereas the existing studies have covered the first 
half of the 1990s, this study covers up to 2003. 
3. Research Questions, Methodology, Structure and 
Contributions of the Study to Knowledge 
(1) Research Questions 
The above background renders the following research questions for this study. 
The main question to ask is: How did international labour migration and the 
language barrier as force of globalisation affect the Japanese state, and how did 
the Japanese state respond to the challenge from the language barrier? The above 
main question can be broken down into subsidiary questions asked within the 
current contemporary Japanese context as follows: 
(i) In what way is international labour migration a force of globalisation? 
(ii) In what way is the language barrier a manifestation of international 
labour migration as a currently ongoing process of globalisation? 
(iii) What is the language barrier, and who will be affected by it? 
(iv) Who in Japan responded to the language barrier problem? Was it only 
state officials in the criminal justice administration, or civil society actors as 
well? If civil society actors were instrumental to the response, how did they 
interact with the state actors? 
(v) Was the Japanese state capable of responding to the language barrier 
problem as a force of globalisation by altering a part of its organisation and 
the way it works? In this study, the capability of the state to respond to 
consequences of globalisation, in particular the language barrier problem, 
refers to: (1) whether the entire extent of detrimental effects in society were 
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reduced; and (2) in what way the above reduction of the detrimental effects 
was distributed within the society. 
(2) Methodology 
In order to answer the above questions, this study employs the research strategy as 
shown below. While primarily a study in International Relations and International 
Political Economy, this study takes an interdisciplinary approach, drawing mainly 
from the insights of Sociology and Gender Studies on migration in Chapters 2 and 
6. It also learns from Japanese law concerning criminal justice administration. 
Because this research examines the events that took place in the relatively recent 
past, research methods employed here are documentary research of secondary and 
tertiary documents complemented by semi-structured interviews. Fieldwork trips 
were conducted for this research in Thailand and Japan in 2001 and 2002, for the 
duration of six months in total. The documents studied include White Papers and 
official statistics of the Immigration Bureau, the Police, the Ministry of Justice, 
and the Supreme Court; case laws; publications by defence lawyers and civil 
rights campaigners (both in Thailand and Japan); minutes of parliamentary 
debates, and academic studies on economic development and labour migration in 
Thailand, and those on Japan's migration, political economy and criminal 
procedure. 
In order to complement the findings of the documentary research, the 
author also conducted interview with sixteen research collaborators. Starting 
from a number of key research collaborators. the so-called snow ball method was 
used to identify the additional interviewees for further information. In the end the 
28 
CHAPTER 1 
author managed to meet those who performed important roles in the developments 
over the language barrier problem, including a judge who made a crucial decision 
concerning the Japanese state's handling of the language barrier problem. another 
one who was in charge of the compilation and implementation of the training 
policy for the court interpreters; defence attorneys who have worked in the cases 
of foreign defendants; civil rights campaigners who noticed the implications of 
the language barrier problem and made the issue known to the wider Japanese 
society. In addition, the author was able to meet one civil rights campaigner in 
Thailand who migrated to Japan earlier; and an attorney at law in Thailand who 
used to work as a judicial interpreter. The choice of the questions during the 
interview was sometimes flexible, but in principle the following questions were 
posed during those semi-structured interviews: first, when and how the language 
barrier affected the interviewee in her/his tasks? Second, why did she/he address 
the language barrier? Third, how did she/he tackle the language barrier? Fourth, 
How did she/he assess the current status of the language barrier problem in 
Japan's criminal justice system? Fifth, in addition to the interviewee 
herself/himself, who else contributed to reducing the extent of the language 
barrier problem? Thus, this study is possibly the first one to discuss the language 
barrier problem with interviews with judges, defence counsels, and Thai nationals 
who are involved in the language barrier issue. A full list of the interviewees is 
presented in the Appendix at the end of this study. The period of research is from 
the early 1990s when the problem was discovered, and then subsequently 
addressed by the actors in the Japanese state and civil society, up to the present 
time. 
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(3) Structure of the Study 
The structure of this study is as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 present a theoretical 
framework to analyse the language barrier problem and responses to it. In order 
to identify the implications of foreign crime control for the migrant receiving 
country, Chapter 2 examines contending theoretical approaches to the following 
concepts: globalisation, international labour migration, international structure and 
the state, policy-making in domestic politics, and citizenship and state-building. 
Chapter 3 carries out similar tasks to the previous chapter, but aims to work out a 
framework that is specifically applicable to the contemporary Japanese context, 
since its international and domestic structures are different from those of other 
countries or regions, which is the case for any other countries or regions. 
Chapter 4 and 5 employ the above analytical framework in order to 
investigate and explain empirically the background of the language barrier 
problem, its emergence and the responses to it. Chapter 4 studies the relation 
between Japan's response to its international structure from the 1970s onwards 
and international labour migration from Thailand, with particular attention paid to 
the role of international capital mobility as a cause of structural conditions for 
labour mobility. It will show that recent international labour migration from East 
Asia to Japan is a manifestation of Japan's re-entry into the region within the 
context of the progression of globalisation and the ending of the Cold War. 
Chapter 5 considers the emergence of. and Japan's response to, the language 
barrier problem in the 1990s. It first identifies the significance of the language 
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barrier problem within Japan's international context in the post-Cold War years. 
The chapter then examines the legal and political implications of the language 
barrier, before reporting the responses that various actors in Japan made 
concerning the challenge from this manifestation of the globalisation process. 
Chapter 6 summarises the findings of the preceding chapters, before 
moving on to answer the research questions, and to contemplate upon the 
implications of these findings in a wider context in the later sections of Chapter 6. 
In particular, the significance of the above findings will be considered in the final 
chapter with regard to the following relations within the context of globalisation: 
(i) globalisation and the Japanese state; (ii) state and civil society in Japan; and 
(iii) the Japanese state and individual migrant workers. 
(4) Argument and Contributions 
The argument of this study is as follows: Even though it was partially constrained 
by the language barrier problem, by the late 1990s Japan's criminal justice 
administration was able to reduce substantially the extent of such constraint, and 
became able to argue (if implicitly) that its criminal justice administration 
operates legally in investigating and convicting foreigners suspected of offence. 
Hence, as far as the language barrier problem is concerned, the Japanese state was 
able to respond to such a challenge arising from international labour migration as 
a force of globalisation, and was able to maintain its legitimacy, which will be 
contrary to the expectation of advocates of the Hyperglobalist thesis. The 
implications of the above findings to the relation between globalisation, the 
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changing population that constitutes the contemporary society in Japan. and the 
Japanese state will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
This introductory chapter concludes with the list of contributions this 
study makes to knowledge: 
a. The study is possibly the first to theorise that recent international labour 
migration to Japan reflects Japan's increasing re-engagement with East Asia after 
the ending of the Cold War, with capital export from Japan to the region 
contributing to the creation of structural conditions for population mobility. 
b. The study shows that manifestations of globalisation force may vary between 
different parts of the world during the same period in time, by characterising 
international labour migration in East Asia since the 1970s as such a force, in 
contrast to Western Europe or North America where the migration is sometimes 
dismissed from such a force. 
c. The study has theorised that controlling crime committed by foreigner is the 
migrant receiving state's response to a challenge from international labour 
migration as a force of globalisation. To show this in the contemporary Japanese 
context, the study conducted research into Japan's criminal procedure law 
(Constitution; law regulating immigration control, the police, public prosecutors, 
defence counsels, court; and parliament). Existing studies on the language barrier 
problem in Japan have characterised the language barrier as a challenge for 
foreigners suspected of committing an offence, but not for the state. In this 
respect, this study approaches the language barrier problem in a way that has 
possibly not been pursued in English yet. 
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d. As far as the author of this study is aware, no study has discussed the language 
barrier problem in such detail. In addition, the study has examined the language 
barrier problem from an interdisciplinary perspective, this is probably the first 
piece of literature to discuss the language barrier problem in Japan: being mainly 
a study in International Relations and International Political Economy, it has also 
learned from the insights of the Sociology of international labour migration, and 
gender studies. 
e. The study has carried out documentary research on the following materials, and 
conducted semi-structured interviews with the following people who were 
involved in the language barrier problem in the 1990s. Also presented are 
empirical findings concerning the language barrier problem in Japan for the entire 
period of the 1990s (the existing studies on the problem covered up to the early 
1990s), which are probably the first to be reported in English: 
(i) Secondary and tertiary documents 
" White Papers of Japan's National Police Agency, and of the Ministry of 
Justice. 
" Court administration statistics of Japan's Supreme Court 
" Minutes of Japan's parliamentary debates 
(ii) Interviewees 
" Four judges and five defence counsels in Japan; and more than five 
leading civil rights campaigners in Japan and Thailand 
0A former migrant worker and a former judicial interpreter from 
Thailand 
f. This is possibly among the first studies to discuss globalisation. international 
labour migration, the state and the problem of justice in contemporary Japan in 
one single study. 
ýý 
CHAPTER 2 
GLOBALISATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION, AND THE 
STATE: MANAGEMENT OF THE STATE-SOCIETY RELATION 
IN AN ERA OF GLOBALISATION 
1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to demonstrate an analytical framework for considering 
implications of the state's response to a force of globalisation, in particular to 
international labour migration, to the relation between the migrant receiving state 
and the migrants who are present within the jurisdiction of the state. Such a 
framework will be carved out through examining the contending approaches to 
the concepts of globalisation, international labour migration and the state. In 
section 2, the following question will be asked: is the force of globalisation 
uncontrollable and unstoppable; if so, has the state become obsolete as an 
effective institution for managing contending interests, not only between the states 
but also other actors, in world politics? These questions will be asked in order to 
present how globalisation is envisaged by this study. The section will show that 
claims that would answer the above questions in affirmative are less persuasive 
than they would initially appear. 
Section 3 presents this study's understanding on international labour 
migration as a force of globalisation. For that purpose, the following questions 
will be posed: are individual migrants and the countries from which they migrate 
CHAPTER 2 
(migrant sending countries) solely responsible for labour migration? To what 
extent can various contexts that exist in the country where the migrants arrive 
(migrant receiving country) be attributed to international labour migration? Are 
the sending and receiving countries the only actors operating in the context of 
population mobility? Is international labour migration a consequence of 
globalisation, or is it a force of globalisation? This section will show that the 
process of international labour migration is much more complicated than some 
depictions of common perceptions on migration would suggest. Namely. 
population mobility is mediated by non-state actors, despite their presence has not 
fully been acknowledged in some of IR/IPE literature. To conceive international 
labour migration as a collective force for which each individual migrant is entirely 
responsible will have implications when considering the relation between 
globalisation, international labour migration and the state. Section 4 of the current 
chapter investigates theoretically how could international economic force, a key 
driving force of globalisation, have impact on the state, and what would be the 
consequences of such impact. In addition, this section asks the following 
questions: among the various theoretical approaches to the state in International 
Relations, which one is more capable of explaining the impact of international 
economic force on the operation of the state? What actors in a state would 
respond to new developments in the international and domestic environment, and 
how? What about the role of civil society actors? Further. what are the 
implications of the impact of globalisation force upon the state, to the relation 
between the state, civil society and the individuals that constitute the state? The 
section will indicate that international economic force does affect operation of the 
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state both from outside and inside, and different actors of the state and civil 
society are capable of responding to such effects in different manners. In addition, 
it will be pointed out that, considering the fact that it is historically contingent, the 
currently accepted consensus on the relation between individuals, civil society and 
the state is likely to be reconfigured within the context of currently ongoing 
globalisation. Findings from theoretical investigations listed above collectively 
serve as a general framework for analysis for the entire study. 
2. Conceptualising Globalisation 
(1) Three Approaches to Conceptualising Globalisation and 
the Role of the State 
In Chapter 1, this study characterised the term globalisation as an analytical aid 
for describing, investigating and explaining the developments in contemporary 
world politics, which was frequently used in the 1990s. Being aware that it is a 
heavily contested concept, this study envisages globalisation in the following 
manner: First, from the viewpoint of those who are influenced by the process, 
globalisation can be described as: 
`[T]he process of increasing interconnectedness between societies such that 
events in one part of the world more and more have effects on peoples and 
societies far away. 
"I 
' Steve Smith and John Baylis, `Introduction', in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), 
The Globalization of 'World Politics: An introduction to international relations 
(Second Edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-12. p. 7. 
,6 
CHAPTER 2 
In contrast, the following definition is helpful in drawing analytical attention to 
what the causes of globalisation are, and what is at stake: 
`[T]he emergence of a set of sequences and processes that are increasingly 
unhindered by territorial and jurisdictional barriers and that indeed enhance 
the spread of trans-border practices in economic, political, cultural and 
social domains. '2 
The significance of the changes to distance and territory in world politics, which 
the above two definitions refer to, becomes clearer when historical forms of the 
state are taken into consideration. This is because the linkage between political 
power and territorial demarcation has been one of the core characteristics of the 
current form of organisation of political community, namely the nation state. The 
state form that preceded the nation state is the empire up to the fourteenth century, 
and the boundaries between the empires were overlapping and ambiguous. 3 
However, during the development of monarchies in Europe from the fifteenth to 
eighteenth centuries, the shape of the state was determined in terms of 'its size, 
external form, ethnic composition, organizational structure, material infrastructure 
and so on. '4 This was followed by the establishment and consolidation of the 
modern nation state from the late eighteenth century, in particular in the 
nineteenth century onwards. In addition to the territory, major characteristics of 
the modern nation state that were institutionalised include: (i) monopolistic 
control of the means of violence; (ii) `impersonal structure of power' (i. e., 
2 Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Wang ick, 'Research 
Agenda', http: //www. warwick. ac. uk/fac/soc/CSGR/agenda. html. (Cited November 2002) 
3 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldbratt and Jonathan Perraton, Global 
Transfcwmutions: Politic.. Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polit\, 1999). pp. 2-35. 
' Held et al., Global Transformations, p. 36. 
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bureaucracy, as opposed to religious control); and (iii) claim to legitimacy. The 
above account shows that the assumption over `autonomy of the self-sufficient 
nation state', which used to prevail particularly in the 193 0s, 6 is historically 
contingent. What has been taking place in the last few decades is that the 
importance of land and territory for politics is in relative decline, though not 
becoming irrelevant. This development is such that it can be described as 
becoming increasingly difficult to assume `the separation between the national 
and international, the political and the economic' as given. ' 
While civil society actors and individuals are by themselves affected by 
the progression of globalisation, states are also under the influence, thus the 
capacity of the state to cope with the forces of rapid change [arising from 
globalisation is] being tested. ' 8 In addition, such impact on the state further 
affects its population. Held et al. argue that globalisation's impact on modem 
nation states includes at least the following four aspects. First, political power is 
`shared and bartered' by different levels of governments, namely national, 
regional and international. 9 Second, even though `national sovereignty ... 
[has] 
... 
not at all ... subverted, 
' 10 `the notion of sovereignty as an illimitable, indivisible 
and exclusive form of public power' is being reconfigured by `criss-crossing 
loyalties, conflicting interpretations of rights and duties, interconnected legal and 
5 Held et al., op. cit., pp. 45-46. 
6 E. A. Brett, The World Economy since the War: the Politics of Uneven Development. 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), p. 2. 
Brett, The World Economy since the War, p. 18. 
8 Charles W. Kegle}. Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation 
(Eighth Edition) (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001), p. 303. 
`' Held et at., op. cit., p. 80. 
10 Ibid., p. 81. 
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authority structures, etc. " 1 The increasing significance of regionalisation projects 
such as EU and NAFTA are cases in point. In addition, political power is also 
`shared and bartered' at sub-state (local government) level. While the above two 
carry much significance for the study of globalisation in general, the following 
two kinds of impact on the state are also important for the current study. This is 
because they matter to implications of the state's response to the challenge from 
globalisation to the population to which the state is responsible, as will be 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this study. 
Third, the relation between the exercise of state power and accountability 
is changing. Held et al. wrote: 
`In a world where powerful states make decisions not just for their own 
people but for others as well, and where transnational actors and forces cut 
across the boundaries of national communities in diverse ways, the questions 
of who should be accountable to whom, and on what basis, do not easily 
resolve themselves. ' 12 
The above point may have assumed a situation where the power of state A extends 
beyond the geographical territory, reaching the population in the jurisdiction of 
state B in a distant place. This study will investigate cases where state A's power 
extends to the population of country B, but who are present within the territory of 
state A, a situation which could take place after international labour migration. 
Fourth and related to the above, because of the blurring of the 
" Ibid., p. 81. 
12 Ibid., p. 81. 
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domestic/international and political/economic distinctions, world politics is 
becoming, if only partially, trans-territorial. 
`Political space for the development and pursuit of effective government and 
the accountability of power is no longer coterminous with a delimited 
political territory. Contemporary forms of political globalisation involve a 
deterritorialisation of political authority. ' 13 
As has already been mentioned above, such `deterritorialisation of political 
authority' could take place within the geographical territory of one state due to the 
impact of globalisation, namely international labour migration. In other words, 
globalisation renders `change in constituency of the state'. 14 Problems of the 
accountability of political power merit an analysis in this study in this context. 
Having seen the above, yet another definition of globalisation, "the growth of 
`supraterritorial' relations between people, " 15 where developments in human 
action are increasingly detached from territorial logic, renders an abstract but 
persuasive definition. 
In the following, this study is going to compare contending approaches to 
understanding globalisation, in order to justify this study's conceptualisation of 
globalisation shown above. For the purpose of taking a succinct survey of these 
approaches, the accounts of Held and McGrew are useful. According to Held and 
McGrew, the first of the three approaches is what they called the Hyperglobalists. 
Proponents of this approach tend to see globalisation in terms of globalisation of 
the economy brought about by `the establishment of transnational networks of 
1' Ibid., p. 81. 
Jan Aart Scholte. Glohalization: a critical introduction (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 135. 
15 Scholte, Globalization, p. 46. 
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production, trade and finance', with the possible consequence being `traditional 
nation-states as the primary economic and political units of world society' will 
eventually be supplanted by such globalised economy. ' 6 Held and McGrew 
included both neoliberal and radical/neo-Marxist accounts as Hyperglobalists. 
While there is `considerable normative divergence' between them, these two 
accounts share convictions that the developments in economy have been driving 
globalisation, and globalisation has produced both winners and losers. 17 
Advocates of this notion would claim, regarding the socio-economic 
consequences, that the winners in economic globalisation are "the elites and 
`knowledge workers"', and they have established "transnational `class' 
allegiances, " which was reinforced by the neoliberal economic ideology. 18 The 
political implication of globalisation could be the emergence of `a radically new 
world order [... ] which prefigures the demise of the nation state. ' 19 Hyperglobalist 
claims tend to overgeneralise their observations, which will be examined later in 
this section. 
The second approach is sceptical about the claims of the Hyperglobalists. 
Advocates of this second view would assume an `ideal type' of globalisation, and 
claim that the current degree of economic activities is far from meeting the above 
ideal type of the globalised economy. The sceptics would also contend, according 
to Held and McGrew, that: `the historical evidence at best confirms only 
heightened levels of internationalisation, that is, interactions between 
16 Held et al., op. cit., p. 3. 
1' Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
18 Ibid., p. 4. 
19 Ibid., p. 4. 
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predominantly national economies. ' 20 The dynamics within the `alleged' 
globalisation is regionalisation in the world economy, namely in Europe, Asia- 
Pacific and North America. 21 States have maintained, from this viewpoint, their 
political significance through regulatory capacities and promoting `cross-border 
economic activity. ' 22 The sceptics may be effective in cancelling out the 
overgeneralisation of the Hyperglobalist claims, but by aiming to do so, the 
sceptic account may overlook the significance of the developments to the political 
economy during the last few decades. 
The third approach, which is distinct from both of the above, is called 
"hransformationalist. ' Proponents of this thesis would conceive globalisation as a 
historically unprecedented process where `governments and societies across the 
globe are having to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction 
between international and domestic, external and internal affairs. ' 23 The 
dynamics behind globalisation is `the growing deterritorialization of economic 
activity as production and finance increasingly acquire a global and transnational 
dimension. '24 The socio-economic consequence involves `new patterns of global 
stratification', where "North and South, First World and Third World, are no 
longer `out there' but nestled together with all the world's major cities. "25 With 
regard to the political implications of globalisation, the Transformationalists 
would juxtapose "the ultimate legal claim to `effective supremacy over what 
occurs within their territories' [... ] with the expanding jurisdiction of institutions 
20 Ibid., p. 5. 
21 Ibid., p. 5. 
22 Ibid., p. 6. 
23 Ibid., p. 7. 
` Ibid., p. 8. 
25 Ibid., p. 8. 
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of international governance and the constraints of, as well as the obligations 
derived from, international law. , 26 Adherents of the Transformationalist approach 
would recognise the `emergence of powerful new non-territorial forms of 
economic and political organisation in the global domain, such as multinational 
corporations, transnational social movements, international regulatory agencies, 
etc. ' 27 In order to adjust themselves to the globalised world, states have 
`reconstituted and restructured' their political capacity. 28 As for historical 
consequences, the Transformationalist would consider globalisation to be `a long- 
term historical process which is inscribed with contradictions and which is 
significantly shaped by conjunctural factors. '29 The Transformationalist concept is 
balanced and draws a more accurate picture of the recent and the current 
developments than the above two would do. There will be a comparison between 
the Hyperglobalist and the Transfomationalist accounts later in this section. 
(2) Comparing the Hyperglobalist and the Transformationalist Theses of 
Globalisation 
This section is going to compare the Hyperglobalist and the Transformationalist 
theses of globalisation, in order to consider whether and in what respects the 
notion of the `demise of the state' in the era of globalisation can be plausible. The 
reason for making this comparison is because the above notion of the weakening 
of the state is not so convincing: as far as the relation between the state and the 
10 Ibid., p. 8. 
'' Ibid., p. 9. 
`'R Ibid., p. 9. 
29 Ibid., p. 7. 
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population that migrate internationally is concerned, the former continues to 
maintain control over this relation. Such continued state's ability to control 
appears to apply to the case of the Japanese state as well as other migrant 
receiving countries, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
a. Main claims of the Hyperglobalist thesis 
(a) Ohmae's claim 
As a part of this comparison, the accounts by Ohmae and Strange are referred here. 
Both of them are considered to have advanced the Hyperglobalist thesis. In 
Borderless World, Ohmae displayed abundant accounts of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) that were operating in more than one country. In this new 
international business environment, it is an imperative of the MNCs to be able to 
meet demands of customers worldwide, who are able to obtain the information on 
the available goods and services regardless of their geographical location. 30 
Technological developments, particularly information technology, are the driving 
force of the globalisation of production, marketing and consumption. In addition, 
the surge in the volume of foreign exchange trade, which became possible because 
of technological development and financial deregulation in the industrialised 
countries, was also driving forces of globalisation. 31 In the meantime, states were 
unable to adapt themselves to the globalising economy, because `economic 
30 Kenichi Ohmae. The Borderless World: Power and Strategy' in the Interlinked Economy. 
London: Collins, 1990. p. 185. 
31 Ohmae, The Borderless 11'orld, pp. 161-163. 
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policies based on conventional macroeconomic statistics that compare one nation 
against another' would not work effectively any longer. 32 Ohmae declared that 
the arrival of the global economy was as follows: 
`The global economy follows its own logic and develops its own webs of 
interest, which rarely duplicate the historical borders between nations. As a 
result, national interest as an economic, as opposed to a political, reality has 
lost much of its meaning. '33 
He then contended that states were becoming obsolete, and that they should 
minimise their roles in the global economy to night watchers. 34 Ohmae's 
accounts were based on his working experiences with various multinational 
companies. His claims about globalisation carry the following characteristics. 
First, he overgeneralises the facts about some of multinational corporations as if 
applicable to the entire world economy. Second, his claims contain technological 
determinism. Third, he tends to give limited historical account and background of 
economic events. Fourth, his accounts are based the distinct state-market 
dichotomy. Fifth and finally, he distinguishes economy and politics. 
(h) Strange's argument 
There is a certain similarity in Ohmae's claims on globalisation and Strange's 
conceptualisation of it. She found technological developments to be the driving 
;' Ohmae, op. cit., p. xi. 
3i Ibid., p. 183. 
34 Ibid., p. x. pp. 12-1 3. 
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force of the globalisation process, 35 and that states (in particular the US) have lost 
their power in relation to the market. 36 But Strange did not go as far as 
dismissing the state as totally irrelevant in the international political economy, as 
Ohmae did. Hence, even though they appear to share certain points in common, 
Strange's works were out of normative concern. In this respect Strange was much 
different than Ohmae, who was able to celebrate the increased activities of 
multinational corporations for the benefits of the 'have's' of the North. From the 
above two somehow similar but qualitatively different representative cases, the 
main claims of the Hyperglobalist thesis can be characterised as follows: (i) the 
emergence of a global economy where businesses operate with their own logic; 
(ii) technological evolution as the driving force of globalisation, and (iii) states' 
loss of power to the market. In addition to the above, Amoore et al. found that 
some of the existing analyses of globalisation tend to depoliticise this process by 
covering the existence of such social agencies as `the state, social movements and 
organised labour' which do operate in the globalisation process. Amoore et al. 
described the above tendency `teleology', with a possible consequence being the 
assumption that the process of globalisation is benign. 37 
35 Susan Strange, 'Wake Up, Krasner! The World Has Changed', Review of International Political 
Economy, 1(2), 1994, pp. 209-219, pp. 210-211. 
z`' Strange, 'Wake Up, Krasner! ', p. 213. 
i' Louise Amoore, Richard Dodgson, Barry K. Gills, Paul Langley, Don Marshall and lain 
Watson, 'Overturning "Globalization": Resisting the Teleological, Reclaiming the 'Political", 
; 1'cºý Political Economv, 2(l), 1997, pp. 179-195, pp. 183-184. 
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b. Role of the state in globalisation 
In the following this study is going to critically assess some of the major claims of 
the Hyperglobalist thesis in comparison to that of the Transformationalist thesis. 
This assessment covers these three points: (i) has the world economy 
`globalised'?; (ii) is the technological evolution the only driving force of 
globalisation?; and (iii) does the state really not play an active role in 
globalisation process? 
(a) Internationalisation and regionalisation of the economy 
Advocates of the Hyperglobalist thesis would claim that there is now a global 
economy where `national difference [has] virtually disappeared. ' Weiss counters 
such a claim by arguing that the world economy was actually `internationalised, 
and that `national and regional differences remain substantial and national 
institutions remain significant. ' 38 The following points substantiate her claim. 
(i) In terms of the volume of economic flows, the last few decades are not 
entirely unique in history. The size of the global flow of trade and capital in the 
inter-war period was as large as today, while the trend toward greater trade 
integration was slowing down at the time of her writing. 39 
38 Linda Weiss, 'Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State', New Left Review, 225,1997. 
pp. 3-27, p. 13. 
39 Weiss, 'Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State', p. 7. 
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(ii) International economic flows do not operate as `globally' as the 
Hyperglobalist thesis would suggest. Foreign direct investment (FDI) does not 
automatically `extend economic linkages' between different countries because of 
the following reasons: much FDI goes into non-manufacturing sectors; FDI in 
manufacturing tends to be made for renewal of existing assets rather than for new 
ones; share of FDI is much smaller compared to portfolio investment (18% of the 
total long-term foreign investment of the major OECD countries in 1992). 40 In 
addition, wage level is not the only factor that influences decisions of MNCs to 
invest/disinvest, thus capital investments of MNCs are not as mobile as the 
Hyperglobalists would assert. There are MNCs that operate in their home 
countries despite high wage levels. This is because: high premiums are available 
from utilising high-technology; it is to their advantage to locate their operations 
close to the market where they can sell products and/or services using high- 
technology; and they can continuously benefit from domestic linkage for business 
operations. 41 
(iii) International economic flows do not cover geographical areas globally. 
The majority (about 90%) of production in OECD countries is within the country; 
trade occupies about 10% of their GDP. World trade concentrates around OECD 
countries; the share of those countries accounted for 84% of world trade in 1989 . 
42 
(iv) There are indications that international economic flows tend to be 
regional in their reach. Trade and investment of the North tend to be more intra- 
4" Weiss, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 
41 Ibid., p. 10. 
'' Ibid., p. I I. 
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regional rather than inter-regional. 43 Growth of capital flow since the 1970s is 
undeniable; but there is a tendency that movement of capital is intra-regional 
rather than 'global'. 
44 
Amoore et al. shared a view similar to the above, and have argued that it 
does not hold to claim that transnationalisation of business activities undermined 
the nation state. This is because `the foundations of the global economy remain 
largely national in character. ' They also claimed that `[s]tates are held to continue 
to exercise considerable authority in the management of the national economy', 
including providing the businesses the guarantee for `the rights of capital, whether 
national or foreign'. 45 
(b) Historical factors of globalisation 
It has been pointed out earlier in this chapter that the Hyperglobalist thesis, such 
as the claims of Ohmae, tends to relate technological developments as the only 
reason for globalisation. Amoore et al. saw such analysis as an 
overgeneralisation. 46 Even though attempts to discuss globalisation in a historical 
context were not entirely missing from Ohmae's work, the following historical 
accounts on the developments of the world economy (since the end of the Second 
World War) helped to conceptualise globalisation in a more balanced and 
plausible manner than resorting to technological determinism, as in Ohmae's 
a' Ibid., p. I I. 
as Ibid., p. 12. 
45 Amoore et al., `Overturning "Globalization"', pp. 185-186. 
4" Arnoore et at., op. cit., pp. 183-184. 
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claim. The accounts by McMichael and Strange tell us that significant changes in 
the managing principle of the world economy are among the major (though not 
the sole) factors that have caused globalisation. 
McMichael argued that the collapse of the Bretton Woods system meant 
that the rule of world economic management changed in the 1970s becoming a 
stricter environment. He saw these changes, including the introduction of 
Monetarist policies, as the main driving factor of globalisation. The post-war 
economic order planned by the First World involved `raising and protecting living 
standards [of the First World], and to this end [employed] massive (military and 
economic) assistance programmes. ' 47 Management of national economies was 
left to each state, with free trade `as a stimulus' for national economy 
management. A stable trade environment was envisaged when the Bretton Woods 
agreements were designed, in order to support stabilisation of `wage relation 
through rising investment (in mass production) and state subsidies (to promote 
full employment and rising consumption). ' 48 Meanwhile, the development project 
in the Third World countries was a replica of the national economy management 
of the First World. 49 The above management of the economies of the West was 
possible with the existence of the US dollar. Financial aid from the US to Europe, 
East Asia and Africa, provided within the context of the Cold War, have resulted 
in making the US dollar the international reserve currency. 50 
" Philip McMichael, `Globalization: Myth and Realities', Rural Sociology. 61(1), 1996, pp. 25-55, 
pp. 30-3 1. 
ax McMichael, `Globalization: Myth and Realities', p. 30. 
'`' McMichael, op. cit., p. 31. 
50 Ibid., p. 30. 
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However, the above economic management was not sustainable. The failure 
of developmental ism was `both cause and consequence' of the globalisation 
project. 51 In contrast to stabilising capitalism `through national economic 
management' in preceding decades, the globalisation project `seeks to stabilize 
capitalism through global economic management - this time along the lines of 
specialization, rather than replication. ' 52 The transition from the above 
developmental ism to globalisation was implemented in the following way. 
Transnational business operations or `global exchanges' have begun to `overlay' 
national economies since around the 1970s. US agribusiness was a preceding 
example of cross-border operations in Europe and East Asia, within the context of 
the US aid during the Cold War period. 53 The newly industrialised countries' 
"participation in the world market" through export-oriented industrialisation 
meant that the developmentalism has effectively ended. 54 
The presence of the US dollar outside the country in the form of aid, 
export credit and FDI created the off-shore market. The growth of the off-shore 
market undermined the Bretton Woods regime, and eventually resulted in the US 
termination of gold-dollar convertibility in 1971. Consequently foreign-exchange 
rates were set to float and became unstable. McMichael wrote: `[t]he 
fundamental monetary relations of the development project unravelled. '55 In the 
early 1980s the First World states adapted Monetarism `as a mechanism of 
restructuring the balance of power within [those states], putting labor and social 
S1 Ibid., p. 31. 
Ibid., p. 31. 
Ibid., p. 33. 
51 Ibid., p. 33. 
55 
Ibid., p. '33- 
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programmes on the defensive. '56 It was in connection with this that in 1980 the 
Federal Reserve Board of the US reduced the monetary supply. The international 
consequence of this policy included the debt crises of the Third World countries 
that had received increasing volume of commercial lending from the First World 
countries in the 1970s. 57 
Strange tells us that the root cause of the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system has existed since the years prior to the 1970s. She suggested that, even if 
it was technically unsustainable in the long run, the Bretton Woods system might 
have been managed better and the extent of the financial instability since the 
1970s might have been less. Strange cited Robert Triffin, who had continued 
warning `from 1959 on' that the Bretton Woods system would not be sustainable 
in the long term, and that eventually the US would have no choice, as the amount 
of Eurodollars (dollar IOUs in foreign hands') kept growing, than to raise the 
price of gold or to devalue the dollar. 58 In addition to the above basic problem, 
there were two more factors that kept the US balance of payment deficit growing, 
but also kept credit creation expanding in the post-war years: (a) US military 
spending in Germany, Europe, Japan and Vietnam; (b) foreign investment in 
Europe. As the EEC was set up by the 1958 Rome Treaty, it became more 
sensible for US businesses to invest in the Community and to manufacture there, 
than to export from the US. 59 The latter contributed to the creation of 
Eurocurrency markets in the 1960s and 1970s, which `put such tremendous 
pressures on the exchange rate system' that by 1973 it appeared to the US that 
56 Ibid., p. 34. 
57 
Ibid., p. 34. 
51 Susan Strange, States and Markets (Second Edition) (London: Pinter, 1994), p. 105. 
59 Strange, States and Markets, p. 106. 
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there was no choice other than to float the dollar. 60 The root causes of the 
economic troubles that appeared after the collapse of Bretton Woods were: 
`misuse [and exploitation of] the system rather than managing it, giving too 
much freedom and responsibility for credit creation to the banks [... ] It was 
the pursuit of short-term instead of long-term national interest that sowed the 
seeds of monetary disorder and financial instability [after the 1970s]. '61 
These historical accounts by McMichael and Strange not only make the 
technological generalisation regarding globalisation less plausible, but also make 
it clear that the perception of international capital flow as a benign or neutral force 
(as Ohmae appeared to have held) is an oversimplified view of the world 
economy. Distinction between the above analytical approaches (whether being 
deterministic as in the case of Ohmae's claim, or being aware of historical 
contingency) is important for this study, as much as any study on globalisation, 
because political actors would produce different planning for action from a 
different analysis, including actors of a migrant receiving state when responding 
to challenges from the international population mobility. 
(c) Role of the states in the internationalised economy 
It has been found that the Hyperglobalist thesis is less plausible than had initially 
been assumed, in terms of its explanation on the driving force and the extent of 
historical analysis. In addition, states may have been able to manoeuvre the 
Strange, op. cit., p. 106. 
`'` Ibid., p. 104. 
53 
CHAPTER 2 
globalisation process more than the above thesis suggested. First, states can 
actively participate in globalisation. Weiss argued that the East Asian economic 
development experiences since the 1970s indicated that states could compile plans 
for economic internationalisation and implement them, 62 with representative 
examples being the cases of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. 63 Second, states can 
reformulate the constitution of their operation, which is not necessarily a 
weakening of the functions. Zysman reported that some states managed to 
`reregulate' the economy, not to `deregulate' it. 64 `Reregulation' here refers to 
`reconceptualization of the rule (of economic management) and redefining the 
role of government'. 65 Similarly, Amoore et al. argued that many processes of 
globalisation involve `reorganization of the state', thus it is not plausible to 
dichotomise the state and globalisation. 66 Third, states' responses to globalisation 
are diverse between the countries; 67 whereas impacts of globalisation may be 
various to different state institutions, inter-ministerial interests and power 
distribution may change in the globalisation process. 68 
" .1 Weiss, op. cit., p. 4. 
63 Ibid., pp. 21-23. 
" John Zysman, `The Myth of a "Global" Economy: Enduring National Foundations and 
Emerging Regional Realities', New Political Economy, 1(2), 1996, pp. 157-184, p. 165. 
`'s Zysman, 'The Myth of a "Global" Economy', p. 171. 
66 Amoore et al., 'Overturning "Globalization"', p. 186. 
67 Michael Mann, `Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state? ', Review of 
International Political Econonzi. 4(3), 1997, pp. 472-496, p. 494. 
68 Robert W. Cox. 'Global Perestroika', Socialist Register 1992, pp. 26-43, pp. 30-3 1. Marianne 
H. Marchand and Anne Sisson Runyan, 'Introduction: Feminist sightings of global restructuring: 
conceptualisations and reconceptualizations'. in M. H. Marchand and A. S. Runyan (eds). Gender 
and Global Restructuring: Sightings, sites and resistances (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 1-22, p. 
13. 
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(3) Globalisation Theses Compared 
This section has briefly reviewed the three contending theoretical approaches to 
globalisation, and it has found that the Transformationalist thesis is most plausible. 
Consequently globalisation can be conceived as follows. 
(i) The state continues to play an important role in managing the national 
and international economy; 
(ii) Globalisation is a historical and political project in which mobility of 
capital plays a crucial role in the driving the process (hence technological 
development is not the only force of globalisation); 
(iii) States play various active roles in planning and implementing 
globalisation of the economy; and 
(iv) States are not entirely powerless before market forces, and can 
reformulate their capabilities in the face of the globalisation process. 
Among those four points, (ii) and (iv) are particularly pertinent to this study: 
globalisation is a historical and political project; mobility of capital is a key 
driving force of globalisation; and the states can respond to market forces and 
reformulate their capabilities while globalisation progresses. These points will be 
applied in Chapters 4 and 5 of this study when analysing the developments in 
globalisation. As a corollary of the above findings, it is possible to make the 
following points when discussing developments in the international political 
economy in globalisation. 
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(i) to link developments in the world that are separated in terms of 
geographical location and/or time, taking the role of capital mobility as 
mediator of such events into consideration; 
(ii) to assume that there should be some room, however limited, for 
managing the consequences of globalisation, since globalisation is a 
historical and political project (not only the 'faceless' technological 
developments); and 
(iii) to expect that the state can operate towards reducing the negative 
consequences of globalisation. 
Having examined the driving force of globalisation, and theoretical capabilities of 
the state in relation to international economic force, the next section seeks to 
develop a theoretical framework for understanding international labour migration 
as a force of globalisation. As has already been indicated in this study, 
international labour migration is an economic force that could render manifold 
effects on the migrant receiving country (as well as the sending country and the 
migrants themselves, but the focal point of this study is on the receiving country). 
3. Theorising International Labour Migration in Globalisation 
(1) Introduction 
This section is going to present a theoretical framework for understanding 
international labour migration as a force of globalisation. The following accounts 
are given in general terms that are applicable to population movements throughout 
the world. However, the body of literature on international population movement 
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in Asia indicates that such theories are capable of explaining migration in the 
region, including the flows to Japan, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4. It will 
also be shown that capital mobility creates conditions for the migration. Since it 
has been pointed out that capital mobility constitutes a key driving force of 
globalisation, the theoretical framework demonstrated in this section should 
highlight the characteristic of international labour migration as a force of 
globalisation. Research indicates that theories of international migration can be 
classified in the following three criteria: 
(i) `Supply-led' and 'demand-led' approaches. Whereas the former claims that 
individual migrants decide to migrate, the latter find the causes of population 
movement in the characteristics of such structures as capitalism and patriarchy. 
This distinction is based on analytical emphasis: whether the supplier or employer 
of migrant labour is thought to be more responsible for labour migration. The 
approaches that fall within this `supply-led' approach are Neoclassical theory, 
Human Capital theory, Behaviouralist theory, while those of the latter are Dual 
Labour Market theory, World Systems theory and feminist theories. 
(ii) Initiation and perpetuation of migration. Whereas the approaches mentioned 
in the above (i) intend to explain the initial causes of migration, Migration 
Networks and Migration Institutions theories can explain qualitatively why 
international labour migration sustains over time. 
(iii) Objective and subjective accounts of migration. All of the approaches in (i) 
and (ii) can be described as positivist in that a researcher observes migration 
process without taking into account an individual migrants' subjective view on 
their movement. In contrast, what this study provisionally calls `subjective 
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account' approaches tries to incorporate these individual migrants' insights into 
research. 
This section is going to present the main arguments of each of these 
theories of migration, accompanied by an assessment of each, in the following 
order: subsection 2 discusses the `Supply-led' approaches, which is followed by 
`Demand-led' approaches in subsection 3; subsection 4 is about the factors that 
sustain migration; in subsection 5, subjective accounts of migration, as opposed to 
the above objective ones, will be mentioned. Calls for integrated approaches to 
migration will be considered in subsection 6, and some concluding remarks will 
be presented in the final subsection 7. Research for this section has been guided 
by theoretical reviews by Boyle et al. and Massey et al. 69 
(2) `Supply-led' Approaches 
a. The Main claims of Neoclassical and Behaviouralist theories 
Three major approaches in this grouping are Neoclassical theory, Human Capital 
theory, and Behavioural theory. These three approaches are similar in that they 
conceive migration only in economic terms. Neoclassical explanations of 
migration attribute wage differentials between the sending and receiving areas of 
`'`' Paul Boyle; Keith Halfacree; and Vaughan Robinson, Exploring Contemporara' Migration 
(Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), Douglass S. Massey; Joaquin Arango; Graeme Hugo; 
Ali Kouaouci; Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor, `Theories of International Migration: A 
Review and Appraisal', Population and Development Review, 19(3). September 1993, pp. 431- 
466. 
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migration. 70 This approach expects that migration will end when wage 
differentials disappear; only imbalances between labour markets create 
international labour migration, and no other markets have any significant effects. " 
Massey et al. noted that the neoclassical macroeconomics theory of migration has 
provided a `simple and compelling explanation', has `strongly shaped public 
thinking and has provided the intellectual basis for much immigration policy. '72 
Meanwhile, the neoclassical microecnomic theory of migration incorporates 
actual and expected employment rates in sending and receiving countries, 
respectively, in explanation. 73 It also assumes that migration will not cease until 
expected earnings between the sending and receiving countries have become 
equal; decisions to migrate are made solely in terms of labour market 
imperfections, and no other markets affect the decisions. 74 
Next, from the Human Capital theory perspective, migrants will consider 
migration as an investment, and calculate costs and expected short-term and long- 
term returns of migration. These expected returns could be both economic as well 
as psychological. 75 This theory is also called `a family-based risk reduction 
strategy. '76 Key characteristics of this perspective include the decision to migrate 
made by members of families and households, not solely by individual migrants. 
In this respect, migration is conceived as a strategy to compensate for the lack of 
affordable insurance and credit programmes in developing countries. 
70 Boyle et al.. Exploring Contemporary Migration, p. 61. 
71 Massey et al., `Theories of International Migration', p. 434. 
72 Massey et al., op. cit.. p. 433. 
13 Ibid., p. 435. 
'a Ibid., p. 435. 
75 Boyle et al., op. cit., p. 62. 
76 Ibid., p. 74. 
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International labour migration is consequently seen as follows: households may 
decide that members of the family should migrate in order to reduce risks arising 
from the lack of social insurance and affordable credit, even if there are no wage 
differentials; government policies that can influence migration are not only those 
concerning labour markets, but on the above factors. " Third, the Behavioural 
theory accounts for migration, using such terms as `pull factors (attractions)', 
`push factors (expulsions)', and `intervening opportunities (obstacles)', as a 
consequence of a series of decisions that a migrant makes in a search for better 
living conditions. 78 
A characteristic that is common to the above approaches is that they are all 
micro-level decision/rational choice models, as Boyle et al. found. First, they 
conceive migration as `a relatively systematic response', and expect that 
generalisation can be possible. Second, these approaches explain migration in 
quantitative terms. Third, these approaches naturalise migration as an action that 
`leads to a better living conditions, higher wages and more pleasant residential 
environments. ' 79 
h. Critique and modifications of Neoclassical and Behaviouralist theories 
The plausibility of the neoclassical economic theory can be tested first by the 
statistical significance of the relation between immigration flow and expected 
earnings gap (_ `real earnings in the country under consideration multiplied by the 
" Massey et at., op. cit., pp. 439-440. 
-x Boyle et al., op. cit., p. 64. 
79 Ibid., p. 65. 
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probability of employment there'), but not the absolute real-wage differential. ' 
Second, the existence of international migratory flow without a wage gap or the 
end of it before the wage gap disappears, poses a theoretical challenge for this 
approach. 80 A similar critique was made by Boyle et at. who argued that 
`difference in wage differentials' was a `poor determinant of migration, because 
the differentials between and within countries did not disappear after migration 
ceased to take place. 81 A critique of Human Capital theory is directed against the 
point that it assumed the availability of acquiring perfect information, which is 
`clearly an unrealistic assumption. '82 In addition, Human Capital variable may 
negatively affect international migration, because "Human Capital acquired at 
home generally transfers abroad imperfectly. "83 Thus the explanatory capability 
of the above approaches is limited, in particular that of the Neoclassical theory. 84 
However, a critique of these approaches has shown that migration is `a highly 
contextual phenomenon', instead of `the isolated, objectifying rational act. ' 85 
Furthermore, it is also acknowledged that migration is `fundamentally dissimilar 
to the flow of water'; 86 degrees of risk-taking are different between individuals; 87 
and that `asymmetry of information' exists between employers and employees. 8 
80 Massey et al., op. cit., p. 455. 
" Boyle et al., op. cit., p. 61. 
82 Ibid., p. 62. 
83 Massey et al., op. cit., p. 456. 
84 Massey et at. had reservations about explanatory power of neoclassical economic theory of 
migration. They wrote: `Only after the historical circumstances have been clearly specified and 
their influence on the returns to specific forms of human capital clarified, can a critical test of the 
neoclassical microeconomic model be formulated'. (Massey et al., op. cit., p. 457) 
85 Boyle et al., op. cit., p. 75. 
96 Ibid., p. 74. 
R7 Ibid., p. 74. 
RK Ibid., p. 75. 
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These insights about `what migration is not', would be valuable when considering 
migration practice. 
The extent of modifications to Behaviouralist approaches, and lessons 
from such modifications, appear to be limited compared with those from the 
Neoclassical theory. These approaches have been modified through the 
introduction of multiple decision-making processes or multiple goals for 
migration. However, Boyle et al. criticised Behaviouralist approach for being 
deterministic, 89 despite the decision-making process in regard to migration being 
not as systematic' as they would suggest. 90 
To sum up, characteristics of the theories discussed above are as follows: 
these theories are concerned with individual migrants' decision-making process 
only in economic terms; while questioning `how do they migrate? ', these theories 
accept migration as given and do not ask the question `why does migration 
occur? ' In other words, the above approaches are `economic' and `apolitical'. 
Attempts to explain international labour migration solely from these `economic' 
and `apolitical' perspectives can possibly be unsatisfactory for research from the 
International Political Economy perspective, which intends to transcend analytical 
distinctions between economy and politics. This is the case because, as much as it 
is concerned with demonstrating international labour migration as an international 
economic force, this study intends to discuss the changes in the constituency of 
the state, and the subsequent reconfiguration of power relations. For this reason, 
89 Ibid., p. 75. 
90 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
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population movement needs to be analysed as a political issue, as will be seen in 
Chapters 4 to 6. 
(3) `Demand-led' Approaches 
a. Assumptions of `demand-led' approaches 
The fundamental difference between `supply-led' approaches and `demand-led' 
approaches lies in the following points. Whereas the former implicitly assumes 
that there are "pre-given `laws' of migration" that can be identified by 
observation, 91 the latter assumes that migration is `a fundamentally social 
phenomenon - migration is a product of society. '92 The latter approaches explain 
migration in terms of `the macro-scale conditions within which decision making is 
undertaken, '93 asking the question, "why does migration occur? "' 94 Being aware 
that the answer to this question has an important implication when considering the 
manner of changes in social relations in the migrant receiving country, notably 
Japan, this section is going to discuss the two structures to which the `demand- 
led' approaches pay attention, namely capitalism and patriarchy. 
91 Boyle et al., op. cit., p. 66. 
92 Ibid., p. 67. 
93 Ibid., p. 66. 
94 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
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b. Marxian structuralist theory of migration 
From a Marxian perspective, labour migration is the consequence of `changes in 
the social relations of production - the way in which participants in the productive 
process relate to one another - and the uneven development of the economy. '95 In 
other words, migration occurs when a new mode of production undermines the 
traditional mode of production and creates a labour reserve. 96 There are at least 
three different approaches to international labour migration that are based on a 
Marxian perspective. The first approach is Piore's theory of dual labour market. 
Piore argued that international labour migration is indispensable in industrialised 
countries because a dual labour market exists there. In the labour intensive and 
poorly-paid sector of such countries, recruitment from the local population 
becomes increasingly difficult, making it necessary for these employers to recruit 
workers from poorer countries. This is a demand-led explanation of international 
labour migration as opposed to the supply-led explanations of neoclassical 
theories' such as those discussed in the previous subsection. 97 Hence international 
wage differentials are not necessarily the cause of migration. 98 While Dual 
Labour Market theory may explain why employers in the receiving country need 
the migrant workers, it will not explain why and how the migrants arrive in the 
first place. 
The second approach is the World System theory, which explains 
international labour migration as an inevitable consequence during the 
95 Ibid., p. 68. 
"6 Ibid., p. 69. 
`" Ibid., p. 69. 
9' Massey et at., op. cit., p. 444. 
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development of the world capitalist economy that is uneven between core and 
periphery countries. 99 Insertion of peripheral, noncapitalist societies into 
capitalist economic relations involves marketisation of availabilities of land, raw 
materials and labour. This marketisation process that creates displaced population 
enables them to become a mobile labour force. 100 From this perspective, 
international labour migration usually moves in the opposite direction of 
international trade and capital flows, because `investment and globalization are 
inevitably accompanied by the build-up of a transportation and communication 
infrastructure. " 01 
Meanwhile, the structuralist approach to migration has been criticised for 
being deterministic, and also for being unclear about specific links between 
capitalist development and migration. For example, one description of the World 
Systems theory states that this theory characterises international migration as `a 
natural consequence of capitalist market formation in the developing world. )102 
(emphasis added) It would be an overstatement to argue that migration always 
occurs under such circumstances. In answering such a critique, Boyle et al. cited 
Jones, who acknowledged that economic determinism was an implausible 
explanation since it dismisses the capability of human agency: 
"the destruction of the peasant economy is not an inevitable one-way 
process but is a contested experience, where the individual can, at least in 
some circumstances, `make a difference'. " 103 
99 Boyle et at.. op. cit., p. 69. 
10° Massey et al., op. cit., pp. 444-446. 
101 Ibid., p. 446. 
102 Masse) et al.. op. cit., p. 447. 
103 Cited in Boyle et al., op. cit., p. 76. 
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c. Patriarchy as a structure 
Another structural factor of migration is patriarchy. Boyle et al. referred to 
patriarchy as `a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, 
oppress and exploit women. ' 104 Patriarchy needs to be analysed independently of 
capitalism, since it cannot be reduced to capitalism. For example, Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis argued that `gender divisions are irreducible to class or other 
divisions. ' 105 This is the case because the concept of class is related to the notion 
of the mode of production, but this concept does not contain `non-class, non- 
economic social relations such as race and gender. "°6 Divisions based on class, 
race and gender are interrelated and produce different relations depending on the 
context. Boyle et al. reported that Boyd and Wood were among those who found 
that gender-specific decisions to migrate are often taken at the household level 
rather than at individual level. Boyd in particular argued that `family and 
friendship sources of approval, disapproval, assistance and information' are `sex- 
specific. ' 1 07 
"" Boyle et al., op. cit., p. 70. 
105 Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, `Introduction', in Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias 
(eds), I omen-Notion-State (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 1-15, p. 11. 
106 Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, 'Contextual izing Feminism - gender, ethnic and class 
division', Feminist Re'viewtw, No. 15,1983, pp. 62-75, p. 64. 
107 Boyle et al., op. cit., p. 70. This should read `gender-specific. ' 
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(4) Factors That Perpetuate Migration 
Whereas the analytical focus of the approaches discussed above is on the causes 
of the beginning of migration, reasons for sustained migratory flow have also 
been studied. These theories may be able to explain why migration continues 
when conditions that initiated migration cease to exist and vice versa; and why 
immigration control by the state is imperfect. ' 08 Migration Networks and Migrant 
Institutions theories have been advanced in this context. 
Migration networks refer to interpersonal ties between `migrants, former 
migrants, and non-immigrants in [areas ofJ origin and destination through ties of 
kinship, friendship, and shared community origin. ' 109 These networks reduce 
costs and risks of migration over time, and increase the possibility of successive 
migrations. This renders migration `a self-sustaining diffusion process' over 
time. ' 10 Wage differentials and migration will not be totally irrelevant, but they 
are `not strongly correlated'. 1" It would be difficult for the government to 
influence these networks through policies to reduce migration, because activities 
of these networks that prolong the population flow are usually in the `private' 
domain and `outside [governments'] control. ' 12 The above fact that the operation 
of the migration network takes place where the state normally does not reach has 
some implications when considering the changes in constituency of the migrant 
receiving state, includes the migrant workers, and subsequent power relations. 
10R Massey et al., op. cit., pp. 450-45 1. 
109 Ibid., p. 448. 
"° Massey et al., op. cit., p. 448, Boyle et al., op. cit., p. 76. 
.' Massey et al., op. cit., p. 450. 
112 Ibid., p. 450. 
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This point will be briefly discussed in Chapter 6, in terms of the implications for 
the incidence of crime between foreign residents to the authority and 
responsibility of the migrant receiving state in controlling crime. 
Private institutions other than the participants of the above Migration 
Networks are also thought to have an influence on migration. Migration brokers 
provide migrants with services, either legally or illegally, that enable migration. 
Both the above migration brokers and the humanitarian groups can `support, 
sustain and promote international movement. ' Similar to migration network, it 
will be difficult for the governments to influence the operations of those 
institutions. ' 13 
(5) `Subjective Account' Approaches 
The next approaches to discuss here are those that explain migration using the 
subjective accounts of migrants themselves. The `humanist' approach, as Boyle 
et al. called it, criticises determinist approaches since `migration cannot be 
predicted ... 
[because]... beliefs, aspirations and obligations' of individual 
migrants are never the same and there will be no `one-to-one relationship' 
between the likelihood and actual practice of migration. ' 14 Thus this approach 
aims to obtain and present `subjective understandings' of migration. ' 15 Building 
up migrant histories is one way of conducting research from this approach. There 
can be two different reasons for adopting this approach to explain migration. The 
first is that use of migrant history enables the researchers to avoid `problems of 
13 Ibid., pp. 450-451. 
"' Boyle et al., op. cit., p. 71. 
5 Ibid., p. 71. 
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the averages of aggregated situations, where such averages may not reflect the 
actual situation of any one case. ' 116 The second is based on a more `strictly 
humanist philosophy' which claimed that 
`I am sure they [individual migrants] would appreciate our listening to their 
stories before we assume behavioural characteristics for them and proceed to 
solve models and make policy decisions for them. ' 117 
However, in either case the advocates of this approach do not intend to 
produce `uncoordinated' 118 countless individual stories. Rather, it aims to 
emphasise `the need for case studies to illustrate and inform the impersonality of 
more general accounts of migration trends and patterns', and to point out that 
`individual stories are expressed and respected in their own light. ' 119 There is 
another approach similar to the above, which conceives migration as a culture of a 
certain social group. From this perspective, migration `tends to have meanings for 
a given society or for a sub-section of that society' that cannot be explained by 
economic or social reasons. This approach has been accepted in anthropology. ' 20 
Boyle et al. acknowledged that the amount of research conducted from the 
`humanist' approach remains relatively small compared to the `determinist' 
approaches. 121 But these accounts on `humanist' approaches to migration 
highlight the need to carry out empirical case studies in order to avoid both 
implausible generalisation and intellectually `patronising and condescending' 
1 16 Ibid., p. 72. 
1' Ibid., p. 72. 
118 Ibid., p. 72. 
119 Ibid., p. 72. 
120 Ibid., pp. 72-73). 
12' Ibid., p. 71. 
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attitudes. 1 22 In other words, an empirical case study including interviews is 
indispensable in confirming and supporting theoretical assumptions and the 
findings of documentary research, which has been done in Chapter 4 and 5 of this 
study. 
(6) Integrated Approaches 
a. The call for an integrated and 'holistic' approach 
Massey et al. called for integrated approaches to explaining migration that can 
account for `causal processes [that are] relevant to international migration [and 
operating] on multiple levels simultaneously. ' Such analysis of causal processes 
at multiple levels is necessary because: 
it is entirely possible that individuals engage in cost-benefit calculations; 
that households act to diversify labour allocations; and that the socio- 
economic context within which these decisions are made is determined by 
structural forces operating at the national and international levels. ' 
Consequently researchers are expected to identify which theory produces 
plausible explanations both empirically and logically. ' 23 Boyle et al. also claimed 
that different theoretical approaches can become mutually complementary. and 
122 Colin Hay, `Structure and Agency', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds), Theory and 
Methods in Political Science' (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 189-206, p. 195. 
123 Masse' et al., op. cit., pp. 454-455. 
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called for a `holistic perspective. ' 124 But it is also imperative not to overlook the 
issues of power and contrasting resources. ' 125 
b. Agency and structure 
Boyle et al. reported that the number of works that tried to explain migration 
relying on the Structuration theory, with an aim of formulating an integrated 
approach to theorise migration, was increasing. Giddens' Structuration theory has 
been known as a social theory with which he tried to combine two contending 
theoretical approaches to explain developments in society (namely the so-called 
`agency-structure problem'). However, at the time of this writing, other 
approaches to this problem were also known. The following paragraphs briefly 
discuss the agency-structure problem in three respects, namely: (i) Why it is 
necessary to consider the agent-structure relation; (ii) How can the relation 
between structure and agency be explained; and (iii) What theoretical approaches 
are there to explain the relationship? 
Explaining the agency-structure relation is a task specific to social science. 
This is because there is no need to consider the relation between structure and 
agency in natural science, for the students can assume the existence of 
metastructure. In contrast, it is not possible to assume metastructure in human 
society, since the relation between structure and agency changes over time. This 
is why the relation between structure and agency needs to be explained in social 
Boyle et al., op. cit., p. 82. 
125 Ibid., p. 82. 
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science. Hay argues that, even though explanations in social science used to be 
made from monocausal perspectives, namely either from `structuralism' or 
`intentionalism, ' neither of them a plausible explanation in social science. 126 
There are at least three approaches to theorise the structure-agency relation. 
Despite their differences, each of these three approaches tries to explain that there 
is a dialectical relation between structure and agent. In other words: an agent 
makes a decision under structural constraints; such action has both intended and 
unintended consequences; as a result, an action of a certain agent affects both the 
agent herself/himself and the structure, which then creates a new condition for the 
next action. Following Hay, the above may be put in a slightly more detailed way 
as follows: 
(i) The distinction between structure and agency is `purely analytical', 127 and 
this relation can be conceived (using an analogy) similar to two metals in 
alloyed coin, rather than two sides of a coin. ' 28 
(ii) Human agency can be conceived `only in relation to already 
preconstituted, and deeply structured, settings. ' Constituents of structures 
depend on the `vantage point' of actors, and these structures both `constrain 
and enable' actors; 
(iii) The notion of structure is different from determinism. `Structures do 
not determine outcomes directly, but merely define the potential range of 
options and strategies. ' (Hay's emphasis) The environment in which 
individual and collective actors choose and carry out their actions `can be 
conceived of in terms of a nested hierarchy of levels of structure that interact 
in complex ways to condition and set the context within which agency is 
displayed', and 
126 Hay, `Structure and Agency', pp. 193-196. 
12' Colin Hay. Political. -inaIivsis (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 125. 
128 Hay, Political. -l nalvsis, p. 127, Hay, `Structure and Agency', p. 200. 
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(iv) The relation between agent and structure is dialectic, not a 
unidirectional causation. `Actions occur within structured settings, yet 
actors have the potential (at least partially) to transform those structures 
through their actions. ' 129 Consequences of actions by agents can be both 
intended and unintended. 
The three major approaches to theorise the relation between structure and 
agency that Hay identified are: structuration theory, morphogenetic approach, and 
the strategic-relational approach. Hay found that explanations provided by the 
first two were less persuasive than the one made by the last approach. According 
to him, this was because: structuration theory switches between structuralism and 
intentionalism, and morphogenetic approach reverts, though unwittingly, to 
analytical dualism. 130 Consequently Hay argues that the strategic-relational 
approach is more plausible than the above two. 131 Having claimed the potentials 
of capabilities of agents to transform their environment, it is also imperative to 
remind oneself that such capabilities are not necessarily equally available to each 
actor. Hay argued that systems (composed of structures) `are not level playing 
fields - their complex, sloping contours favour certain strategies and actors over 
others. ' 
132 
'"' Hay, `Structure and Agency', p. 200. 
130 Hay, Political Analysis, p. 120. 
Hay, op. cit., pp. 115-114. 
H2 Hay, `Structure and Agency', p. 199. 
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c. Biographical approach 
Going back to the possible integrated approaches to explain migration, one of 
them could be a biographical approach. This approach would argue that the 
migrant's decision to move is a complex consequence of various events over time; 
that reasons to migrate are multiple, not singular; and that numbers of people are 
involved in the decision, thus it is not necessarily an individual migrant's free 
decision. 133 Consequently, this approach argues for an understanding of migration 
as concerning identity, rather than `automatic stimulus-response. ' 34 This should 
enable an analysis of migration conducted from a viewpoint different from 
theoretical individualism. 
c. Political Economy approach 
Results of the assessments of different theories of migration conducted in this 
section so far indicate that the structuralist perspectives, including the political 
economy one, are clearly suitable for considering the `fundamental question of 
power in society and how it links with migration. ' 135 In particular, the above 
assessment has found that the World Systems theory and the Migration Network 
theory are capable of explaining the way structural conditions are developed both 
at macro- and micro-levels. Therefore, to pose the following two questions 
; Boyle et al., op. cit, pp. 80-81. 
Ibid., p. 81. 
j5 Ibid., p. 8'-. 
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(informed by the World System theory perspective) will help identify the way 
macro-level structural conditions operated in international labour migration: 
(i) Whether inflow of foreign capital into peripheral regions corresponds to 
emigration to core region. 136 
(ii) Whether and how the following factors contribute to the migratory flow: 
prior colonial relationships, the prevalence of common languages, the 
intensity of trade relations, the existence of transportation and 
communication links between the sending and receiving countries of 
migration. ' 37 
Likewise, asking the following four questions based on the Migration Network 
theory will aid finding out the way micro-level structural conditions were 
instrumental in the migration process. Accounts of these conditions should also 
provide clues in learning about migrants' decision to migrate, particularly when 
conducting interviews with the current and former migrants and their relatives: 
(iii) Whether the migrant has prior international migration experience. 
(iv) Whether the migrant has someone she/he knows in the receiving country 
that has already migrated. 
(v) Whether someone from the family has, or members of the community 
have, already migrated internationally. 
(vi) Whether and how migration control policy, in particular that of the 
receiving country, is tight. If so, operation of Migration Network is likely to 
be more powerful than otherwise. ' 38 
6 Massey et al., op. cit., p. 459. 
137 Ibid., p. 460. 
138 Ibid.. pp. 460-461. 
75 
CHAPTER 2 
The above analytical framework will be applied to the empirical case study in 
Chapter 4 to examine structural conditions for international labour migration from 
Thailand to Japan in the 1990s. 
(7) Conclusion 
The assessment of different theories of migration has been carried out in this 
section in five steps. Firstly, subsection 2 considered Neoclassical and 
Behaviouralist theories. It has been found that assumptions of these theories tend 
to be `economic' and `apolitical' and thus sometimes can be questionable from the 
perspective of International Political Economy. Secondly, subsection 3 discussed 
structuralist approaches to migration that conceive the migration process as being 
driven by such structures as capitalism and patriarchy. Critiques against Marxian 
theories are also noted, namely its possible determinism and the lack of non- 
capitalist structures such as patriarchy. Thirdly, Migration Network and 
Migration Institutions were the factors studied in subsection 4, which sustain 
international labour migration even after the initial causes for migration have 
changed or disappeared. Accounts based on these theories can complement the 
above structuralist approaches. Fourthly, subsection 5 paid attention to explaining 
migration through looking at the subjective accounts of migrants themselves. The 
significance of this approach is that it can possibly underscore the findings of 
structuralist approaches. Fifthly the necessity for integrated theories of migration 
was the subject of the final subsection 6, where it is found that the Political 
Economy approach to migration is possible. One important finding of this section 
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has been that a critique of the `supply-led' approach led to a recognition that 
international labour migration is a process that is much more complicated than is 
often assumed: for example, wage differentials are not the sole reason for 
migration; and migration is `fundamentally dissimilar to the flow of water. ' 
Consequently it is now possible to argue that international labour 
migration reflects the mobility of capital, and in this sense globalisation affects 
the population movement. In the meantime, relevance of the so-called migration 
industry has been highlighted. Since Japanese capital has been mobile in East 
Asia in the last few decades, the theoretical framework demonstrated in this 
section is applicable to the case study in Chapter 4 where Japanese capital served 
an indispensable role in creating structural conditions for migration. 
4. The State in Contemporary International Political Economy 
(1) Introduction 
It has been argued in Section 2 of this chapter that globalisation is a historical and 
political project in which capital mobility plays a crucial role. Section 3 then 
demonstrated that capital mobility contributes to creating structural conditions for 
labour mobility within the country receiving capital, which sometimes extends 
beyond its state border. As a next analytical step, this study requires a theoretical 
framework with which to explain how international economic force such as 
international labour migration could affect the migrant receiving country's 
domestic policy. Academic disciplines that have dealt with influence of external 
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forces on the state are International Relations and International Political Economy. 
This section therefore examines four major theoretical approaches in IR and IPE 
in order to identify the one with which it is able to argue that international 
economic force such as capital mobility and labour migration could affect the way 
the recipient country works. In other words, this section compares the way each 
theory conceived the possibility where international non-military forces could 
influence a state's management of domestic affairs such as the economy, internal 
order and national identity. The approaches compared here are classical realism, 
neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and Gramscian theory advanced by Cox. 
As a representative argument of each approach, the works of Morgenthau, Waltz 
and Keohane and Nye, and also that of Cox are investigated here. In the 
following, these four approaches will be compared in terms of how they perceive 
(i) the relation between politics and economy; (ii) the relation between 
international and domestic; and (iii) the possibility of reformulation of 
characteristics of the state. This theoretical comparison is also informed by the 
point made by Underhill, who called for reconceptualising the state. 139 He has 
argued that it is the concept of the state that makes an observer of events in the 
world distinguish the international and domestic spheres, and also this concept 
may lead to an assumption that politics is a matter of the state, not the society. In 
other words, the existing assumptions about the state may not always meet the 
reality of the contemporary world. 
19 Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, 'Introduction: Conceptualizing the Changing Global Order', in 
Richard and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order 
(Second Edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 3-24, p. 8. 
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(2) State Theories in International Relations 
a. Morgenthau: autonomy of the political sphere 
(a) Power as political interest 
One representative case of the analytical distinction between politics and economy 
can be found in Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations. In this work he set out a 
definition of international politics as pursuit of political interest defined as power. 
This notion of political interest was contrasted with wealth as economic interest. 
Starting from the above definition, Morgenthau wrote that Political Realism 
assigns `an autonomous sphere of action and understanding' which is 
distinguished from such other spheres as economy, ethics and religion. ' 40 The 
reasons behind his decision to distinguish politics and economy appear to have 
been at least twofold: first was his conviction from recent history, and second was 
professional aspiration. First, being seriously alarmed by the failures of foreign 
policies of European countries in the first half of the twentieth century that took 
non-political factors such as `legal-moralistic' issues into account, Morgenthau 
argued that politics could not be subordinated to law, morality, economy and 
religion. He claimed that these non-political spheres could be discussed in their 
own separate places. 141 The second reason for the analytical distinction may be 
described as professional aspiration. Morgenthau apparently valued the status of 
X40 Hans J. Morgenthau, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations. the Struggle 
for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), p. 5. 
141 Mor`.. enthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 15-16. 
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economics as a scientific discipline, and expressed his intention to emulate the 
`success' of economics in the following words: 
`It is exactly through such a process of emancipation from other standards of 
thought, and the development of one appropriate to its subject matter, that 
economics has developed as an autonomous theory of the economic 
activities of men [sic]. To contribute to a similar development in the field of 
politics is indeed the purpose of political realism. ' 142 
Consequently the major analytical focus of Morgenthau's theory of international 
politics was foreign policy of nation states, with such factors as `political 
institutions, diplomatic procedures, and legal arrangements' being seen as relevant, 
excluding economy. 143 
Even though he held the above analytical distinctions between politics and 
economy, Morgenthau implicitly acknowledged the relevance of industrial 
capacity with international politics through the building of military capability. He 
noted that industrial capacity allows building of `a military establishment 
commensurate with its foreign policy. ' 144 Developments in transportation and 
communication technologies are significant for military capacity building. ý5 
Hence: 
Morgenthau, op. cit, pp. 1I -12. 
143 Ibid., p. 8. 
144 Ibid., p. 137. 
145 Ibid., p. 137. 
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`[T]he leading industrial nations should be identical with the great powers, 
and a change in industrial rank, for better or worse, should be accompanied 
or followed by a corresponding change in the hierarchy of power. ' 146 
(b) Analytical focus on foreign policy 
As for the distinction between international and domestic spheres, Morgenthau 
argued that `the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign policy' was 
the nation state. 147 This analytical separation of the international and domestic 
could possibly have been drawn from the above conceptualisation of international 
politics. By defining International Politics as a study of foreign policy, it may 
have been justifiable for him that the discipline deals with only non-domestic and 
non-economic issues. 
(c) Repetitive patterns in history 
Morgenthau declared that Political Realism intends to explain international 
politics in terms of human nature, which has not changed for millennia. This 
approach to international politics refers to history to learn possible measures for 
contemporary foreign policy: `[m]an [sic] responds to social relations with 
repetitive patterns. The same situation, recoginzed in its identity with previous 
situations, evokes the same response. ' 148 He then argued that the notion of power 
and political interest would be valid over time and space, if contents and use of 
146 Ibid., p. 138. 
147 Ibid., p. 12. 
148 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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power vary according to `the political and cultural environment. ' 149 However. 
substantial social transformations would be unlikely. Disagreeing with non- 
Political Realist perspectives, Morgenthau described how the Political Realist 
would see the future of world politics: 
`The realist is persuaded that [... ] transformation can be achieved only 
through the workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have 
shaped the past as they will the future. ' 150 
(d) An assessment 
The above analysis shows that the main assumption in Morgenthau's theory of 
international politics includes the following points: politics and economy are 
clearly distinguished; so are the international and domestic spheres; historical 
events are thought to be more or less as similar in the future as they were in the 
past; by extension, the character of the nation state as the analytical unit will not 
change. This study's assessment of Morgenthau's conceptualisation of 
international politics and the state consists of the following five points. First, the 
fact that he assigned the above analytical distinctions has to be deemed 
understandable given the time and place of his work, where making social science 
`scientific' was thought to be desirable. Second, his academic orientation to learn 
from human history could make sense on several occasions in comparison to 
starting an analysis solely from a belief in ideals. Third, however, what sort of 
history a Political Realist refers to will also be a problem. given the general 
''`' Ibid., pp. 10-1 l. 
150 Ibid., p. I2. 
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tendency that history has often been written from the perspective of those who 
had power. Fourth, the notion that the same events could repeat themselves in 
history is less than convincing, because that could lead to deterministic assertions 
that are theoretically implausible, as this study has already discussed. Fifth, 
Morgenthau's claim for `realist defence of the autonomy of the political sphere 
against its subversion' 151 compared to other modes of thought contains a potential 
problem. As seen above, Morgenthau's concept of politics is narrow in its focus. 
However, in the real world many more things take place in addition to the official 
foreign policy per se seen from diplomats' viewpoints. That is why ascending 
analytical distinctions between politics and the economy, and between the 
international and the domestic, becomes necessary. In other words, it is possible 
that his claim could, in practice, be used by policy makers and/or commentators to 
justify their `disregard for the existence and importance of these other modes of 
thought [such as the economy, morality and religion]' despite Morgenthau 
denying it. 152 Further, his claim that `each [non-political factor] should be 
assigned its proper sphere and function' 1 53 can lead to the following problem; if a 
certain issue was not covered at the time of policy formulation and 
implementation, it could be extremely difficult to incorporate that issue into 
political agenda retroactively. Issues of gender would be such an example, among 
others. When these non-foreign policy issues were missed out, that could render 
the Realist approach paradoxically unrealistic. 
'" Ibid., p. 16. 
'`2 Ibid., p. 16. 
15.3 Ibid., p. 16. 
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b. Waltz: scientific theory of international politics without domestic factors 
While intending to create a rational and scientific theory of international 
politics, 154 as far as methodology is concerned, Morgenthau frequently used 
historical accounts to substantiate his arguments. Waltz shared the perspective on 
world politics that was similar to that of Morgenthau: ' 55 events take place over 
time in international politics, and in this sense there is stability in world 
politics. ' 56 But in contrast to Morgenthau, Waltz applied an explicitly `scientific' 
approach to the above assumption to build his theory. 
(a) Political theory of international politics 
Waltz does not seem to have been interested in seeking linkages between 
international politics and the economy. His reasoning for this disinterest was that 
the economic theories of international politics were unsuccessful in explaining 
developments that took place after these theories were formed. Waltz referred to 
the theories of imperialism by Hobson and Lenin, as well as the post-war neo- 
colonialist theories, that `broaden[ed] ... the 
definition of imperialism' in their 
attempt to account for the new events. ' 57 Waltz wrote: 
If capitalism, then imperialism" is a purported economic law of politics, a 
law that various economic theories of imperialism seek to explain. Can we 
'54 Ibid., pp. 1 1-12. ISS 
Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
156 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Newti York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 39. 
157 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. p. 33. 
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find political laws of politics and political theories to explain them? ' 158 
(Waltz's italics. ) 
Then he characterised the method of theory construction of those economic 
perspectives as `reductionist' and attributed this methodology to the failure of 
being able to explain historical events. Having negatively assessed the 
plausibility of the reductionist approach in `economic' international political 
theories, Waltz claimed that systems theory could provide a more plausible 
framework for explaining stability in international politics. ' 59 The reason why 
Waltz thought systems theory would be appropriate for international politics was 
as follows: `[w]here similarity of outcomes prevails despite changes in the agents 
that seem to produce them ... 
[s]omething works as a constraint on the agents or 
is interposed between them and the outcome their actions contribute to., X60 In 
other words, the same political structure produces similar political outcomes, if 
not necessarily the same. 161 Waltz wrote: `[s]tructure operates as a cause, but it is 
not the only cause in play. ' 1 62 
Adopting a neoclassical microeconomic theory, Waltz conceived 
international politics as consisting of different systems that are operating 
simultaneously. Each system is composed of structure and units. Waltz then 
defined that the structure is comprised of. (i) `the principle by which a system is 
ordered'; (1) the specification of functions of differential units' in hierarchy of the 
158 Waltz, op. cit., p. 39. 
's`' Ibid., p. 39. 
"'" Ibid., p. 39. 
161 Ibid., p. 87. 
162 Ibid., p. 87. 
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states; and (iii) `the distribution of capabilities across units'. 163 The figure of the 
above conceptualisation of international politics as systems' 64 (Figure 5.2 on page 
100 of his book) shows that the notions of systems and units can be interpreted as 
a coalition of the states, and individual states, respectively. It appears that the 
structure refers to attributes that affect the system but is not assignable to the 
individual units. Then, it also seems that Waltz introduced the notions of system 
and structure in order to become able to account for the influence of those 
structural factors that are non-political, non-domestic, and/or non-international, in 
international politics. 
(b) Exclusion of domestic factors 
Similar to his theoretical orientation towards the relation between politics and the 
economy, Waltz did not seek the linkage between the international and domestic 
spheres in his theory of international politics either. The reason for this appears to 
be twofold: out of his theoretical assumption, and technical necessity for his 
theory building. First, starting from the assumption that states pursue survival 
under anarchy in international politics, 165 Waltz assumed that each state operates 
in a similar way, or that `states remain like units. ' 166 Thus he claimed it would be 
unnecessary to consider how domestic institutions could influence international 
politics. '67 Second, adoption of systems theory in international politics required 
163 Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
"'4 Ibid., p. 100. 
165 Ibid., p. 91. 
"'`' Ibid., p. 93. 
'6' Ibid., p. 93. 
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Waltz to exclude domestic factors or what he called `unit-level factors' out of his 
analysis. He wrote: 
`One must ... 
keep the attributes and interactions of the system's units out of 
the definition of its structure. If one does not do this, then no systems-level 
explanations can be given. ' 
168 
In other words, `aims, policies, and actions of states' were a description of 
international politics from which `no valid generalization can logically be 
drawn. ' 169 
(c) The state as a stable and static entity 
Waltz seems to have assumed that the configuration of the state would be stable. 
His theoretical presumption as a Political Realist and the characteristics of the 
theory he built led him to this conclusion, the same as in the cases of his analytical 
distinction between politics and the economy, and the international and the 
domestic. As shown earlier in this section, Morgenthau expected that the ways in 
which state power is exercised could be various, while the characteristic of 
politics as a pursuit for power itself will be unchanged. 170 In contrast, the extent 
of variations in international politics, that Waltz anticipated, appears to be more 
limited compared with that of Morgenthau. 
168 Ibid., p. 57. 
"'`' Ibid., p. 65. 
170 Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 10. 
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Waltz was aware that structural transformation could occur in international 
politics when there were `changes in the distribution of capabilities across the 
system's units. ' 171 Such structural changes in international politics could take the 
forms of war or revolution. ' 72 But other than the above forms of `transformation', 
he did not think that the structure of international politics would be altered. The 
reason for this is threefold, and they are inter-related. First, because it is 
distinguished from characteristics of unit factors (domestic politics or personality 
of political leaders, for example), structure endures over time. 173 Second, while 
there is no overarching `ordering' authority in world politics, just like organised 
market operation derived from actions of individuals participating in the market 
(as microeconomic theory would argue), `[i]nternational-political systems, like 
economic markets, are individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and 
unintended. ' 1 74 This peculiarly ahistorical remark was followed, however, by the 
next claim that seems to reflect the Political Realist view on history of the states: 
`structures are formed by the coaction of their units. Whether those units live, 
prosper, or die depends on their own efforts', ' 75 thus the primary motivation of the 
state is assumed by Waltz as `[seeking] to ensure their survival". 
176 Third, in 
addition, international political theory does not require the theory of an individual 
171 Waltz, op. cit., p. 97. 
172 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 70; Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: a 
theoretical anah'sis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 224. 
1" Waltz, Theory, of International Politics, p. 80. 
174 Waltz, op. cit.. P. 91. 
175 ibid., p. 91. 
1 '7(, Ibid., p. 91. 
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state's foreign policy, just as the economic theory of markets does not require the 
theory of an individual firm's management. ' 77 
Consequently Waltz declared that his theory does not have to explain 
significant changes in international politics. Waltz thus exempted his theory from 
explaining changes in international politics; instead he expected his theory to 
explain `recurrences and repetitions. ' 178 In addition, structures are, by definition, 
`static' and `endure for long periods, ' thus there is no need for an explanation of 
changes in international politics. ' 79 Because he has only discussed redistribution 
of the capabilities of the state, which is a change in the structure in quantitative 
terms, Waltz has not explicitly considered whether the structure or capability of 
individual states could qualitatively change after such redistribution. Considering 
this point, and the Political Realist assumption that the characteristics of 
international politics will remain unchanged, it is unclear whether Waltz expected 
that characteristics and formulation of the state could change. Earlier, section 2 of 
this chapter found that states are capable of changing their operation and 
formulation in order to respond to the forces of globalisation. Then, it appears to 
be the case that Waltz's conceptualisation of the state is not necessarily helpful for 
this study. 
"' Ibid., p. 71. 
178 Ibid., p. 69. 
179 Ibid., p. 69. 
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(d) An assessment 
This subsection has shown that characteristics of Waltz's theory of international 
politics consist of the following: politics and economy were clearly separated, 
even without implicit reference to the relevance of the economic to foreign policy, 
as Morgenthau did; assertion that domestic factors have to be excluded from 
effective systemic analysis of international politics; and the claim that events in 
history will be stable except for war or revolution, so will the forms of the state. 
Waltz's theory may be assessed in terms of the following four points. First, it is 
impossible not to notice that an enormous amount of careful analyses and patience 
were indispensable in building this `elegant' theory of international politics. 
Second, however, it appears that his theory reduces various factors in international 
politics to the function of systems and units, in order for it to become an `elegant' 
theory. Third, considering the point that Waltz shared similar theoretical 
assumptions with Morgenthau as a proponent of Political Realism, Waltz's theory 
may be characterised as an attempt to develop a `better' analytical tool for the 
`same' analytical objects that had been already known to them. Fourth, the 
strength of this theory in explaining the already known facts by reducing various 
factors could become a weakness, when accounting for events where unknown 
factors (such as those in which politics and economy overlap, or the international 
and domestic do so) became relevant. Consequently, it appears to be the case that 
more than what Waltz's theory offers is needed, as far as the current search for a 
theory of the state (with which it can be seen as being influenced by external 
economic force and responding to such a force) is concerned. 
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c. Keohane and Nye: linking politics and economy in inter-state politics 
As a Liberal critique of Political Realist conceptions of international politics, 
Keohane and Nye advanced a theory in which economic issues could play a role 
that can be more significant than military power within allied of countries. 
(a) Interdependence: power as political and economic interests 
Keohane and Nye conceived the characteristics of contemporary world politics as 
`interdependence. ' They defined interdependence in the following terms: it refers 
to situations where there are reciprocal and costly effects among countries or 
among actors in different countries; 180 interdependent relations are not necessarily 
symmetrical 18 ' nor necessarily mutually beneficial; ' 82 it possibly puts constraint 
on autonomy of the state. 183 Contrary to its appearance as a politically neutral 
concept which can be used as `a rhetoric device [... ] by publicists and 
statesman', ' 84 Keohane and Nye argued that `asymmetrical interdependence can 
be a source of power', exercised through one state's control over resources of the 
counterpart. 185 This conceptualisation of power is very different from the 
180 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Second Edition) (Neww 
York: Longman, 1989), p. 8. 
18' Keohane and Nye. Power and Interdependence, p. 9. 
182 Keohane and Nye. op. cit., p. 10. 
ix., Ibid., p. 9. 
'R. Ibid., p. 5. 
185 Ibid., p. 1 1. 
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Political Realist perspectives, in that it included an economic element, compared 
with that of Morgenthau who defined pursuit of political interests as power. 
(b) International regime: inclusion of the domestic into the international 
Having introduced the notion of interdependence, Keohane and Nye named the 
organising principles of world politics where complex interdependence exists as 
an international regime. International regime refers to `the sets of governing 
arrangements ... 
[such as] network of rules, norms, and procedures ... that affect 
relationships of interdependence. ' 186 In other words, international regimes 
mediate `the power structure of an international system and the political and 
economic bargaining that takes place within it. ' 187 Here, the structure of the 
system means `the distribution of capabilities among similar units. ' 188 Based on 
the above two concepts of interdependence and international regime, world 
politics can be perceived to have the following three characteristics: first, not only 
the inter-state relations, but also trans-governmental and transnational relations 
operate in world politics. 189 Second, issues placed on the agenda in world politics 
are multiple, and not limited to military issues: `[m]any issues arise from what 
used to be considered domestic policy, and the distinction between domestic and 
foreign issues become blurred. ' 190 Third, in relation to the second point just 
mentioned above, military force is given a lower priority as foreign policy option 
186 Ibid., p. 19. 
'R' Ibid., p. 21. 
188 Ibid., p. 20. 
189 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
190 Ibid., p. 25. 
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than it used to be. In this respect the interdependence approach appears to be 
different from the Political Realist approach. However, there is a similarity 
between these approaches: Keohane and Nye acknowledged that military power 
could remain significant for an `alliance's political and military relations with a 
rival bloc. "91 
(c) International organisation: analytical extension of interface between states 
For Keohane and Nye, changes in world politics under interdependence take place 
in the form of international regime change in international organisations. 192 
International organisation refers to the world political structure in which 
governments are linked together at multiple levels (inter- and trans-governmental 
ties). 193 Consequently, from the complex interdependence perspective, world 
politics carried out at an international organisation is seen as a process in which 
power is exercised to `control [... ] outcomes, ' 194 rather than being used explicitly 
to influence the counterpart in political process. Such control over outcomes can 
be carried out by linking different issues, formulating a negotiation agenda, and 
the use of transnational and transgovernmental relations rather solely operating 
through interstate relations. 195 Since there are various means of exercising 
political power available for the states as mentioned above, international 
'9' Ibid., p. 25. 
192 Ibid., p. 19. 
191 Ibid., p. 54. 
'`''' Ibid., p. 30. 
1115 Ibid., pp. 219-335. 
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organisation carries more significance in world politics than the Political Realist 
approach assumes. 
196 
(d) An assessment 
By developing the theory of interdependence, Keohane and Nye have done the 
following: first, their perspective attributed more significance to international 
relations in regard to economic issues than the Political Realist perspective would 
do. Second, they extended interface in interstate relations to include 
transgovernmental and transnational (business) relations, in addition to diplomatic 
relations in the previous analyses; in this sense the distinction between the 
international and the domestic has become less clear than the Political Realist 
assumption. Third, the above extended interface and the role of international 
organisations show that interstate relations are changing. In relation to the current 
comparison of characterisation of the states in the theories of International 
Relations, the following two points arise. First, despite referring to the blurring of 
the international and the domestic, analytical distinction between these two 
spheres still largely remains. This is because the non-state actors discussed in this 
work operate at international organisations in the proximity of the state 
institutions, and it is unclear how those non-state actors affect the domestic. 
Second, the above-mentioned expansion of interface of inter-state relation is an 
extension in analytical focus, and is different from discussing the change in the 
forms of the state. In addition, Keohane and Nye assume that international 
196 Ibid., pp. 35-39- 
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regimes, which organise the operating principles of the states within 
interdependence, are stable. 197 Therefore, it does not appear that their theory 
explicitly covers the question about whether the forms of the state could change. 
Their theory is effective for explaining inter-state relations through multilateral 
institutions, in particular over non-military issues. However, this section has been 
seeking a conceptualisation of the state that can account for interactions between 
international economic forces (international labour migration and the migration 
industry) and domestic policy of the state, instead of inter-state relations. Because 
this study needs a theory that can offer more on the above interactions than 
Keohane and Nye could, it now turns to Cox next. 
d Cox: state/society complex and world orders 
(a) State/society complex as the analytical unit in international relations 
Out of his critique of Political Realist theories of international relations, Cox 
introduced the notion of `state/society complex' in order to build his theory of 
international relations in his `Social forces, states, and world orders. ' The key 
concept that relates the state and civil society is the mode of production. Cox 
argued that production relates both politics and the economy, and the international 
and domestic. Production links politics and the economy, because in the 
production process, `a power relationship' operates `between those who control 
197 Ibid., p. 58. 
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and those who execute the tasks of production. ' 198 Here the relation between 
`structure (economic relations) and superstructure (the ethico-political sphere)' is 
reciprocal. 1 99 The way in which production relates international and domestic 
spheres is twofold: first, production creates the basis for one state to `mobilize 
power behind its foreign policy', thus connecting the international and 
domestic. 200 Second, the above power relation in production could extend to the 
international sphere because production can `overflow state boundaries. ' 201 The 
state/society complex concept led Cox to see international relations as follows, 
which should enable a researcher to cross the analytical distinctions that this 
section has been discussing: 
The world can be represented as a pattern of interacting social forces in 
which state plays an intermediate though autonomous role between the 
global structure of social forces and local configuration of social forces 
within particular countries. '202 
(b) World order as a complex combination of social forces and state forms 
Cox's assumption about historical events is in contrast with those of the Political 
Realist perspective that assumes a recurrence of similar historical events. He has 
argued that events in international relations need to be accounted for within the 
199 Robert W. Cox, 'Social forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations theory', 
in Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), pp. 85-123, p. 96. 
X99 Cox, 'Social forces, states, and world orders', p. 96. 
200 Cox, op. cit., p. 96. 
201 Ibid., p. 105. 
'"p Ibid., p. 105. 
96 
CHAPTER 2 
historical context of individual cases. 203 The above assumption is underpinned by 
Cox's perception that historical events take place as complex interactions of three 
types of forces that overlap and are influenced by each other, 204 within `a 
framework of action or historical structure. ' 205 Cox called these three forces 
social forces, forms of the state and world orders. Social forces are driven by the 
production process, while forms of the state can change over time and place. 206 
World orders refer to how events in world politics usually take place. 207 Here 
Cox introduced the notion of hegemony to explain contemporary world order. 
Hegemony is one form of world order, in which order can be maintained without 
continuous use of explicit power. Whereas power `takes a primarily consensual 
form' in hegemonic order, in the nonhegemonic order `there are manifestly rival 
powers and no power has been able to establish the legitimacy of its 
dominance. '208 This distinction is based on Gramsci's conception of power as `a 
combination of force and consent. '209 
(c) Different forms of the state in the contemporary world 
Applying the above theoretical framework, Cox accounted for the world order 
from the nineteenth to the twentieth century as having three different forms of the 
state and world order (among the industrialised countries). This includes liberal 
'"' Ibid., p. 98. 
204 Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
205 Ibid., p. 98. 
206 Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
207 Ibid., pp. 116-117, Note 2. 
208 Ibid., p. 120, Note 24. 
'"`' Ibid., p. 119, Note 20. 
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form of the state during imperialism from the nineteenth century to the inter-war 
years; the welfare-nationalist form before the `decline' of US hegemony in the 
1970s, 210 and `the internationalization of the state' since the 1970s. 
While the welfare-nationalist form of the state involved `economic 
planning at the national level and the attempt to control external economic 
impacts upon the national economy', 21 1 internationalisation of the state maintains 
the current world order 212 through such measures as surveillance, `policy 
harmonization' and internationalisation of production. These measures worked in 
the following ways. First, such international institutions as IMF and the World 
Bank played the surveillance role, in order to `reconcile domestic social pressures 
with the requirements of a world economy. ' 213 This `surveillance' and 
`reconciliation' has been carried out, in many cases, in developing countries since 
around the end of the 1970s. Second, there has also been `elaborate machinery for 
the harmonization of national policies' for industrialised countries, 214 an example 
being `mutual consultation and mutual review of national policies (through the 
OECD and other agencies). '215 One consequence of such surveillance and `policy 
harmonization' is that certain state agencies directly relevant to the international 
economic adjustment 'overshadow[s]' the other state institutions that are in charge 
210 Cox. 'Social forces, states and world order', p. 106. There are contrasting views on the issue of 
the 'decline' of the US hegemony, as Hughes notes. Whereas some maintain that the United State 
has lost hegemony in international economic system, there are others who consider that it remains 
at `the centre of the global economy, having transformed its power "into various forms of `soft' 
and structural power"'. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Economic Power and Security: Japan 
and North Korea (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 49). 
"1 Cox, 'Social forces, states and world order', p. 109. 
212 Cox, op. Cl-t., p. 107. 
213 Ibid., p. 108. 
214 Ibid., p. 108. 
215 Ibid., p. 108. 
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of domestic policies. 216 Third, `[t]he internationalization of the state is associated 
with the expansion of international production [... and ... ] [i]nternational 
production expands through direct investment. ' 217 
(d) An assessment 
There are four points to be mentioned as an assessment of Cox's theory discussed 
in this subsection. First, Cox's theory of internationalisation of production and 
internationalisation of the state appear to be applicable to research that discusses 
international migration within the context of globalisation process, because his 
theory covers both politics and the economy, as well as the international and 
domestic spheres as its analytical focus; it also assumes that events in 
international relations are individual in historical character; and from this 
perspective it is possible to argue that forms of the state can change over time and 
space. Second, characteristic of Cox's theory in relation to the interdependence 
theory is that the power relation between various state (and quasi-state) 
institutions can be clearer in the former than the latter. Cox found that the 
literature on interdependence often did not discuss how `mechanisms for policy 
coordination among states and for [permeation] of external influences within the 
states' affect the power structure within states. In connection with this he referred 
to Gourevitch who argued to link the concept of interdependence with `power 
struggles among social forces within states. '218 Third, Cox's analytical focus did 
216 Ibid., p. 109. 
217 Ibid., pp. 109-110. 
218 Ibid.. p. 121, Note 29. 
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not apparently cover ethnicity and gender. This may be seen to be understandable 
to a certain extent, considering the time of his writing in 1981 and the fact that his 
theory derives from a critique of Political Realist theories of international 
relations. This needs to be rectified by different theories. In the meantime, his 
notion of fragmentation of industrial workers in terms of 
`established/nonestablished' and `national/international capital' 219 could explain 
the mixed reactions of unionised workers in the migrant receiving country 
towards the arrival of migrant workers. 
e. Theories of the stale compared 
This section has compared four different approaches in International Relations 
that dealt with the relationship between politics and the economy, and the 
international and domestic, and the forms of the state. Basic assumptions of the 
theories of Morgenthau and Waltz are closer than they may initially appear: both 
approaches share the conviction that analytical autonomy of the political sphere 
needs to be maintained if International Politics is to be a `scientific' discipline. 
Thus neither of them acknowledged that crossing the analytical distinctions would 
be necessary. In addition, the assumption that history repeats itself in world 
politics led them to suppose it to be unnecessary to consider whether forms of the 
state could change. 
Interdependence theory by Keohane and Nye is in contrast with the above 
Political Realist perspectives, in that it introduced economic issues into power 
19 Cox, `Social forces, states and world order', pp. 1I 1-1 1 ?. 
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politics, which is carried out at international institutions and between the state and 
quasi-state institutions of the allied countries, unlike inter-state diplomacy and 
armed conflicts. Its analytical extension of interface of inter-state relation is 
surely different from the Political Realist views; however, this approach is still 
largely state-centric analysis of international politics. In other words, their 
theoretical contribution, namely the introduction of economic issues into power 
politics, does not necessarily translate into theoretical cross-over of the analytical 
distinctions between the four spheres in question (politics/economy, and 
international/domestic). 
In the meantime, through the introduction of the notion of production, 
Cox's theory of a state/society complex has managed to cross over the analytical 
barriers between the four spheres. His assumption that historical events take place 
under different conditions can support the fact that forms of the state change over 
time and space. This is depicted in the argument by Hobden and Wyn Jones, who 
write that Cox's theory provides `[a] theoretical understanding of world orders 
that grasps both the sources of stability in a given system, and also the dynamics 
of a process of transformation. '220 This notion of reconfiguration of the state form 
should lead a researcher to give a more plausible explanation to the events in 
globalisation process, compared with adopting the other approaches discussed in 
this section. Consequently, as far as the crossing of the analytical distinctions 
between the above-mentioned four spheres is concerned, Cox's theory clearly 
provides a suitable and dynamic theoretical framework. In particular, these 
220 Steve Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones, 'Marxist theories of International Relations', Baylis and 
Smith (eds). The Globalization ofli'orld Politics, pp. 200-223, p. 212. 
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developments, which will be presented in more details in Chapters 4 and 5, can be 
plausibly explained based on Cox's perspective: capital mobility transformed 
Japan's international economic structure in the 1970s and 1980s, with one 
culmination being export of Japanese capital since the 1970s, which intensified in 
the late 1980s. The export of Japanese capital then affected the political economy 
of the capital receiving country, particularly Thailand. to create structural 
conditions for international labour migration; the migration then exerted a certain 
degree of influence on Japan's domestic political economy. 
In other words, the significance of Cox's theory is as follows: the fact that 
the state is a core actor in world politics (which is why the state demands careful 
analysis) is different from assuming that the role and capacity of the state will be 
constant over time and place. International labour migration, subsequent change 
in the population of the migrant receiving country, and political issues that derive 
from the above change (e. g., national identity) are cases in point. It is possible 
that an analysis carried out from the neo-neo synthesis perspective may be unable 
to grasp the variable character of the state unless the analyst is mindful of it. In 
contrast, Cox's theory enables to see from the outset that constituents of the state, 
namely members of the society for which the state is responsible, will vary. To 
expand on this point further, conceiving the state from the Coxian perspective is 
important for this study for the following two reasons: first, without an 
understanding that the configuration of the state could change over time and space, 
the state actors might not be able to acknowledge the `deficit in delivering 
collective goods' (justice in terms of equality before law, or of the balance 
between law-enforcement and provision of security, for example) in globalisation 
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process, and also the possibilities where such a deficit may be rectified. if to a 
limited extent. Second and in the meantime, for civil society actors, it is pertinent 
to be aware that there are occasions when working with the state can advance their 
interests, such as curbing the negative impact from globalisation. The state may 
be able to advance interest of civil society actors, depending on the policy agenda 
at the time (and the political resources available, as will be demonstrated in the 
next section). The problem related to human smuggling is a case in point: this 
study has already pointed out that this is one manifestation of globalisation 
process, namely the contest between non-state actors and the state. 22' 
(3) Operation of Domestic Agents of the State 
a. Introductory Remarks 
Having demonstrated in the previous subsection that international economic force 
could influence the domestic political economy of a country, the task in this 
subsection is to specify how such external influence, in particular international 
labour migration, could affect the working of the domestic actors. To do so first 
requires learning from theories of the state that have been advanced in Politics, the 
academic discipline that has examined the functioning of the state and society 
mainly in the domestic domain. Part b of this subsection is therefore going to give 
an overview of theories of the state that are applicable to contemporary Western 
"1 The problems of human smuggling can only be alluded to in this study, since this is in itself an 
important issue in globalisation that merits a close attention. The author intends to conduct such a 
research in the future. 
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nation states. This part will show that, due to an overlap of the contending 
theoretical approaches to the state, namely Elitism, Marxism, and Pluralism, it has 
become possible for analysts to discuss the relation between the society and the 
state in a more plausible manner than relying on only one of these three 
approaches. An effort is also made to see the relation between the above 
convergence and feminist theories of the state. Such analysis is necessary because 
the ensuing chapters of this study will pay attention to the implications of 
developments in globalisation on women migrant workers, particularly the `deficit 
in delivering collective goods', which was mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
Further, this section demonstrates what actions of the state are to be investigated 
in order to discuss the state's response to impacts from globalisation, in particular 
international labour migration. 
b. Convergence of State Theories 
Marsh, a Professor of Politics in Britain, argues that there is `a clear convergence" 
of three major theoretical approaches to the state. 222 Though the differences in the 
basic assumptions remain, the extent of theoretical differences between Pluralism. 
Marxism and Elitism, which were distinct in the first decades of the post-war 
years, became less distinct today. This is the case because the advocates of each 
222 David Marsh, The Convergence between Theories of the State', in David Marsh and Gerry 
Stoker (eds), Theon" and Methods in Political Science (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 268- 
287, p. 268. 
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theoretical perspective have acknowledged shortcomings and revised each theory 
accordingly. 
223 
(a) Core arguments of the conventional theories 
According to Evans and Martin Smith, the core arguments of each of those three 
perspectives prior to the convergence are as follows. Whereas Elitists would 
argue that the state requires elites to rule it, Marxists would claim that the state 
reflects the interests and ideology of the ruling class, and Pluralists would 
maintain that the state is a mediator (or the site) of contending interests. 224 The 
following demonstrates in what respects those perspectives have become closer, 
what are the remaining differences, and then discusses briefly the implications of 
these developments to the analysis of the relation between the state and civil 
society, before moving on to the influence of the theoretical convergence to 
feminist theories. 
22' According to Marsh, this theoretical developments and the subsequent convergence are mainly 
due to the accumulation of academic endeavour, but he also suggests that (at least for Pluralists 
and Marxists) the events in the post-war world had indirect impact on the above theoretical 
reformulation. Such influential social events include the following. For Pluralists, the political 
instabilities in the US in the 1960s 'as a result of anti-Vietnam protest and inner city riots in 
response to racial inequalities' made it difficult for the theorists to be complacent about the social 
realities, and to keep maintaining that the US society was entirely pluralistic. It is within this 
context where the elite-pluralist approach was developed. In the meantime, 'the centralisation and 
abuse of power in the Soviet bloc' in the post-war years undermined the Marxist argument that 
abolition of private ownership would resolve political and social problems, plausibility of 
economic determinism thus eroded. (Marsh, 'The Convergence between Theories of the State', pp. 
273-274) 
224 Mark Evans, 'Elitism', in Marsh and Stoker (eds), Thoerv and Methods in Political Sceince, pp. 
228-247, pp. 229-2330; Martin Smith, 'Pluralism'. in Marsh and Stoker (eds), op. cit., pp. 209-227, 
P. 2 11. 
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(b) The recent theoretical developments in each perspective 
Marsh argues that the recent theoretical developments in each of the three state 
theories include the following. First, Marxist theorists acknowledge the relevance 
of an intentional agent, ideology, and the state in a political process. Major 
theoretical developments in this perspective include the following points: 
(i) Relations between the economic and the political are contingent, not a 
causal one (rejection of economism and determinism). 
(ii) Theories of the state are multiple and they may vary over locations and 
time. Marsh wrote that `relationships between the state and civil society 
[are] historically specific. ' 
(iii) Sources of structured inequality manifest in the state are not limited to 
class; inequalities that can be associated with gender or race can be more 
significant. 
(iv) The state and the social forces operating in it are not unified. `[T]here is 
a plurality which is mediated, if not resolved, through politics. ' 
(v) Increasing analytical attention is given to intentional explanation, or 
operation of the intentional agents who make `strategic judgements [... ] 
within a context characterised by structured inequality. ' 225 
These theoretical developments are due to the following contributions in the last 
few decades. First is one from Gramsci, who acknowledged the importance of 
ideology, actions of agents, and the notion of consent under hegemony. 226 Second, 
Poulantzas advanced the notion or relative autonomy of the state. Though 
criticised later, this notion provided a crucial starting point for the ensuing 
225 Marsh, op. cit., p. 269. 
220 Ibid., p. 274. 
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theorists such as that of Jessop. 227 Third, according to Marsh, the debate between 
Poulantzas and Miliband also contributed to informing contemporary Marxists of 
the role of agency. 228 Fourth, Jessop has tried to overcome economism in Marxist 
thought, and also denied the supremacy of class and emphasised `the importance 
of other social forces, especially gender. ' 229 Fifth, Marsh notes that feminist 
theorists informed Marxist theorists that power relations operate within the private 
sphere, not only in the public, the consequence being that men are relatively 
privileged compared to women (in such terms as the time available to spend in 
public sphere for the pursuit of interests, for example). 230 
Second, in contrast to the above theoretical developments by the advocates 
of Marxist positions, pluralists now take structural constraints seriously. Pluralists 
today agree that access to political process is unevenly distributed to different 
social groups: `some groups are privileged by their role in sub-governments or 
policy networks, while others are excluded. ' 231 In addition, the focal point of 
analysis has expanded from only the official policy-making process to include the 
preceding agenda-setting process. On this point there was an influence by Elitists 
who argued that such agenda-setting power was concentrated to certain political 
actors. 232 However, Pluralists continue to maintain that no one group completely 
dominates the society or the state, and that the formulation and operation of 
privileged groups vary over time. Hence, as Marsh describes, the influence of 
227 Ibid., pp. 274-275. 
228 Ibid., p. 275. 
Ibid., p. 276. 
2310 Ibid., p. 276. 
231 Ibid., p. 270. 
232 Ibid., p. 277. 
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any particular group [in policy-making process] ebbs and flows over time. ' 233 
Third, even though they would insist that emergence of elites is inevitable, the 
advocates of Elitist position now acknowledge that there is no universally fixed 
pattern in which the elite will emerge from the society to rule it, contrary to the 
claim of the earlier Elitists. Whereas empirical evidence advanced by Elitist 
against Pluralist contributed to the latter's acknowledgement of power, 234 the 
Elitists themselves tried to provide theoretical grounds for their position by 
associating their argument either with Pluralism or Marxism. 235 
(c) Remaining difference between the three approaches 
While there is a `clear convergence', or an overlap, between the three theoretical 
perspectives, there certainly exist differences in the basic assumptions of each 
approach. Broadly speaking, these are differences in the focal point of analysis 
and characterisation of structural inequalities. According to Marsh, the first point, 
divergence in analytical focus, is rooted in understandings on structural 
inequalities: namely, Pluralists would not assume such inequalities as given; but 
Marxism and Elitism presume that there are structural inequalities in political 
process. 236 Because of this point, Pluralists would play down analytical 
effectiveness of `broad social categories' such as gender, putting more emphasis 
on the different interests that exist within a wide-ranging group such as 
Ibid., p. 270. 
234 Ibid., p. 277, p. 285. 
?. S 
Ibid., p. 270. 
2 16 Ibid.. p. 281. 
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`women. ' 237 Consequently, Pluralists would pay more attention to policy 
networks and sub-governments than structural privilege. In contrast, Marxists 
would be more interested in: (i) economic/property relations; (ii) gender; (iii) 
`political resources, control of agenda and membership of policy networks' and 
(iv) knowledge. 238 As for the second point, while both Elitism and Marxism 
emphasise the existence of structural inequalities in society, the former sees them 
as inevitable, whereas the latter sees need for change. 
239 
To put matters in another way, whereas Pluralists tend to emphasise 
capabilities of intentional agents, Elitists and Marxists highlight the existence of 
structural inequalities. Both approaches have explanatory power, but neither of 
them would be a plausible account on social events on their own. This 
contradiction derives from an assumption concerning the explanation of events in 
society that causal relation is one way and one-off. To disentangle the above 
analytical contradiction, conceiving the relation between structure and agency as a 
dialectical process would be effective. In this connection, Marsh's argument 
below makes sense: 
`[W]hile politics may decide outcomes, the process takes place in a context 
that is characterised by structured inequality [... ] rooted in class, gender, race 
and knowledge as well as control of political resources. As such, the 
relationship between structure and agency is crucial and the relationship is 
clearly a dialectical one. '240 
217 Ibid., p. 27 1. 
"g Ibid., p. 272. 
239 Ibid.. p. 282- 
240 Ibid., p. 286. 
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Therefore it is possible to conceive the characteristics of the state (or, the relation 
between the state and civil society) as follows: 
(i) The state is a continuous social relation. 241 
(ii) The state institution has its own interests, but it can also mediate (if not 
resolve) different interests. 
(iii) No one group completely dominates the policy making process, but 
political power tends to be concentrate amongst particular groups. 
(iv) Because no one group constantly dominates the operation of the state, 
the boundary between the state and society is blurred, uneven and contingent 
on the timing and the issue in question. 
(d) Feminist theories of the state 
In the following this subsection is going to present in what way the above 
theoretical convergence has affected feminist theorisations of the state. This is 
necessary, because Chapter 6 will consider the implications of the encounter 
between women migrant workers and the migrant receiving country, in particular 
in terms of the delivery of collective goods by the state to the migrant workers. 
According to Waylen, feminist theorists did not explicitly analyse the state until 
the 1990s, as there were claims that the state was too large a unit for investigating 
gender relations. 242 Nevertheless there were some analyses of the state from 
feminist perspectives. However, most of them were about the liberal democratic 
states of the First World, and were either over-generalised or focused on minute 
24 ' George Taylor, 'Marxism', in Marsh and Stoker (eds), op. cit., pp. 248-267, p. 262. 
242 Georgina Waylen, 'Gender, feminism and the state: an overview', in V. Randall et al. (eds), 
Gender, politics and the state (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 1- 17, pp. 3-4. 
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relationships between actors. Watson pointed out that those analyses implicitly 
assumed that: 
`the state is a homogeneous entity and a given which lies almost outside of 
society rather than being something which is created in part as a result of 
interaction with different groups. '243 
In other words, according to Waylen, there has been a dichotomy in feminist 
theorisations of the state, in which the state is seen as either essentially 
potentially good or bad for women as a group. ' 244 Social democratic and liberal 
feminist approaches tend to see the state as good because it may be able to 
empower women by providing opportunities for making economic and political 
gains. The Liberal feminists' view is underpinned by the Pluralists' account that 
the `state can be a neutral arbiter between different groups within society. ' 245 
Waylen cautioned readers on the above view, because the liberal feminists' 
argument `cannot provide a very sophisticated understanding of why the state 
does not always play this role. '246 The contending characterisation of the state has 
been that `it should be avoided, ' which was often held by socialist feminists in the 
1970s. The reasoning for this argument was that the state represented interests of 
capital and gender oppression. Meanwhile, radical feminists claimed that the state 
was `inherently patriarchal' and it operated solely `to uphold and defend male 
interests at the expense of women. '247 
,, I " Waylen, `Gender, feminism and the state', p. 4. 
X44 Waylen, op. cit., p. 4. 
?. JS 
Ibid., p. 5. 
'40 Ibid., p. 5. 
247 Ibid., p. 5. 
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A critique to the above two approaches emerged by the late 1980s. 
influenced by post-structuralist thinking. From this viewpoint, the state is 
conceptualised `as an arena where interests are actively constructed rather than 
given. ' 248 Waylen argued that this approach created a potential for "being 'in' the 
state. "249 Another approach questioned the assumptions of the state as a unitary 
actor, as well as the notion of `a unitary set of women's interest. ' 250 Alvarez 
argued that `the state is not monolithic', and suggested looking at `different 
conjunctures and periods. '251 Waylen linked the above argument of Alvarez to 
claims that in some cases local governments can be more `women friendly' than 
the central government. 252 Consequently, Waylen conceptualised the state in the 
following manner. The state is a set of institutions, not a unitary actor; it is `a 
differentiated set of institutions, agencies and discourses, and the product of a 
particular historical and political conjuncture. ' 253 The relation between society 
and the state is thus more complicated than may be assumed from certain 
viewpoints. Waylen identified mixed capacities of the state for advancing 
feminist goals, hence `a site of struggle. ' She wrote: 
jThe state does not lie] outside of society and social processes, but [has], on 
the one hand, a degree of autonomy from these which varies under particular 
circumstances, and on the other, being permeated by them. Gender (and 
racial and class) inequalities are therefore buried within the state, but 
through part of the same dynamic process, gender relations are partly 
248 Ibid., p. 6. 
Zan Ibid., p. 6. 
150 Ibid., p. 6. 
251 Ibid., p. 6. 
252 Ibid., p. 6. 
253 Ibid., p. 7. 
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constituted through the state. The state therefore partly reflects and partly 
helps to create particular forms of gender relations and gender inequality. 
State practices construct legitimate gender divisions, and gendered identities 
are in part constructed by the law and private discourse which emanate from 
the state. '254 
This subsection has found that the contending theories of the state on its domestic 
operation have become convergent, and that consequently it is possible to argue 
that there are possibilities for agents to advance their political interests, while it is 
also the fact that the political resources necessary for such action are unevenly 
distributed within society. This can be largely applicable when discussing the 
relation between women and the state; whereas the political resources are often 
distributed disproportionately more so for women than men, there are possibilities 
in which a certain branch of the state could advance some parts of certain 
women Is interest, depending on the timing and the kind of interests pursued. 
c. Gauging the state 's response to glohalisation 
In order to gauge the state's response to challenges from globalisation, in 
particular international labour migration, the making and implementation of 
policy, and also accountability of such policy implementation are briefly 
examined below. First, the state would respond to the developments from 
globalisation through: (i) responses of the bureaucracy with the authority alreadl,,, - 
given to them by the existing law; and (ii) if that is insufficient, the state responds 
25' Ibid., p. 7. 
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through making a new law and giving new power to the bureaucracy. 255 Second, 
one of the assumptions about the operation of the modem nation state is that the 
bureaucracy, which is delegated the policy implementation by parliament and 
through cabinet, should be able to limit 'the abuse of power' as opposed to the 
rule by the monarchy or charismatic leaders. 256 This check is important not only 
for protecting the population of that country from the misuse of the power, but 
also because it matters to the continuation of that state. Hence the notion of 
legality and legitimacy are relevant. This study conceives these notions as 
follows. First, legality refers to 'whether the law was made ... 
following regular 
procedures. ' 257 Second, legitimacy refers to whether an entire system of 
government is acceptable, as opposed to the authority of an individual official. 258 
Legality and legitimacy are different matters, as '[r]egulations can be legal 
without being legitimate. ' 259 The significance of legitimacy to the state lies in the 
point that it could affect 'how a regime gains and sometimes loses the people"s 
belief in its right to rule. ' 260 Evans, a British Political Scientist, also explains the 
relevance of legitimacy for the state as follows. As 'the major authoritative 
association' within the territory, it is crucial for the state to maintain 'a monopoly 
of the legitimate use of force. ' 261 Evans argues that state domination requires 'a 
minimum of voluntary compliance; an acceptance of commands as valid non-ns-. 
255 Gabriel A. Almond; G. Bingham Powell, Jr.; Kaare Strom; and Russell J. Dalton. Comparative 
Politics Today: A World 17ew (, 5eventh Edition) (Harlow: Longman, 2000), p. 104. 
256 Rod Hague-, Martin Harrop; and Shaun Breslin, Comparative governments andpolifics: an 
introduction (4th edition) (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 11. 
257 Hague et al., Comparah . ve governments and politics, p. 12. 
258 Hague et al., op. cit., p. 12. 
259 Ibid., p. 12. 
260 Ibid., p. 12. 
201 Evans, 'Elitism', p. 232 
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and a belief in the legitimacy of the form of domination. -)262 In other words, for 
the stability and survival of the state, 'a source of legitimation for their form of 
governance' is indispensable in addition to force. 263 
(4) The Impact of Globalisation on the Relation between the State and Society 
a. Globalisation, migration and the state 
In the previous subsection it has been found that international economic force is 
capable of affecting the operation of the state, namely compilation and 
implementation of policies of the state. To gauge how international labour 
migration as a force of globalisation influences the relation between the society 
and the state of migrant receiving country first requires articulating social 
relations in a way that did not assume the presence of foreign individuals as 
migrant workers. The following three assumptions have been maintained, 
according to Giddens, within the border of nation states. First, the state authorised 
capital to operate within the state border, and in return, the state relied on tax 
income from capital. States assisted capital to operate within their territory by 
providing 'the legal conditions for the establishment and maintenance of property 
rights, which are defined in private terms within capitalism. -)264 The role of the 
state in capitalist societies has also included providing, though in some cases 
'`'`' Evans, op. cit., p. 233. 
263 Ibid., p. 233. 
264 Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political EconomY: Perspectives, Problems, and 
Policies (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), p. 84. 
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indirect, assistance for economic activities such as community services and 
(surveillance' activities. 265 In return, 'revenue [of the state] is dependent upon the 
accumulation process, ' but the modem state does not control the process directly. 
in contrast to the feudal state. ' 266 The state utilised revenue from capital., by 
taxing or borrowing, in order to 'help finance state expansion. ' 267 Second, 
businesses pay wages to employers, and in return use the labour of the employees 
under certain working conditions agreed between the employers and employees 
(and supervised by the state). Third, individuals are entitled to receive protection 
from the state, and in return they are supposed to fulfil certain responsibilities for 
the state. Such conjunction is characterised by 'the relationship between people 
and government which [is] mediated through the institution of citizenship. ' 268 
The presupposition of these assumptions was that the above three actors (the state. 
capital (= social forces), and the individuals) operate within the self-contained 
space of the nation state; this is where the legal-territorial definition of the state 
appeared to be more applicable. However, forces of globalisation bring about 
developments that are contradictory to the previous relationship between the state 
and society, or the destruction of 'domestic social arrangements' due to 
globalisation. 269 Consequences of globalisation include destabilisation of the 
2"5 Anthony Giddens A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. - Vol. I. Power, 
property and the state. (London: Macmillan, 198 1), p. 214. 
266 Giddens, A Contemporary Critique oj Historical Materialism, p. 212. 
267 Robin Cohen and Paul Kennedy, Global Sociology. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 44-45. 
268 Stephen Castles and Mark J. MiI ler, The Age qf Migration: International Population 
Movements in the Modern World (Second Edition) (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 297-298. 
209 Richard Devetak and Richard Higgott, 'Justice Unbound" Globalization, states and the 
transformation of the social bond', InternationalAffifirs, 75(3), 1999, pp. 483-498, pp. 488-489. 
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consensus over management of society and polity. 
270 Devetak and Higgott 
described the challenges we face caused by the above destabilisation as follows: 
(a deficit in the relationship between the de fiacto market led process of 
economic liberalization and integration and de jure state generated 
mechanisms that underwrite the international fora for the delivery of 
collective goods. ' 271 
Such a discrepancy can take the form of the relation between the state and its 
population, whose constituents are changing as international labour migration 
proceeds. Problems relating to the status of the migrant population in the migrant 
receiving country, such as the following, are a case in point. This population has 
not acquired full membership in that polity, and their entitlements (such as social 
welfare and political participation) are limited in comparison to the nationals and 
long-term residents. Some limitation of such entitlements may be justified on the 
basis of the length of her/his stay in that society. However, there could be other 
entitlements that should (ideally) be available indiscriminately, such as certain 
kind of security (bodily security and civil liberty, for example). Chapters 5 and 6 
of this study pay particular attention to availability of such entitlements to migrant 
workers in terms of justice in legal process. 
270 Devetak and Higgott, 'Justice UnboundT, p. 497. 
27 1 Devetak and Higgott, op. cit., p. 495. 
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b. The Nation state and citizenship 
This section is going to review how citizenship has developed in relation to the 
modem Western European nation states, where an alternative source of social 
cohesion was required during industrial i sation. By looking at this process, it 
should be able to find out why the relation between entitlements and obligations 
of both the state and the constituent population is cuffently being questioned in 
globalisation. According to Cohen and Kennedy, development of the modem 
Western European countries can be characterised as a reconfiguration of the 
feudal political economy to a capitalist political economy. This reconfiguration 
process was followed by industrial i sation and expansion of military capability. 
Developments in Western Europe between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries 
have been named 'modemity', with the following three as its major constituents: 
the emergence of the nation state; 272 the development of science; and the rise of a 
body of universal secular thought, or 'the Enlightenment. ' 273 While the ideas of 
the Enlightenment criticised feudalism in political terms, the feudalist mode of 
production was replaced with the capitalist mode of production. Major changes 
that allowed the transition from feudalism to capitalism were the creation of 'a 
fully commoditzed economy' where land and labour are also sold as commodities, 
2 '2 Emergence of the nation state involved use of the following measures, and is closely related to 
the establishment of capitalism in Western Europe: increasing tax revenues, improving 
communications; partially taming nobility by making it more dependent on the perks derived from 
the state; centralizing the nation by suppressing regional identities; monopolizing the most 
efficient means of violence for conducting wars; encouraging and subsidizing technological and 
craft development, investing in naval and army strength; and nurturing local trading classes whose 
wealth could be taxed or borrowed to help finance state expansion. (Cohen and Kennedy, Global 
Sociologj-, pp. 44-45. ) 
2 73 Cohen and Kennedy, op. cit., p. 44. 
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and the dislodging of 'self-sufficient peasants and craft producers from their farms 
and workshops. '274 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, inter-state rivalry between the 
European countries acquired nationalist and industrialised characteristics. One 
representative example of the emergence of nationalism can be found in the 
French Revolution: whereas the universal rights of humanity were proclaimed to 
justify citizens' rights against the French feudal regime, the Revolution 'further 
centralized the French state and, by unleashing citizen armies, propelled 
nationalist fervour across Europe's territories. ' 275 Meanwhile, the political 
significance of the Industrial Revolution, that started in eighteenth century Britain, 
was that industrialisation could lead to greater military capabilities of the state. 
Cohen and Kennedy argue that the European states took the initiative in 
industrial i sation partly because it was a matter of military security for those 
states. 276 
The consequence of industrial isation for the domestic society of modern 
West European nation states included the emergence of the need for an alternative 
source of social cohesion to the one that already existed in feudal society. 
Reconfiguration of European society in the modernisation process involved the 
perceived loss of social cohesion that hitherto existed, which led to the 
advancement of nationalism. According to Cohen and Kennedy, sociologists of 
nineteenth century Europe thought that social consequences of the modernisation 
process were the growth of 'materialism, class conflict, egotism and 
274 Ibid., p. 47. 
275 Ibid., p. 79. 
276 Ibid., p. 79. 
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individualism', accompanied by 'the declining hold of Christianity. ' 277 Among 
such sociologists, Durkheim advanced the notion of the 'conscience collective', or 
'a new set of universally significant moral bonds' [ ... ] 'that championed mutual 
respect for human rights and the sanctity of the individual' in order to respond to 
the above-mentioned problems in the then current society. 278 Despite his initial 
interests in developing universal moral links, after France's defeat in war with 
Prussia in 1817, Durkheirn advanced nationalism as a potential 'substitute for 
declining moral certainties and societal incoherence. ' 279 Cohen and Kennedy 
noted that the surge of socialism in the nineteenth century and the First World 
War also contributed to the building of nationalism. Development of the welfare 
state was linked to the emergence of citizenship, "which simultaneously excluded 
'foreigners' and deepened the commitment of the 'natives' to the state. , 
280 
Nationalism as we know it today consists of various factors that were 
added over time in the modem Western European context. According to Halliday, 
despite claims of a 'long historical tradition' that its advocates would have us 
believe, nationalism is an ideology which has been developed since the eighteenth 
century. During the French Revolution, 
"the opponents of the monarch called themselves la nation, i. e. *the nation', 
meaning by this the community of all French people irrespective of previous 
title or status. [ ... ] The concept of 'nation' was, ... tied to the principle of 
277 Ibid., pp. 80-8 1. 
278 Ibid., p. 81. 
279 Ibid., p. 81. 
290 Ibid., p. 82. 
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equality of all those living within states, to an early concept of 
democracy". 281 
In addition to the above political implication to the nation, the communitarian idea 
was also added. Herder and Fichte promoted the idea of 'the Volk or people, a 
community based not so much on political identity but on history, tradition and 
culture', 282 whereas Mazzini advanced a moral conception of the nation, or an 
idea that each member of a nation 'owes the nation unquestionable obedience. ' 283 
Halliday also suggested that linkage between Rousseau's idea of self- 
determination of communities, and J. S. Mill's idea of representative government, 
have also contributed to the emergence of national iSM. 
284 The notion of an 
6unconditional contribution to the community' attached to nationalism will 
become relevant to gendered analysis of citizenship, because this notion assisted 
limiting provision of citizenship to women. 
Having seen the historical background of the development, this section 
now turns to the analysis of the concept of citizenship. According to Cohen and 
Kennedy, citizenship is a 'modem, western invention' 285 consisting of two 
principles. The first is a notion of universal rights which every member of a 
28 ' Fred Halliday, 'Nationalism', in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), The Globalization (? f World 
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 
359-373, p. 362. 282 Halliday, 'Nationalism', p. 362. 
283 Halliday, op. cit., p. 363. 
284 [bid., p. 362. Consequences of ideology of nationalism in international relations are at least 
fourfold. First, claims of representing the nation, together with the self-determination doctrine, 
provided justifications for the Westphalian states system. Second, nationalism has served as a 
source of 'common identity and consciousness' within societies. Third, nationalism has motivated 
various claims for re-drawing territories. Fourth, nationalism has also been source of armed 
conflicts and wars, particularly in the twentieth century. Halliday noted that nationalism can be 
salient in such forms as 'protests about migration and free trade', and it is one way of 'reaction 
against globalization' (Halliday, op. cit., p. 360, pp. 365-366). 
285 Cohen and Kennedy, Global Sociologv, p. 82. 
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society is entitled to; the second is that in return for the above entitlements. 
citizens are supposed to accept obligations and duties for the society to which they 
belong. Such obligations include 'the willingness to accept military conscription. 
to pay taxes, to seek employment and to obey the law. ' 286 Thus it is evident that 
the notion of citizenship reflects the developmental process of the modem West 
European states and nationalism. T. H. Marshall was among those who first 
theorised citizenship, arguing that citizenship consists of three sets of rights as a 
result of developments since the eighteenth century. The first type of citizenship 
right is civil rights, which include 'the right to own property and arrange contracts, 
to free assembly, speech and thought and the right to expect justice from an 
impartial legal system based on laws which apply equally to everyone. ' 287 The 
second type is political rights, including the right to vote in elections and the right 
to conduct political activities. The third is social rights or the rights to social 
welfare provisions. 288 This classification provides an effective analytical tool for 
discussing citizenship rights. Meanwhile, the notion of citizenship has been 
challenged from at least two perspectives. One of those is from right-wing 
thinkers who have argued that in the last two decades citizens' entitlements, such 
as social welfare provision, exceeded their obligations to the society and thus put 
disproportionate burden on the state. Another criticism is posed against the 
principle of excluding certain members of society as beneficiaries of the 
entitlements. Among the domestic and indigenous population. 'disabled, women 
286 Cohen and Kennedy, op. cit., p. 82. 287 
Ibid., p. 82. 
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and children' 289 are more likely to be excluded from citizenship rights. in 
addition: 
"in a globalizing world, where disadvantaged migrants increasingly seek 
work or political asylum in the prosperous countries, many will encounter 
racism and discrimination from officials or host members and will become 
,, 290 non or partial citizens' . 
In other words, citizenship provision will be denied by the state if someone is 
unable to discharge obligations expected by the state, because: (i) the contribution 
she/he can make to the society and the state is different from what the state 
expects, or (ii) she/he is not legally accepted as a member of the nation. However, 
the above has shown that provision of citizenship has been extended with the 
development of the nation state, which itself was undergoing a state 
transformation at the time. If globalisation involves the transfon-nation of the 
contemporary state, including Japan, it is at least theoretically possible to expect 
that the relation between the state and its population could change accordingly, 
broadening the reach of citizenship entitlements to the population who were not 
assumed to be members of the polity in the nation state, in particular foreign 
residents including migrant workers. 
'81) Ibid., p. 83. 290 Ibid., p. 83. 
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c. Women migrant workers and the nation state 
In the following, the relation between women migrant workers and the nation 
state is briefly considered. This point requires attention here, because the growing 
number of women migrant workers who are present in Japan causes manifold 
concerns for civil society actors, and also unprecedented challenges for the 
Japanese state. It appears to be the case that, contrary to their previous 'invisible' 
status up to the late 1980s, it has become almost impossible for the society and the 
state to (pretend to) ignore the presence of women migrant workers in Japan today. 
Because of the increase in the immigrant population, even if each migrant's stay 
was temporary, there is constantly a sizeable number of immigrant population at 
around two million. This fact should require contemplating upon the relation 
between the state and its population within the progression of globalisation. 
Pettman identified two contrasting risks that women migrant workers 
could face in the migrant receiving country. First, women migrant workers may 
not always be able to expect that the state of their home country would support 
them when they were involved in troubles while in the receiving country. This is 
because the home state may be concerned more about foreign currency revenue 
that the women migrant workers remit to the home country than security of those 
workers as their nationals abroad. 291 Second, there are possibilities that women 
migrant workers face (as with male migrant workers) scapegoating by the 
291 Jan Andy Pettman, 'Gender Issues', in Baylis and Smith (eds), The GlobalLatioil qflf'Orld 
Politics (1997 edition), pp. 483-497, p. 49 1. 
124 
CHAPTER 2 
indigenous population of the receiving country, particularly during -rising 
unemployment and social distress. ' 
292 
Meanwhile, Steans' analysis shows that women migrant workers ha,.,, e at 
least two characteristics, which the state of the receiving country could take 
advantage of. first, as a woman who is a 'second-rate citizen'; second, as a 
foreigner who appears not to share any common identity with the members of the 
nation state. Concerning the first point, kinship imagery that Anderson identified 
in nationalism plays an important role. Steans argued that nationalism contains 
"the powerful imagery involved in merging the idea of national community 
with that of the selfless/devoted mother. This automatically triggers the 
response that one should ultimately prepared to come to her defence or die 
for her". 293 
Thus the state and nation are fused through "a profoundly gendered conception of 
, ). )294 'kinship' and 'home' . The perceived gendered role of women, as those to be 
protected, or those who depend on men, contributes to justify limited citizenship 
granted for women. 295 This point dovetails with the characterisation of citizenship 
by Cohen and Kennedy that was referred to earlier in this section. Second, the 
notion of the nation state as a source of identity has been established so strongly 
that it has been assumed as 'the single irreducible component of identity. ' 296 
192 Pettman, "Gender Issues", p. 492. 
2 93 Jill Steans. Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), p. 
67. 
294 
Steans, Gender and International Relations, p. 67. 
295 Steans, op. cit., p. 68. According to Steans, Western political thought has linked citizenship 
and military service since Aristotle (p. 82). What is relevant here is that citizenship was extended 
to significant part of male population in the modem nation states as opposed to the ancient Greek 
City-states, where citizenship was limited to far smaller number of population. 2% 
Ibid., p. 61. 
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While such an assumption has contributed to the development of the modem 
nation state, another consequence is that alternative sources of identity other than 
this, such as 'gender, along with class, race or other facets of identity', have been 
ignored. 297 Therefore it is possible that the interests of women migrant workers 
may not be taken seriously by some of the population of the migrant receiving 
country, including officials of state institutions. For example, there were 
occasions where circumstances arising from ethnic and gender identities were not 
fully taken into consideration (at least in the viewpoint of some) when women 
migrant workers were put on public trial, in particular, exploitation of and 
violation against women migrant workers by migration brokers, employers and 
customers, which preceded the commission of crime by migrant workers. As will 
be discussed in Chapter 6, questions were raised during these public trials as to 
whether justice was fully realised both for the 'victim' (represented by the 
Japanese state) of the alleged offence, and for those women migrant workers who 
were also victims of violence before the commission of the above-mentioned 
offence. 
(5) The State within the Globalisation Context 
This section has compared different conceptual i sations of the state in order to 
identify the one that can explain the impact of globalisation on the state and 
society. As a result. the section has found that the notion of a state/society 
complex is effective for this purpose. Having confirmed theoretically that 
297 Ibid., p. 62. 
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international economic forces affect the operation of the state, the section then 
considered in what way such forces influence the state. Among several possible 
factors, the study paid attention to the relation between the state and the 
population that constitutes the society. It has also become clear that the state is 
supposed to provide security to its population, including equality before law. 
However, this provision is linked to the institution of citizenship, which is based 
on the building of the nation state. While international labour migration as a 
globalisation force brings foreign individuals to the receiving country, it is 
unlikely that citizenship (including security provision such as equality before law) 
will be automatically extended to these foreign individuals, since the notion of 
citizenship is linked to nationhood. This can particularly be the case for women 
migrant workers, because of the historical characteristics of the notion of 
citizenship. Even though the extent and the manner of the operation of 
nationalism varies across the countries, the above possible insufficiency in 
equality before law to foreign residents could exist in contemporary Japan, as will 
be seen in Chapters 5 and 6. 
5. Conclusion 
The first task of this chapter was to conceptualise globalisation. It has been found 
that globalisation would be more plausibly understood as a historical and political 
project. Technological development is an important factor, but not the only 
driving force of globalisaiton. Hence there should be some, at least theoreticaliv 
and however limited, room for managing the consequences of globalisation. The 
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state, one of the core actors in world politics, has surely been influenced by the 
forces of globalisation, but it has not become obsolete as some of the 
Hyperglobalists would contend; it should retain capabilities to respond to the 
negative consequences of globalisation force, with the possibilities for 
representing the population within the territory. The second task has been to 
demonstrate international labour migration as a force of globalisation. A review 
of the theories of migration has found that capital mobility, a core force of 
globalisation, creates structural conditions for international labour migration. In 
addition, the operation of the migration industry is also important in explaining 
the continuity of migration. It has been found in this chapter that it is possible to 
see international labour migration itself as a force of globalisation. This is based 
on the finding that capital mobility, operation of the non-state actors such as the 
migration industry, and also the fact that technological developments in 
transportation and telecommunication are likely to have contributed to the 
operation of the migration industry. 
The third task is to conceptualise the relation between forces of 
globalisation and the state. In order to account for the developments in the world 
in recent decades. ) where international economic forces have been playing a 
crucial role, it is necessary to transcend the analytical boundaries that were 
assumed in the existing theories of International Relations. This chapter has 
identified that the notion of state/society complex enables an analysis that can 
overcome the analytical boundaries between the international and domestic 
spheres, and the one between politics and economy. What followed the above 
was that the consensus over the management of the state and societv are 
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destabilised because of globalisation forces. Such destabilisation is manifest in 
the fact that the state's provision of various entitlements to its population 
(including the civil rights, such as equality before the law) may not automatically 
be extended to those who are physically present in the society, but not the member 
of the polity or the nation. This problem can be exacerbated for women migrant 
workers because of the historical characteristics of citizenship. 
This chapter has thus examined the above three main concepts in a general 
context, and the theoretical framework presented in this chapter should largely 
suit the contemporary Japanese context. However, considering the fact that the 
process of its building of a political economy has been different from those of the 
West, and also from those in East Asia (including its history of labour migration 
in the twentieth century, as will be shown in next chapter), a theoretical 
framework that is specifically developed for contemporary Japan is necessary. 
This is the task to be carried out in the next Chapter 3. 
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GLOBALISATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION AND 
THE STATE IN JAPAN 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 found the following points concerning interactions between international 
labour migration as a force of globalisation and the state: (i) globalisation is a historical 
and political project in which capital mobility perfouns a key role; (ii) international 
labour migration is a force of globalisation, because capital mobility creates structural 
conditions for population mobility, thus connecting political economies that are 
geographically distant and legally different; (iii) international economic forces affect the 
operation of a state, including that of the state sectors primarily in charge of domestic 
and political/legal issues; (iv) different sectors of the state can produce a response to the 
force of globalisation, namely administrative, legislative and judicial branches of the 
state; and (v) the impact of international labour migration as a globalisation force could 
be manifold: for example, fulfilling domestic economic needs on the one hand, and 
causing perceived threats to domestic security, on the other. In other words, as a 
consequence of the above long and complicated process, intemational labour migration 
as a force of globalisation can cause reconsideration of the relation between the state 
and the population within the territory. 
This chapter applies the above theoretical framework to the specific context of 
contemporary Japan in order to produce a firm foundation for the analysis in the 
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empirical case studies that ensue in this chapter. For that purpose, the chapter examines 
the following: (i) the Japanese state's response to its international structure and the 
subsequent development of its domestic institutions; (ii) the Japanese state's response to 
international and domestic conditions relating to labour migration; (iii) a theoretical 
framework for explaining the Japanese state's maintenance of domestic order through 
controlling crime in response to one of the consequences of international labour 
migration; and (iv) whether and how could the Japanese state counterbalance its actions 
in the maintenance of domestic order, in particular in its relations to its foreign residents. 
This chapter argues that Japan's response to the language barrier problem merits 
enquiry and analysis for the following three reasons: first, the language barrier emerged 
in Japan in the early 1990s as the detected number of crime committed by foreigners 
increased as a natural consequence of growth in the foreign population: in this respect 
the language barrier is one manifestation of international labour migration in Japan. 
Second, the language barrier posed Japan's criminal justice administration partial 
constraints unknown until the early 1990s. Third, while the language barrier thus 
embodies a force of globalisation, the criminal justice administration of a state has been 
an internal (domestic) and political sector; therefore, the way Japan's criminal justice 
administration addressed the language barrier problem shows how the domestic and 
political sectors of the state tackled the challenge from an international economic force. 
namely that of globalisation. 
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2. Japanese State's Response to International Structure 
Chapter 2 found that, in comparison to the other approaches of International Relations, 
the notion of the state/society complex advanced by Cox provides a more plausible 
explanation concerning the operation of the state: it can demonstrate that the impact of 
globalisation forces permeates the legally defined state border both from outside and 
inside, and also can explicate the linkages between economic and political matters. In 
this connection, Hook and others' argument on Japan's international relations is 
pertinent. They argue that (i) Japan's international relations are a consequence of a 
dialectical relationship between international structures and active domestic policy- 
making agents; ' and (ii) international structures 'can impinge actively upon the policy- 
making process within Japan itself. ,2 Drawing from the above theoretical findings, the 
significance of the Japanese state's response to issues in international labour migration 
(namely, the language barrier problem) is that the operation of the criminal justice 
institutions of the Japanese state which has been assumed hitherto as 'domestic' and 
political' has become to a certain extent 'international' and 'economic'. In order to 
identify the characteristics of contemporary Japan's response to globalisation, this 
section is going to demonstrate how external forces have constituted international 
structures for Japan since the late nineteenth century, and how this has affected the 
domestic configuration of the state. 
I Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson, Japan's Inlernational 
Relations: Politics, 
2, economics and security 
(London: Routledge, 200 1 ), p. 25 and p. 4 1. 
Hook et al., Japan's International Relations, p. 40. 
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(1) 1868-1945: From Meiji to Showa 
Globalisation and the ending of the Cold War pose Japanese society and the state 
challenges that are comparable to previous ones from the international system which 
existed from the mid-nineteenth century. Such considerable changes in Japan's 
international relations took place twice, in the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth 
centuries. The first one was the transition from being within a Chinese world order to 
an imperial one. From the seventh century to the mid-nineteenth century, Japan aligned 
itself with the Chinese world order. 3 After self-imposed international isolation for two 
centuries, Japan was 'dragged into a new imperial world order by the early-starters of 
4 Europe and the United States' in the mid-nineteenth century . In order to maintain its 
independence, Japan imported the superior administrative and military technology of an 
external civilization, and unified the country from the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries. 5 In place of China, Japan thus sought alignments with the 'leading 
global powers of the day': Britain in 1902 (the Anglo-Japanese alliance) and Germany 
6 in 1940 (the Tripartite Pact) . Japan simultaneously created a contradictory relationship 
with East Asia: despite claiming to be a part of it, Japan colonised the East Asian region 
to acquire resources, thereby sustaining its independence against the West. The notion 
of dalsua nyfi6 [abandonment of Asia, and joining with Europe] gave justification to 
this practice. 7 It is within this context that Japan caused the extreme damages both in 
3 Hook et al., op. cit., pp. 25-27. 4 Ibid., p. 27. 5 ]bid., p. 27. 6 Ibid., p. 28. 7 Ibid., p. 28. 
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material and psychological terms in various areas in Asia as well as in Japan during the 
Asia-Pacific War. 
The core characteristic of pre-war Japan was that it was an absolute monarchy. 
The institutions of the Meiji state (the cabinet, and the civil and military bureaucracy) 
were responsible to the Emperor 'who did not really rule. 8 Ishida and Krauss argue 
that in the Meiji Japanese state: 
4no one was completely accountable to anyone [in the Japanese state], least of all to 
the people. [ ... ] What 
kept the system functioning was, within the government, the 
quiet coordination of the genr6,9 and, vis-a-vis society, the mobilization of popular 
support through the ideology of complete obedience, loyalty, and sacrifice to the 
emperor, propagated in the schools, the media, and the armed forces. "O 
This imperial rule which was legitimised by the 1889 Constitution and the 
opening of the Diet in 1890 11 shifted in the 1920s, to a certain degree, towards 
representative democracy. Japan introduced male suffrage and a two-party political 
system where 'the principle was temporarily established that the prime minister should 
at least be the head of one of the major parties in the Diet. ' 12 However, it was also in 
this period when the Peace Preservation Law was passed, and the repression of the Left 
was enforced by the Ministry of Interior and the secret police. 13 The above tilting 
8 Takeshi Ishida and Ellis S. Krauss, 'Democracy in Japan: Issues and Questions', in Takeshi Ishida and 
Ellis S. Krauss (eds), Democrao, in Japan (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), pp. 3-16, p. 
6. 
9 According to Neary, 'genrW refers to 'small group of senior statesmen from Satsuma and Ch6shO who 
played a critical role in politics between 1890 and 1940, acting as a link between the emperor and 
government. They intervened in all major political decisions but especially on the choice of a new prime 
minister' (Ian Near-y, TheState and Politics in Japan (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), p. xii). 
10 Ish ida and Krauss ( 1989), 'Democracy in Japan', pp. 6-7. 11 Ishida and Krauss (1989), op. cit., p. 6. 12 
Ibid., p. 7. 1.1 Ibid., p. 7. 
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towards popular democracy was overcome by the advent of ultra-nationalism in the 
1930s. The emergence of ultra-nationalism can be attributable to at least the following 
two factors: first, frustration within Japanese society with the impact of the worldwide 
depression, particularly manifest in the living conditions of the rural poor. Second, a 
political inability to address the above economic impact on society because of the 
malfunctioning of the party system, as the two main parties discredited each other for 
voter support, rather than defending parliamentary democracy. In addition to these two 
factors, Japan was internationally isolated after its invasion of Manchuria in 193 1. 
Economic as well as international difficulties and subsequent anxiety 'led to even 
greater emphasis on a mystical, emperor-centered concept of a collective, unique 
"national polity" and the rise of antiliberal, anti-individual, and anti-Western ideas and 
groups. 14 By 1937 the army took over the Japanese state along fascist lines. The 
assassinations and terrorist attacks by small right-wing groups and the coup attempts by 
young military officers did not achieve their original goals, but provided 'opportunities 
and excuses' for military bureaucrats to accumulate political power within the state. 15 
Hence Ishida and Krauss argue that one of the most important characteristics of pre-war 
Japan was the fact that 'the idea of popular sovereignty was never legitimised under the 
imperial system. ' Even Japanese fascism was one 'from the above', in contrast to the 
Gernian and Italian cases which were 'mass fascist movement[s]. ' 16 
14 
Ibid., p. 8. 15 Ibid., p. 8. 16 
Ibid., p. 8. 
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(2) 1945-1970: Post-war Re-entry into the International System 
The second challenge for modem Japan came in the mid-twentieth century. After defeat 
in the Asia-Pacific War, Japan relied on 'the hegemonic power of the day' again, this 
time the US. Although unarmed neutrality and non-alignment were discussed in Japan, 
before the alliance with the US was institutional ised, 17 the consequence of the above 
alliance was favourable to Japan's national interests until the 1960s. According to 
Hook and others: "[t]he development of Japan's post-war domestic policy and 
international relations took place [ ... ] within the protected, and at times restrictive, 
framework, or 'greenhouse' of US hegemony. " 18 But the 1970s saw the decline of US 
economic power and the 'erosion of the international post-war economic order. ' 19 The 
effects of these developments on Japan's political economy since the 1970s will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, including the beginning of capital export. 
In comparison to the pre-war ones shown above, there is a clear contrast in the 
domestic political institutions that operate in Japan today. The most significant changes 
in comparison to the Meiji Japanese state are: the change from a reliance on military 
force as the main policy instrument to the use of economic power; 20 and the change 
from 'absolute imperial rule' 21 to popular sovereignty. The 1946 Constitution of Japan 
stipulates that sovereignty resides with the people. 22 As 'the highest organ of state 
17 
Hook et al., op. cit., p. 38. 18 Ibid., p. 31 19 
Ibid., p. 3 1. 20 lokibe Makoto, Sentj, (jki: shush(j tachi no shin Nippon (The Occupation Years: Prime Ministers of the 
Japan) (Tokyo: Yorniuri Shinbunsha, 1997), p. 35 
21 Ishida and Krauss, op. cit., p. 6. 22 Article 1, Constitution of Japan, Ishida and Krauss, op. cit., p. 9. 
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power', 23 the power given to parliament (the Diet) increased. The Diet chooses the 
cabinet, 24 while the cabinet is 'responsible to the Diet, and the bureaucracy responsible 
to the cabinet. ' 25 In the Meiji Constitution, the power to deten-nine the prime minister 
and the cabinet members was given to the emperor and his advisors, not to the Diet. 26 
In addition, local governors were appointed by the central government in Meiji Japan. 27 
In contemporary Japan, however, local governments and the courts are subject to 
electoral control . 
28 Further, the post-war political and economic reforms under 
occupation included the encouragement of the growth of political parties, women's 
suffrage, land reform and the break-up of the zaibalsu business associations. These 
reform measures certainly set up the institutional structures for the contemporary 
Japanese polity, despite the fact that this revolution from above continued for only 
about two years, 29 as the Occupation Force's focus shifted from democratisation and 
clemilitarisation, to stability and 'making Japan an ally of the United States in the 
Pacific'. 30 
23 Article 4 1, Constitution of Japan 
111 T. J. Pempel, 'Prerequisites for Democracy: Political and Social Institutions', in Ishida and Krauss 
(eds), Democracy in Japan, pp. 17-37, p. 22. 
25 Ishicla and Krauss, op. cit., pp. 9- 10. 
26 Pempel, 'Prerequisites for Democracy', p. 19. 
27 Pempel, op. cit., p. 20. 28 Ibid., p. 22. 
29 Michael Schaller, TheAmerican Occupation ofJapan. - The Origin oj'the Cold War in. Asia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), p. -5 
1 
. 10 Ishida and Krauss, op. cit., p. 10. 
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(3) Japan and Globalisation from the 1970s Onwards 
a. Japan's Responses to Globalisation in International and Domestic Spheres 
The progression of globalisation and the ending of the Cold War constituted Japan's 
international structure from the 1970s onwards. Internationally, Japan responded to the 
new international structure by re-engaging with Asia through 'soft' regional i sation. 31 
and an increasing degree of commitment to political and security roles in the region. 
Industrial restructuring was on the domestic political agenda, and while internationally 
competitive sectors called for economic liberalisation, uncompetitive sectors resisted it. 
This needs mentioning because industrial sectors' attitude to migrant workers is 
different from the above contrast, as will be shown later in this chapter. Recent 
international population movements to Japan can be seen as one of the consequences of 
Japan's re-entry to the region, as the next chapter will demonstrate. As a result, the 
reconfiguration of political institutions to respond to the increase in the international 
population flow became a domestic issue. This dovetails with the argument by Hook 
and others on the significance of the current ongoing globalisation to Japan: 
jglobal i sation] may over time come to challenge the very notions upon which the 
constitution of that state is founded. 32 
There are contrasting responses among Japan's domestic actors towards 
economic liberalisation. Despite their perceptions on globalisation largely coinciding 
with those of the Hyperglobalists, 33 the ministries' arguments about Japan's possible 
Hook et al., op. cit.. pp. 33-34. 
Ibid., p. '35. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Diplomatic Bluebook 2001, Chapter 2, Section 2. 
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responses to globalisation are various. Those ministries more often exposed to 
international affairs tend to favour economic liberalisation, 34 but those ministries with 
domestic jurisdiction tend to resist it. 35 A similar contrast between advocacy and 
resistance to globalisation also exists within the industrial sectors. There is a common 
understanding in Japan, as far as the management of the domestic political economy is 
concerned, that globalisation is manifested as '[d]omestic deregulation, international 
division of labour, and the entrance of foreign companies'. 36 Industrial sectors that are 
internationally competitive (such as the electric, electronics and automobile industries) 
approve of economic liberalisation, but the sectors that are internationally 
uncompetitive do not, being more concerned about possible social consequences. 
Examples of industrial sectors that have been identified as internationally uncompetitive 
include: cement, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, retail, many rural residents and 
http: //www. mofa. go. jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/chap2-2-a. html (cited 5 February 2003); 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), White Paper on Trade and Commerce 2001, Chapter 
3, Note 42. http: //www. meti. go. jp/hakusho/tsusyo/soron/H I 3/CHU042. htmI (cited 5 February 2003); 
METI, White Paper on Trade and Commerce 2001, Chapter 3,2-5-2. 
http: //www. meti. gojp/hakusho/tsusyo/soron/H I 3/03-02-05-02. htmi (cited 5 February 2003); 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), 'Gaikokujin koy6 mondai kenkyakai hokokusho 
(Report on Foreign Employment Issues)', July 2002, http: //www. mhlw. go. jp/topics/2002/07/tpO7l I- 
l. html 
(cited 8 February 2003). 
National Police Agency (NPA), 'Kokusai soshiki hanzai taisaku ni okeru kokusaikikan tono renkei 
(Cooperation with interriational organisations against transnationall organised crime)'. 
http: //www. npa. gojp/kokusai2/renkei. htm (cited 6 February 2003) 
http: //www. moj. gojp/SPEECH/INSTRUCTION/instructionOI04-008. htmi (cited 6 February 2003) 
http: //www. moj. go. jp/PRFSS/000300-2/000300-2-2. htmi (cited 6 February 2003) 
34 MOM Diplomatic Bluehook 2001, Chapter 2, Section 2. 
http: /'NN,, ww. mofa. gojp/policy/other, 'bluebook/200 I /chap2-2-a. html (cited 5 February 2003); Pempel 
2000, op. cit., p. 213., M ETI, (White Paper on Trade and Commerce 2001), Chapter 4. 
http: /, ý%N, Nvxv. met i. go. j p/hakusho/tsusyo/soron/H 13/04-00-00-OO. htnil (cited 5 February 2003) 
'15 Pempel 2000, op. cit., p. 213. 
. 36 Takenaka Heiz6 and Chida Ry6kichi, 'Japan', in Charles E Morrison. and Hadi Soesastro (eds), 
Dom(-, -stic., 14justments to Glohalisation (Tokyo: Japan Center for Interriational Exchange, 1998), pp. 76- 
102, p. 97. 
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semiskilled workers, insurance, brokerage and banking, 37 as well as chemicals and 
mining, forestry, fishing, transportation and telecommunication. 38 
b. Attitudes towards International Labour Migration 
Similar to other aspects of globalisation, there are those who approve of, and those who 
are opposed to, international labour migration. Unlike the responses to the economic 
liberalisation discussed above, however, some of the domestic sectors implicitly accept 
this form of globalisation. Japan's current labour migration policy was presented in the 
Cabinet Resolution of August 1999, which includes the following aims: 
(i) To promote the immigration of highly skilled workers to revitalise the Japanese 
economy. 
(ii) To remain cautious against officially introducing non-skilled migrant workers. 
(iii) An increase in labour immigration should be a last resort, only after all other 
measures available have been exhausted, namely mobilisation of the elderly and 
women; improving efficiency through automation; and flexible labour 
management. 
(iv) If and when increasing labour immigration, a migration control system should 
be institutionalised that responds to developments in the domestic labour market, 
including any increase in unemployment among Japanese nationals. 39 
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and National Police Agency (NPA) have 
considerable influence on the implementation of Japan's policy on migration, because 
,7T. J. Pempel, RegimeShijk Comparative Dýynamics of the Japanese Political Economy, (with a new 
proýce) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 212 and p. 215. 
. 
38 
Takenaka and Chida, 'Japan', pp. 83-86. 39 Dai 9_ji koy6taisaku kihon keikaku (Cabinet Resolution on the Ninth Basic Plan on Employment), 
Section 9 (4), 13 August 1999. http: h'Nk, NN-Nk,. mhlýN. go. jp/topics/2002/07/di/tpO7l I -I a l. pdf (Cited 7 March 
200, 3) Author's translation. 
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they are capable of enforcing the law on those actors involved in population movements. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is more inclined toward the 
internationalisation of population mobility than other ministries. In its 1999 report, 
MOFA argued that immigration control should be relaxed for those who are eligible for 
elderly care work and nursing, 40 including workers from the Philippines .41 The 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) acknowledges the possibilities where 
migrant workers may be increased, but it was extremely careful in its statements on 
actual implementation, as illustrated by the following possible measures: (i) to forecast 
the number of workers required in each industrial sector before starting to accept 
workers; (ii) to accept such workers for a limited period of time; (iii) to introduce 
taxation on employing migrant workers; and (iv) to conclude treaties with the countries 
42 
conceme . 
MOJ's account shows that the Ministry envisages two contending tasks, namely 
fulfilling domestic labour needs, and the maintenance of domestic order, social cohesion, 
and national identity. The Ministry's 'Basic Plan for Immigration Control' published in 
2000 identifies the core objectives of Japan's immigration control as: 'smooth 
acceptance of foreigners' and 'rejection of unfavorable foreigners. I MOFs cautious 
view on the increase in the population flow in Japan is evident in the following: 
40 MOFA, 'Ajia keizai saisei misshon h6kokusho: 21 seiki no ajia to ky6sei suru nihon o mezashite 
(Report of the Mission for Revitalization of Asian Economy: Living in Harmony with Asia in the 
TNNenty-first Century) (November 1999), Part 
http: //www. mofa. gojp/mofaj/area/asiakeizai/saisei/hokoku. html (Cited 7 March 2003) 
41 MOFA, 'Ajia keizai saisei misshon h6kokusho (Report of the Mission for Revitalization of Asian 
Economy), Part 11-6-(2). 
42 MHI, W, 'Gaikokujin k(ýV(3 niondai kenkYfikai h6kokusho (Report on Foreign Emploj, menl /ssues)', July 
2002. http: //'wN%, N%I,. mhlw. olo.. Ip/topics, 2002,07 1/tp071 I-I. htm] (Cited 7 March 2003 
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'the internationalization of the Japanese society and facilitation of the acceptance 
of foreigners should be promoted only on conditions that social safety and order 
would be maintained. 43 
Finally, NPA is most concerned about the negative consequences of the inflow of 
foreigners. In its interaction with foreign residents, the Agency sees crime control as a 
central (though not only) task. The White Paper on the Police characterised 
undocumented foreign residents as an 'incubator of foreign crime, "' which is 'an 
important issue for domestic security. ' 45 
As to the industrial sector, their perceptions and interests concerning possible 
capacity reduction as economic restructuring coincided with that of the ministries with 
jurisdiction. With regard to international labour migration, the ministries whose 
jurisdiction is within the domestic society resisted international labour migration, or are 
at least cautious about it. Nevertheless, the domestic industrial sectors whose capital is 
internationally immobile and uncompetitive would accept the need for migrant labour. 
In other words, the intemationally uncompetitive sector resists the entry of foreign 
business, but it would choose to accept migrant labour in order to survive. The service 
industry, to which the migrant women concentrate is a case in point, as will be shown in 
Chapter 5. 
This section has examined Japan's response to its international structure and the 
subsequent re-organisation of the domestic structure. Even though some references 
were made to international labour migration, it is important to clarify in the next section 
43 MOJ, Basic Plan for immigration Control (Second Edition), March 2000, Part 1. 
http: /, NNNNNN,. moj. go. jp/ENGLISH/IB/IB2000/lb. html (Cited 7 March 2003) 44 NPA, Keisatsu hakusho (White Paper on the Police) Heisei 12 nenban (2000 edillow (Tokyo: 
6kurasho insatsukyoku, 2000), p. 245. 
45 N PA, Keiswsu hakusho (While Paper on the Police) Heisei 6 nenban (/ 994 edition) (Tokyo: bkurasho 
insatsukyoku, 1994), p. 97. 
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the significance of the international labour migration for the management of the political 
economy of modem Japan. 
3. Japanese State's Response to International Structure: 
International Population Movement 
(1) Holistic Approach to Analyse International Labour Migration to Japan 
Parallel to the developments in the theory of migration demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
international labour migration in contemporary Japan is increasingly explained from a 
holistic approach rather than solely individualistic or structuralist perspectives, as 
shown below. 
In the last two decades, it has been common among some scholars to attribute 
international labour migration to contemporary Japan to income differences, labour 
disparity between the sending and receiving countries, and population growth in the 
sending country. 46 However, this approach is increasingly seen as simplistic and with 
only a limited degree of explanatory power. 47 Some Japanese scholars working on 
international labour migration, including Tezuka and Kuwahara who have been aware 
of this problem since the late 1980s, call for a more holistic approach. Tezuka saw that 
explaining labour migration requires accounting for various factors such as gaps 
k, For example, Haruo Shimada, Japan's "Guest Workers ": Issues and Public Policies (Tokyo: 
University of Tokyo Press, 1994), pp. 33-34; Hiroshi Kornai, A4igrani Workers in Japan (London: Kegan 
Paul Intemational, 1995), pp. 157-160. 
47 Robin Cohen, 'Introduction', in Robin Cohen (ed. ), Theories of Migration (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
1996), pp. xi-xvii, p. xv, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age qI'Aligration: InternatIonal 
Population Movements in the Alodern World (Second Edition) (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 20- 
22, Paul Boyle; Keith Halfacree; and Vaughan Robinson, Exploring Contemporan, Afigration (Harlo": 
Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), chapter 33. 
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between countries in terms of demography and labour supply, income difference, and 
the institutions that promote migration. 48 In the current Japanese case, the lack of 
labour supply of Japanese nationals for the external labour market constituted the pull 
factor for labour migration. 49 Meanwhile, labour mobility emerged as the subsistence 
economy in the agricultural community broke up as a consequence of permeation of the 
commodity economy; some of the labour that accumulated in large cities in the same 
country would eventually convert to international migration. 50 These operate as the 
push factors. 
Kuwahara also noted problems with a neo-classical economic approach in 
explaining international labour migration. 51 Towards an alternative approach, he 
suggested that the following facts about migration should be taken into consideration: 
migration is a time-consuming and complicated process; domestic migration serves as a 
precursor for international migration; migration involves decision making of individual 
migrants; migration requires initial costs to be paid to migration brokers. 52 Further, 
following Sassen's theory, Kuwahara argued that the Japanese economy itself has 
created conditions for the recent international labour migration. 53 His point is important 
for comprehending international labour migration as a process of the regionalisation of 
the political economy in which Japan is actively involved, rather than assuming it is 
merely an external force to which Japan did not contribute. 
48 Tezuka Kazuaki, Gaiokqjin r6d6sha (Foreign Workers) (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbunsha, 1989), p. 
117. 
49 Tezuka, Gaikokqjin r6d6sha, pp. 113-116. 50 Tezuka, op. cit., p. 122. 51 Kuwahara Yasuo, Kokký, (j o kocru r6d6sha (Ilorkers Crossing the Border) (Tokyo: lwanaml shoten, 
1991), pp. 177-180. 5' Kuwahara, Kokkl, (j o koeru r6d6sha, pp. 94-102. 5.1 Kuwahara, op. cit., p. 190. 
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Sellek and Iguchi are among those who in the 1990s urged the building of a 
more holistic theoretical approach to international labour migration. Sellek, the leading 
scholar in Britain on international labour migration in Japan, agrees with Sassen's 
argument that capital mobility contributes to inducing labour migration through 
54 industrial and social transformation of the South . Sellek notes that economic 
development since the 1970s until the economic crisis in 1997 was *the dominant cause' 
of 'mass migration from and within Asia. ' Japan has played a significant role in 
creating a structural linkage between East Asian countries and Japan itself by injecting 
capital in the forms of official development assistance and foreign direct investment. 
Japanese capital exported abroad assisted recipient countries' export oriented 
industrial i sation. This economic development process contributed to the generation of 
international labour migration, since the impact of economic development on the 
domestic population, such as the transition from an agrarian economy to wage labour in 
export oriented industry, tended to be uneven. Hence the recent international labour 
migration to Japan 'reflects not only Japan's regional economic hegemony, but also 
highlights an important structural characteristic of the world capitalist economy. ' S, 
Iguchi, a prominent labour economist in Japan, also identified a linkage between 
economic development in East Asia and intemational labour migration. He argued that 
although income difference and labour disparity are contributing factors to labour 
migration, they are not the only ones. Iguchi claimed that the existence of immigration 
brokers induces potential immigrants to go to Japan, even when there is relatively high 
unemployment among the domestic population. It is therefore unlikely that 
54 Yoko Sellek, Aligrant Labour in Japan (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 200 1), pp. 2-3. 
Se I lek, A figrant Labour in Japan, pp. 5 -6. 
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unemployment among Japan's domestic population is due to the presence of immigrant 
workers. 56 Having proposed to discuss international labour migration in terms of 
regional policy coordination rather than the migration control policies of one country, ý' 
Iguchi noted that regional economic integration in East Asia produces a potential 
immigration flow, in particular in manufacturing sectors where industrial restructuring 
could occur. 58 In this connection, economic development in East Asian countries in 
recent decades tended to create domestic (not international) income differences, which 
could result in international population movement. '9 
The arguments of the above two scholars show that international labour 
migration is a manifestation of the increasing interconnectedness of political economies 
in East Asia, or of a progression of globalisation. In other words, for Japan, 
international labour migration is both a consequence and cause of globalisation. It is a 
consequence, because the export of Japanese capital created structural conditions for 
population mobility. It is also a cause of globalisation, since the migration affects 
Japan's political economy by sustaining domestic economic sectors whose capital is 
immobile internationally, and in turn reveals the need to accommodate problems of 
migrants, and also affects the configuration of Japanese national identity. 
56 Iguchi Yasushi, Gaikokqjin Rodosha Shinjidai (Foreign workers in a new era) (Tokyo: Chikuma 
Shobo, 200 1), pp. 134-139 57 1-uchi, Gaikokqjin Rodosha Shinjidai, pp. 16-17. 
S9 Iguchi, op. cit., pp. 166-167. Iguchi went on to argue that '[ijntegration of regional economy does not 
reduce excess labour and chaotic international labour mobility in a linear movement. ' (Iguchi, op. cit., p. 
168) 
59 
Ibid., p. 170 
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(2) 1868-1945: Prevalence of Migration in Imperial Japan 
Sellek writes that 'the recent problems associated with foreign workers are not new', for 
'Japan has experienced streams of both immigrants and migrants for a very long time. ' 60 
The following very brief outline of Japan's labour migration in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries demonstrates that management of the political economy in modem 
Japan almost always involved either emigration or immigration of labour. 
Understanding the above should enable the appreciation that in the long run (instead of 
focusing on Japan's three decades during the post-war years), international mobility of 
labour is an integral part of the operation of the international political economy, rather 
than 'a deviance from the prevailing norm of social organization at the world level. ý61 
During the 1868-1945 period, a substantial number of both emigrants and 
immigrants existed in Japan. Labour migration was required for Japan's economic and 
war management during these years, and the state was often directly involved in 
migration projects. Between 1868 and 1941, the Japanese state promoted emigration in 
62 
order to counter the perceived population growth . Major 
destinations of the Japanese 
emigration up to the 1910s included Hawaii, California and Canada, as well as various 
locations in Asia. From the 1920s, emigration to Brazil, Peru and other South American 
countries began, with half a million Japanese estimated to be living in North and South 
America by around 1940. Another destination from 1932 was Manchuria 
('Manchukuo'). This emigration was designed partly to accommodate Japan's 
60 Sellek, op. cit., p. 15. 61 Aristide R. Zolberg, 'International Migration in Political Perspective', in M. Kritz, C. Kelly and S. 
Tomasi (eds), Global Trends in Aligration. - Theory and Research on International Population Wovements 
(New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1981), pp. 3-27, pp. 6-7. 
62 Yoko Sellek, 'Nikkeijin: The phenomenon of return migration', in Michael Weiner (ed. ), Japan's 
ifinorities: The illusion (? f homogeneiO, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 178-2 10, p. 187. 
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territorial expansion, but also to reduce domestic population pressure after the economic 
depression in the 1930s. Approximately 1.8 million Japanese settled in Manchuria in 
1937.63 Table 3-1 shows that more than one million Japanese emigrated from the late 
1860s to 1945. These migrants (except for those who went to 'Manchukuo' but later 
managed to return to Japan) became the first generation of overseas Japanese. Table 3- 
2 indicates that as many as 2.5 million Japanese lived abroad, about half of them in 
Korea and Taiwan under Japanese control. " 
Table 3-1. Japanese immigrants, 1868-1945 
1868-1898 1899-1924 1925-1931 1932-1941 1942-1945 
North America 89,962 302,772 14,417 4,258 
Middle and South 
Americas -- 70,588 82,285 91,063 
Southeast Asia 37,060 25,376 25,740 
'Manchukuo' -- -- -- 180,534 89,473 
Total 89,962 410,420 122,678 301,595 89,473 
(Source: Tanaka Hiroshi, Zainichi gaikokujin (Foreigners in Japan) (Tokyo: lwanami shoten, 1991), p. 
189, Table VIII-2)65 
Table 3-2. Japanese expatriates, 1900-1944 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1944 
In Korea 15,829 171,543 347,850 527,016 707,742 712,583 
In Taiwan -- 98,048 166,621 232,299 346,663 397,090 
Subtotal 15,829 269,591 514,471 759,315 1,054,405 1,109,673 
Other 
destinations -- 275,745 541,784 740,774 1,421,156 -- 
Total 545,336 1,056,255 1,500,089 2,475,561 
(Source: Tanaka, Zainichi gaikokujin, p. 193, Table V 111-3)" 
Immigration was also frequent in pre-war Japan. During the Meiji period, 
skilled foreigners (the majority of them were merchants) from Europe, America and 
63 Sellek, Aligrant Labour inJapan, pp. 16-17. 
64 Table 3-1 shows flow of emigrants during each period. In contrast, Table 3-2 presents the stock of 
overseas residents at each year. In addition, Korea and Taiwan are not included in Table 3-1, while 
'Manchukuo' is included in 'Other destinations' in Table 3-2. 
05 Tanaka compiled this table from the data published by MOFA and JICA in 1979. 
66 Original sources which Tanaka relied on for this table include MOFA's data published in 1988. 
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China arrived in Japan. 67 Koreans also migrated between 1910 and 1939 and supplied 
labour in Japanese industries. 68 According to Michael Weiner, there were both 'push' 
and 'Pull' factors for Korean migration to Japan after the 1910 Annexation. The push 
factors included '[e]conomic deprivation and political suppression in Korea'. whereas a 
pull factor was an '[a]ctive recruitment of colonial labour to meet the labour demands in 
[post World War 1] economic expansion. '69 He also found that a 'labour recruitment 
70 
system' had been established in Japan by 1917 . Consequently, Weiner's explanation 
of Korean labour migration to Japan largely overlaps with the theory demonstrated in 
Chapter 2 (population growth and domestic income difference on the part of the sending 
country; demands for flexible labour supply on the part of the receiving country, and the 
role of the migration industry). 
Following the enactment of the Kokka s6d6inh6 (National General Mobilisation 
Law) in 1938, Japan officially began importing labour from Korea and China. 71 After 
decades of 'voluntary' migration, Japan started to conscript Koreans from 193 9.72 
Among the 724,727 Koreans who were drafted, 342,620 of them worked in coal mines, 
67,350 in metal mines, 108,644 in construction work, and 206,113 in factories and other 
73 74 jobs, resulting in approximately two million Koreans living in Japan by 1945 . 
Meanwhile, from 1942 to 1945 about 40,000 men were drafted from China and sent to 
67 Sellek, A4igrant Labour in Japan, p. 18. 
68 Sellek, op. cit., p. 18. 
69 Michael Weiner, 'The representation of absence and the absence of representation: Korean victims of 
the atomic bomb', in Weiner (ed. ), Japan's A4inorities. - The illusion of homogeneity, pp. 79-107, p. 84. 70 Michael Weiner, Race and Aligration in Imperial Japan (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 56. 71 , Fanaka Hiroshi, Zainichi gaikokqjin (Foreigners in Japan) (Tokyo: lwanami shoten, 199 1), p. 194. 12 Kan Chunia, Kim Puja, Kim Hunja; Kim Yunam; and Kim Chinja, A4otto shiritai Vari/ii'mondai. - sei to 
niin: oku no shiten kara (Learning more about the 'Comfort Women' issue. - ftom the perspectives of 
sexuality and ethnicity) (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1996), p. 52. 73 
Tanaka, Zainic-higaiokiijin, p. 195, Table Vill-4, which is based on the data published by MOF in 
1947. 
74 
Sellek, op. cit., p. 19. 
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135 factories and mines in Japan . 
75 The actual number of Chinese people forcibly 
drafted by Japan must have been larger than the above-mentioned figures, according to 
Sugihara, drafted Chinese were detained in China before being transferred to Japan 
proper, and some of them died during detention. 76 Japan's industrial sectors where the 
Chinese workers were posted include construction, mining, shipbuilding and dock 
work. 77 Among them, seven thousand are reported to have died in Japan. 78 Further, 
Japan carried out the 'Comfort Women' policy from 1932, in which more than 200,000 
were forced to serve as 'Comfort Women'. 79 The Japanese military asked private 
brokers to conscript women for sexual slavery, 80 and the military controlled the 
migration of the women and provided transportation. 81 For many of the 'Comfort 
Women' who managed to survive the war, the transportation turned out to have been 
82 
one way. 
75 These figures are based on the report compiled by MOFA in 1946. ChOgokujin ky6sei r6d6jiken 
fukuoka sosh6 genkoku bengodan, Ayamachi o mitome, tsugunai, tomoni aymu ajia no rekishi o (Admit 
the guilt and compensate toward the history that Asia and Japan can share) (Fukuoka: Rigaru bukkusu, 
200 1), p. 16; Sugihara T6ru, Chugokujin ky6sei renk6 (Forced Labour Migration of the Chinese) (Tokyo: 
lwanami shoten, 2002), p. 2; p. 3 1. 
76 Sugihara, Chugokujin ky6sei renk6, pp. 58-72. 77 Tanaka, op. cit., p. 195, Table VIII-5. 78 ChOgokuj in ky6sei r6d6 j iken fukuoka sosh6 genkoku bengodan, Ayamachi o mitome, tsugunai, tomoni 
aymu qj . ia no rekishi o, p. 16. 79 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Contemporary Forms of 
Slavci-v. - Vsieniatw rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict h. l. Special 
Rapporteur Gav J. McDougall (EICN. 41Sub. 211998113), p. 3 8. 80 
Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Hayashi Hirofumi (eds), Ky6d6 kenkyfi nihongun iar? fu (Japanese military 
,C, omfbrl Women'. - ajoint research) (Tokyo: btsuki shoten, 1995), p. 36. 81 Cabinet Councillors' Office of Exterrial Affairs, Cabinet Secretariat, 'Statement concerning the so 
called Comfort Women issue (4 August 1993)', in Ishide Norita, Kim Puja and Hayashi Hirofumi (eds), 
', Vihongun iar? /u' o d(i osieruka (Teaching the 'Japanese Military Con? fort Women' at School) (Tokyo: 
Nashinokisha, 1997), pp. 148-149. 82 Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jfigun iaqffi ('Com1bri JVomen) (Tokyo: lwanami shoten, 1998), pp. 211-213), Kan 
et al., A folio shirilai Vaqfu'mondai, p. 76. 
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(3) 1945-1970: the 'Absence' of Migration in the Post-War Japan 
Migration flows from and to Japan continued after its defeat in the Asia-Pacific War and 
up until the beginning of the post-war economic growth. The most significant 
migration outflow was the return migration of the Japanese from the former colonies 
and the occupied areas. This amounted to 5.7 million in the few years after the defeat in 
83 
the war. On the other hand Japanese people continued to migrate to the US, Canada, 
Argentina, Paraguay, and other South American countries until the 1960s, reflecting 
'the economic difficulties experienced in Japan at that time. ' But a few years later, 
demands for domestic labour increased as the Japanese economy began to grow. 84 The 
availability of domestic labour is among the main reasons why Japan's post-war 
economy managed to grow rapidly without resorting to migrant labour, unlike the cases 
of Western Europe or North America from the late 1940s to the beginning of the 
1970s. 85 However, demographical characteristics of Japan's post-war economic growth 
exhibit a stark contrast with its previous war economy management, in which Japan 
conscripted the Koreans and the Chinese to supply labour. 
Korean migration was also significant in the post-1945 years. Out of the two 
million Koreans who lived in Japan in 1945, approximately two-thirds returned to 
Korea. But 600,000 either did not return to Korea at all or came back and settled down 
in Japan again after a brief stay in Korea, because it was extremely difficult for them to 
re-establish their lives there. 86 Similarly, some of the Taiwanese residents in Japan at 
the end of the Asia-Pacific War remained in Japan because of civil war and for 
83 Sellek, Mýizranl Labour in Japan, p. 17. 
84 Sellek, op. cit., p. 17. 85 
Ibid., pp. 21 -25. 86 
Ibid., p. 19. 
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economic reasons. 87 A further example of population movement occurred between 
1959 and 1984, when Koreans who were resident in Japan returned 'pen-nanently to 
their homeland in North Korea. 88 The emigration numbered 93,000, including '1,831 
Japanese-born spouses' who accompanied the resident Koreans leaving Japan. 89 
According to Neary, this is 'the first and only mass migration from a developed 
industrial country to a communist state. '90 In addition, because most of the Japanese- 
born spouses are women (thus called 'Nihonjinzuma'), their living conditions in North 
Korea have become 'a major humanitarian and bilateral issue between Japan and North 
Korea in the late 1990s. 91 Concurrently, another migration flow in addition to the post- 
war population movements were the Korean 'stowaways', which continued to exceed 
500 cases a year after 1965. This is why "the term 'illegal foreigners' generally implied 
Koreans who had entered Japan as stowaways" before 1975.92 
87 Andrea Vasishth, 'A model minority: The Chinese community in Japan', in Weiner (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 
108-139, p. 13 1. 88 Hook et al., op. cit., p. 177. 89 Ibid., p. 177. 
90 Neary, The Siate and Politics in Japan, p. 2 10. 
91 Hook et al., op. cit., p. 177. A number of those Nihonjinzuma have reportedly returned to Japan in 
2003. According to Miki Emiko, an attomey-at-law and civil rights campaigner, resettlement of those 
returnees in Japan could potentially render important impact on Japan's national identity in the future, in 
particular if the number of the resettlements increased with the arrival of their siblings as well. Miki 
Erniko, e-mail posting on mailing lists, 33 1 January 2003. 
(p Sellek, op. cit., p. 19. 
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(4) 1970s onwards: the 'Return' of Migration to Japan 
The characteristics of the flows of international migration that Japan has experienced 
since the 1970s reflect the events related to the ending of the Cold War and the 
progression of globalisation. For example, from 1975 Japan began to accept 
Indochinese refugees; 93 'the number of foreigners working on tourist visas started to 
increase around 1975'; 94 and the first round up and deportation of women migrant 
workers without authorisation was in 1979. However, the Japanese public became 
aware of increasing immigration only in the late 1980s, when the number of male labour 
migrants surpassed that of the women migrants. The debate in Japan on whether and 
how to accept migrant workers followed the above recognition. Japan subsequently 
revised the Immigration Control Act in 1989 and implemented it in 1990. The revised 
Act sanctioned a limited number of migrants to work in Japan legally, while banning the 
brokering and employment of undocumented migrant workers. 
By the late 1990s the volume of immigration inflow to Japan became largely 
stable. Approximately 4 to 5 million foreigners stay in Japan for less than a year, and 
another 2 million stay for more than a year. In contrast to the late 1980s when the core 
issue of migration was whether or not to accept migrants, the central matter concerning 
migration in the 1990s is the extent and the manner of accepting migrants in Japan. 
This coincides with the increasing understanding that the population of Japanese 
nationals of working age continues to decline. These developments, however, do not 
93 
Tanaka, op. cit., p. 144. 94 
Sellek, op. cit., p. 19. 
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necessarily imply that the Japanese govemirnent would legally and openly allow more 
migrants to come to work, as explained earlier in this chapter. 
4. Maintenance of Domestic Order: Controlling Crime 
There are at least two main implications of the increase in the number of foreign 
residents in Japan: first, some industrial sectors benefit from being able to employ cheap 
labour; second, in contrast, the state institutions, in particular the criminal justice 
institutions, have conceived that the presence of foreign residents is a potential threat for 
domestic order and internal cohesion. This section presents a theoretical framework for 
explaining the Japanese state's operation in crime control. 
At the outset, however, two points concerning the characteristics of crime in 
Japan committed by foreigners need mentioning. First, more than half of the 'crime by 
foreigners' is related to immigration control offences, and is not immediately 
threatening to the Japanese population, as will be shown in Chapter 5. Second, the so- 
called 'New Comer' migrant workers who arrived in Japan since the late 1980s, are less 
likely to commit criminal offences in comparison to Japanese nationals and long-term 
foreign residents in Japan, except for very small number of organised criminals who 
commit robbery and other crimes. 95 Hence it is implausible to contend that the migrants 
arrived in Japan in the last decade are more likely to commit offences than other groups 
in Japan. 
95 Nakamura Shinichir6, "'Keisatsu hakusho" no gaikokujin hanzai bunseki hihan (The Analysis of crime 
Committed by foreigners in the White Paper on the Police: a critique)', A4igrants'-netto, No. 22, October 
1999, pp. 5-7; No. 2-33, November and December 1999, pp. 5-7; '2001 nenban "Rainichi gaikokujin hanzai 
no genj6 to taisaku" eno hihanteki kenkai (Critical Comments on "Crime Committed by Foreigners: the 
Present Situation and the Measures")', Migranfs'-netlo, No. 4 1, August 200 1, pp. 10- 16. 
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(1) Policy-making Process 
A theoretical analysis of the Japanese state's response to an international impact of 
migration, namely the language barrier, begins with the policy making process. This is 
the process where an authority to exercise state power, which will then be given to an 
administrative branch of the state, is created. This research takes an holistic approach as 
advanced by Hook and others, in which the following actors are analysed: the 'iron 
triangle' of the central bureaucracy, LDP, and the business community, which 
influences policy-making; 96 non-LDP political parties (whose role has become more 
important since 1993), and civil society actors such as mass media, think tanks, sub- 
state political authorities, and pressure groups, NGOs, social movements and public 
97 
opinion. In particular, the Diet, the bureaucracy, and the civil society actors demand 
analytical attention in this research for three reasons. First, as the 'highest organ of the 
state', the operation of the Diet reflects Japan's response to globalisation, namely 
international labour migration. Second, the Diet grants authority to the bureaucracy to 
operate in accordance with the law, 98 including the branch of the state in charge of 
controlling population flow and crime. Third, civil society actors can cooperate with 
and assist bureaucrats, or even be partially delegated to operate the bureaucracy. and 
they can also hold the bureaucracy responsible for its operation. 
Hook et al., op. cit, p. 61. 97 Ibid., pp. 41-65. Big business and large trade unions are excluded from this analysis because they are 
'invisible' with regard to the foreigner crime issues. Local branches of Immigration Bureau and the 
Judiciary could correspond to the 'sub-state political authorities', but in comparison to the prefectural 
governments, they are more coherently controlled by the central bureaucracy. The role of mass media 
seems to be relatively limited in this particular issue of the language barrier. 98 Frances Rosenbluth and Michael F. Thies, 'Politics in Japan', in Gabriel A. Almond, G. Bingham 
POWell, Jr.; Kaare Strom, and Russell J. Dalton, Comparative Politics Todqv: .4 World View (Seventh Edition) (Harlow- Longman, 2000), pp. 327-370, pp. 3133-3136. 
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The notion of 'patterned pluralism' is effective to analyse Japan's policy making 
process, since it applies the convergence of state theories discussed in Chapter 2 to the 
specific contemporary Japanese context. Muramatsu and Krauss argue that there are 
three main characteristics of Japan's policy-making process. First, political parties and 
interest groups permeate the government and participate in the policy-making process, 
thus the boundaries between the state and society are blurred-99 Second, the above 
integration between society and the state is possible because only one party has almost 
always been in power in post-war history; the LDP as a 'catch-all' party tries to respond 
to different social interests. 100 Third, the party-interest group alliances are divided by 
'ideological cleavage' which means that there will be an antagonistic relationship 
between the alliances 'over important value issues. "01 
Japan's law-making process will now be described. In a parliamentary 
democracy, the law-making process would non-nally include: (i) discussion of an issue 
which culminates in a bill; (ii) the introduction of the bill to parliament; and (iii) the 
enactment of the law. The law-making process in Japan's Diet follows these steps: 
A group of Diet members (at least 20 lawmakers in the House of 
Representatives, 10 in the House of Councillors) can propose a bill. ' 02 
(2) The Speaker of the House refers the bill to the appropriate committee. ' 03 
99 Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss, 'The conservative policy line and the development of patterned 
pluralism', in K&6 Yamanaka and Yasukichi Yasuba (eds), The Political Econom ,v ofJapan 
f'olume 
The Domestic Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 5 16-554, p. 537. 
100 Muramatsu and Krauss, 'The conservative policy line and the development of patterned pluralism', pp. 
5' , 37-538. " Muramatsu and Krauss, op. cit., p. 538. 102 Article 56, Kokkaih6, author's translation. Examination and negotiation of the bill by the ministries 
concerned and the policy board of the ruling party (most frequently the Policy Affairs Research Council 
of 1.13P) that precede the submission to the Diet play a crucial role in the lawmaking process (Neary, op. 
cit., pp. 13 1-139), but these are out of the scope of the current study. 103 
Article 56. Kokkaih(j. 
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(3) The committee examines the bill to decide whether the bill should be put to the 
vote in the plenary session of the House. ' 04 
(4) If approved by the House, the Speaker sends the bill to the Cabinet. The 
Cabinet reports the bill to the Emperor. ' 05 
(5) The law will be promulgated within thirty days after the report to the 
Emperor. 
106 
It can be seen that Diet committees perform a key role in the legislative process, for 
bills cannot be discussed in the plenary session unless the relevant committee decides to 
send them to the ftill house. The constitution and the role of Diet committees are 
defined by law as follows: 
(1) There are standing committees and ad hoc committees in the Diet. 107 
(2) A standing committee examines bills, resolutions and petitions that fall within 
its jurisdiction. 108 
(3) A member of the Diet will be assigned to at least one standing committee 
post. 
119 
(4) Each committee may submit bills to the plenary session. ' 10 
In addition to examining the bills, the committees perform another role, namely to hold 
'the ministers to account and scrutinize their operations. '''' The committees are 
104 
Article 56, Kokkaih(j. 
105 
Article 65-1, Kokkaih(j. 
106 
Article 66, Kokkaih(j. 
107 
Article 40, Kokkaih6. 
108 
Article 41-1, Kokkaih(;. 
109 
Article 42, Kokkaih(j. 
110 Article 50-2-1, Kokkaih(j. 
Jonathan Bradbury, 'Parliamentary question', in Ian McLean (ed. ), The Concise Oxford Diclionatý, 
Polilics (Oxford: Oxford Universitý Press), p. 36 1. 
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authorised to conduct 'investigations in relation to government. ' 112 Procedures for 
questions at the Diet committees are as follows: 
(1) A member of the Diet can, with the permission of the Speaker, pose questions 
to the Cabinet and the member is normally required to submit the prospectus of 
her/his question to the Speaker. 
(2) The Speaker transfers the prospectus to the Cabinet. 
(3) The Cabinet must answer within seven days. 113 
Consequently, through the Diet committee debates, (i) the administrative branch of the 
state is held officially accountable for its operation to the lawmakers as representatives 
of the Japanese citizens; and (ii) lawmakers can communicate to the administrative 
branch of the state any new interests emerging in civil society. Stockwin thus writes: 
'[t]he committees of each house are [ ... 
] the most important forum for parliamentary 
debate. ' 114 This aspect of the parliamentary committee's function is relevant for this 
research, 115 and it is reported in Chapter 5 that the Diet committee debate on judicial 
interpreters formed the beginning of an important law-making process. 
In the 1990s the significance of multi-party coalition in the 1990s emerged. 
After 1993, it became unavoidable for the ruling party to consult coalition partners in 
the policy-making process. Such consultation continued even after 1996 when the LDP 
regained the parliamentary majority. Between 1996 and 1998, the LDP consulted the 
112 J. A. A. Stockwin, Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy, (Third Edition) (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999), p. 114. 11.1 Articles 74 and 75, Kokkaih(j. 114 
Stockwin, Goveiwing Japan, p. 120. 
115 This study is aware of the critical role that LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) plays in 
Japan's policy-making process (Muramatsu and Krauss, op. cit.; Rosenbluth and Thies, 'Politics in 
Japan'; Hook et aL, op. cit., pp. 40-55: Neary, op. cit., pp. 132-139; and Stockwin, op. cit., p. 150). But 
this study does not probe into its working, not because it is irrelevant (on the contrary. it is indeed so), but 
because the fact that the PARC has such a strong influence does not contradict with the legal stipulation 
of the Diet as 'the highest organ of the state' in relation to the Cabinet and Bureaucrac\. 
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SDPJ and Sakigake, and then the Liberal Party (the New Conservative Party from 2000) 
and the New K6meit6 after 1998.1 16 As a result this party-political environment, where 
smaller coalition partners were influential in the policy-making agenda, may have made 
it possible for those parties to place the issues that they were interested in, such as the 
language barrier, on the agendas of the parliamentary committee debates. 
The final point of this section demonstrates the way in which the following state 
institutions operate when addressing suspected offences by foreigners: the immigration 
bureau; the police; public prosecutor; defence counsel; and the courts. The subsection 
nil above showed that the Japanese state's response to a challenge from globalisation, 
namely the language barrier, could be identified in debate at the Diet committees, or 
through the making of a new law. The responses of the administrative and judicial 
branches to the language barrier will be described for each of the above five institutions. 
(2) Immigration Bureau 
a. Core goals of the Immigration Bureau'S operation 
The Immigration Bureau aims to defend and promote Japan's national interests through 
the control of the flow of people into and from its territory, and of the stock of foreign 
residents. The Bureau grants permission for foreigners to enter and stay in Japan for 
limited periods of time on the condition that they engage only in activities specified at 
116 
Neary, op. cit., p. 138- 
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the time of such permission. ' 17 The Bureau does not allow foreigners to enter Japan if it 
suspects that those foreigners could pose a threat to Japan's domestic security and 
national interests. '' 8 Foreigners will be detained by an Immigration Control Officer for 
primary inspection upon arrival if they were suspected to be ineligible for entry, or if 
there are irregularities in their residential status (namely illegal entry. employment, or 
overstay). The Officer will, within 48 hours of detention, send the suspected foreigner 
to an Immigration Inspector for further inspection. There are three stages for an 
examination into an offence of the Immigration Control Act (ICA) - the inspection 
referred to the above is the first stage. In the second stage, a foreigner who does not 
agree with the Immigration Bureau's finding can appeal to a Special Inquiry Officer, 
and then to the Minister of Justice. 119 If found to have violated the Act, that foreigner 
will be deported. 120 However, when an appeal was found to have reasonable grounds, 
the Minister of Justice can grant a special residential permit. 121 
Foreigners with the following capacity and qualifications will be permitted to 
enter Japanese territory and work: diplomats and their families; officials of a foreign 
government or international organisation and their families; university and college 
teachers; artists; priests; journalists; investors and business managers; lawyers and 
accountants; doctors; researchers; school teachers; engineers; persons with special 
knowledge of trade, marketing, translation, interpretation, language instruction and 
designing; intra-company transferees; entertainers; artisans; cultural activists; short term 
117 Article 2, Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (ICA). 
119 Article 5, ICA. 
119 
Articles 44-49, ICA. 
120 Article 24, ICA. 
121 Article 50, ICA. 
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visitors; university and college students; students; technical trainees; and. those who 
visit Japan to stay with their family who are already in Japan. 122 
b. Major developments in the Immigration Bureau's history 
As Hatano and others (the current or former senior level immigration officers at the time 
of writing) indicate, Japan's immigration control in the post-war years was affected by 
the consequences of Japan's policy in East Asia in the first half of the twentieth century, 
and the onset and the ending of the Cold War in the region. Immediately after the Asia- 
Pacific War, Japan's immigration control was under the control of the Occupation 
Force. 1 23 The current immigration control system was thus institutionalised by the US 
military. Authority over immigration control was partially transferred to the MOFA in 
1948 and then full authority was given to the MOJ in 1952 after the conclusion of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty. 124 US service personnel were exempted from the subject 
of Japanese government's immigration control after 1945, and this legal status has 
remained the same since 1952.125 The control of Koreans and Taiwanese was the 
Immigration Bureau's main task during the Cold War years. 126 Matsumoto wrote that 
the subject of Japan's foreign resident control in the post-war years was technically that 
of the Koreans and the Taiwanese; 127 Sklar notes that the post-war immigration law, 
122 
Annexes I and 2 to Article 2-2, ICA. 
i2l Hatano, Isamu; Kurashima Kenji; Tanaka Shinya; Shigemi Kazutaka; and Ishizaki Y01chi, Gaikokujin 
no h6leki chii: kokusaikajidai to h6seido no arikata (Foreigners' Legal Status: how the legal sYstem 
should be in the era ql'internationalisation) (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 2000), p. 67. 1 '4 Hatano et al., Gaikokujin no h6teki chii, p. 107. 125 
Hatano et al., op. cit., p. 105. 126 
Ibid., pp. 67-175. 127 Matsumoto Kunihiko (comment and trans. ), GHQ Nihon seng6shi dai 16 kan: gaikokujin no 
loriaisukai (The Histoo, qIJapanese Occupation ýv GHQ, volume 16: Treatment (? f Foreigners) (Tokyo: 
Nihon tosho sentd, 1996), pp. ix-x. 
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institutional i sed by the US military, was designed to protect Japan against possible 
infiltration by Communists. 128 The Japanese state has changed the legal status of 
Korean residents several times before finally granting rights to permanent residency. ' 29 
In the 1970s, the origins of foreigners who arrived in Japan diversified compared 
to the preceding two decades. In 1978 Japan ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. The impact of the beginning of the end of the Cold War manifested 
with the arrival of Indochinese refugees. As it began accepting those refugees from the 
mid-1970s, Japan ratified in 1981 the Refugee Convention and the Protocol. 130 The 
ratification was primarily aimed at laying the groundwork for accepting the Indochinese 
refugees, but another implication was the subsequent improvements in social welfare 
provision to Koreans (and Taiwanese) who had seriously been excluded due to 
limitations based on Japanese nationality. ' 31 Another important development since the 
1980s concerning the treatment of Korean and other long-term residents was the 
abolition of the fingerprinting requirement for foreign residents. The Alien Registration 
Law required foreign residents in Japan to be fingerprinted at the time of the first 
registration and subsequent re-registrations. The discriminatory character of this 
practice was challenged mainly (though not solely) by Korean residents in 1988. After 
128 Deborah Sklar, 'Testing Japan's Anti-Korean Law', The Nation, June 25,1990, at 866; reprinted in 
Curtis J. Milhaupt; J. Mark Ramseyer; and Michael K. Young (eds), Japanese L", in Context: Readings 
it, socict 
* v, 
Econom. y and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 200 1), pp. 213-216, pp. 
215-216 
, 129 Removal of Japanese nationality in 1952; (Hatano et al., pp. 102-104) Law No. 126 in 1952 (Hatano 
et al., pp. 106-107); K, volel eýffiken of 1965 (Hatano et al., p. I 11), Tokubetsu e4fi Aj, oka in 1981 (Hatano 
et al., pp. 150-154). 
130 Hatano et al., op. cit., pp. 1 7-150. 131 Ibid., pp. 149-150. 
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modifications to the requirements, the fingerprinting requirement was finally abolished 
in 1999.132 
c. The Immigration Bureau's current basic policy 
From the late 1980s onwards, the increase in the number of foreign workers originating 
from places other than Korea or Taiwan became evident even to the majority of the 
Japanese. 133 After a number of years of domestic debate that followed the above 
recognition, Japan revised the Immigration Control Act in 1990. Major points of the 
revision included the expansion of the qualifications for legal entry and the prohibition 
of the entry and employment of unskilled workers. ' 34 The Act was revised several 
times in the decade for a number of different purposes: the criminalisation of human 
smuggling in 1997; the acknowledgement in 1998 of Taiwanese travel documents as a 
valid passport; the criminalisation of illegal stay and the extension of the period of 
refusal of re-entry against former deportees from I year to 5 years, in 1999; 135 and the 
criminalisation of hooliganism and violent demonstrations in 2002.136 
The goal of Japan's immigration control, namely, to accept 'foreigners 
welcomed in Japan' while not accepting 'unskilled' and/or 'illegal' foreign workers. 
was reconfinned in 'The Basic Plan on Immigration Control (Second Edition)' in 
132 
Ibid., pp. 168-175. 
133 It is possible to speculate that some sort of patriarchal power operated to make the presence of the 
migrant workers 'invisible' (Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases (London: University of 
California Press, 2000), p. 198), considering the fact that substantial parts of migrant workers in Japan 
from the 1970s to the m id- I 980s were women. 
114 Hatano et al., op. cit., pp. 155-161. 
1.11-S Ibid., pp. 165-168. 13(, Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, 'ShutsunyOkoku kanri oyobi nanmin ninteih6 no ichibu 
kaisei (Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act Partially Revised)% Kokusaijinryfi. January 
2002, p. 19. 
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2000.137 There are some indications of probable change in the policy. First, ex, . en 
though the Immigration Bureau continues to claim that it would not implement an 
amnesty for undocumented foreigners, it does grant special residential permits to illegal 
visa overstayers with 'good' behaviour. 138 Second, at the level of official statements, 
the Immigration Bureau claims that it takes illegal foreign workers' human rights into 
consideration when processing them for deportation. 139 An account by Sakanaka, a 
high-ranking immigration official, merits attention in this context. 
'[I]Ilegal foreign workers refer to foreigners who violated the Immigration Control 
Act by being solely engaged in unauthorised work, or who are employed after 
entering Japan illegally, or who illegally overstayed in the country. Such 
offenders must be treated strictly in accordance with the Act. But in the meantime, 
since they are present in Japan, even for the illegal foreign workers, the basic 
human rights stipulated in the Constitution of Japan are guaranteed to them, 
because they are workers for businesses in Japan, the labour laws such as the 
Labour Standard Law and the Minimum Wage Law are applied in the same way 
as Japanese nationals. Therefore, sufficient considerations must be made in order 
to guarantee those rights [when the government officials treat those illegal foreign 
workers]. , 140 
A further complicating issue is that the Immigration Bureau operates under 
resource constraints, in particular in terms of the number of immigration officers. In 
137 MOJ, 'Syutsuny6koku kanri kihonkeikaku (dai 2 ji) (Basic Plan for Immigration Control, Second 
Edition)% 24 March 2000, www. moj. go. jp (cited 21 August 2001); Sakanaka Hidenori, 'Gaikoujin no 
nyOkoku, zairyO, taikyoky6sei o meguru shomondai (Issues concerning entry, residence and deportation 
of foreigners)', In Sakanaka Hidenori, Nihon no gaikokujin seisaku no k6s(j (4 ýcenarioft)r Japan's 
Foreigner Poli(-j,, ) (Tokyo: Nihon kajo shuppan, 2001), pp. 135-160, p. 138. 
138 MOJ, 'SyutsunyOkoku kanri kihonkeikaku (dai 2j I)". 
139 MOJ, op. cit., Sakanaka, 'GaikoUjin no nyOkoku, zairy6. taikyoky6sei o meguru shomondai', pp. 150- 
151,153 
* 140 Sakanaka, op. cit., p. 15 1. Translated by the author of the dissertation. 
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1995, the total number of Immigration Officers was approximately 2.400.14 1 The ICA 
allows the Bureau to request the Police and the Coast Guard to assist in detention and 
deportation. 1 42 Sakanaka argues that Japan's Immigration Bureau was probably one of 
the most efficient compared to other countries that have received large numbers of 
immigrants, refusing 15,000 entries and making 65,000 deportations in 1994.143 This 
resource limitation, however, could constrain the Immigration Bureau from moving 
towards the ideal presented above. 
(3) The Police 
a. Core goals 
The core goals of the police are to protect the rights and liberty of individuals, and to 
maintain public safety and order. 144 Their responsibilities towards the above goals 
include: to protect the life, body and property of individuals; and to prevent, suppress 
and investigate crime, arrest suspects, and maintain public safety and order. 1 45 
Consequently, police officers are authorised to investigate suspects and uncover 
evidence when they consider there has been a crime committed. 146 
141 Sakanaka H idenori, 'Tairy6 shutsuny6koku j idai ni okeru shutsOnyOkoku kanri no aratana tenkai (New 
Developments in Immigration Control Policy in the Era of Large Number of Emigration and 
mmigration), in Sakanaka, Nihon no gaikokujin seisaku no k6s(j, pp. 161-190, p. 164. 42 
Articles 39 and 52, ICA. 143 Sakanaka, 'Tairy6 shutsunyOkoku jidai ni okeru shutsOnyOkoku kanri no aratana tenkai', p. 175. 144 Article 1, Keivalsuh6, author's translation. 145 
Article 2, keisalsuh(j. 
146 Article 189- 1, Keýjisosh(jh(j (Code of Criminal Procedure). 
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b. Control o the police and the role of the police in crime investigation ?f 
Similar to other aspects of post-war reform, Japan's police forces underwent 
democratisation, and then followed a reverse course from the late 1940s to the 1950s. 
Post-war reform measures of the police directed by the Occupation Force included the 
abolition of the Peace Preservation Law, dissolution of tokk6 keisalsu (secret police) 
and the Ministry of the Interior, since parts of the Ministry supervised the operation of 
the pre-war police. The 1947 KeisatsuW devolved its authority to maintain a police 
force to local government and municipalities, but the 1952 revision of the law 
technically reverted authority to maintain a force back to both the central and local 
governments. 147 Meanwhile, 'civilian control' of the police is institutionalised in 
KeisatsuW: the Prime Minister appoints and dismisses members of the National Public 
Safety Commission; ' 48 those who were police officers or public prosecutors in the past 
five years cannot be appointed as members of the Commission. 149 The head of the 
Commission appoints, with the approval of the Prime Minister, the Commissioner 
General of the National Police Agency. The Agency then directs and supervises the 
prefectural police force. 
150 
Despite the above democratisation, there is a certain degree of continuity in the 
police. According to Aoki, a researcher on the Japanese police, the Ministry of the 
Interior argued in 1946 before its dissolution that, 
147 Aoki Osamu, Nihon no k6ankeisatsu (Japan's Security Police) (Tokyo: K6dansha, 2000). pp. 42-67. 
148 Articles 7 and 9, Keisatsuh(j. 
149 Article 7, Keisatsuh(j. 
lio Article 16, Keisalsuh(j. 
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'The functions of the police are twofold. One is to serve the public as official 
vigilantes for the protection of the life and property of individuals. The other is to 
operate with authority in order to enforce the execution of the law, which is the 
manifestation of the will of the state, for the guarantee of security and the 
maintenance of the unity of the state. ' 
151 
Operational sections of the police today normally consist of those in charge of criminal 
affairs, traffic control, civil safety (seikatsu anzen), and guard, in addition to 
administrative and support sections. ' 52 The first tasks mentioned in the above quote 
largely fall within the responsibility of the criminal affairs, traffic control and civil 
safety sections. Aoki argues that, the guard section in today's police force carries out 
the second task mentioned above. 1 53 If the police actually continue to conceive their 
role as protecting the interests of Japanese nationals and the state, it would not be 
surprising if the police conceived the foreigners as entirely outside of the constituents of 
the Japanese polity. 
The role of the police in crime control is to detect possible crime, investigate 
suspects and evidence, arrest and interview suspects, and to decide whether or not to 
send suspects and cases to the public prosecutor. While the police have discretion over 
it, they have to make this decision within 48 hours of an arrest. Such limitation in time 
is one of the resource constraints for the police. In addition, they also operate in 
collaboration with other branches of the state: police officers are required to cooperate 
with the public prosecutor; and the prosecutor in turn can instruct and direct police 
151 Aoki, Nihon no k6ankeisalsu, p. 46. 152 NPA, 'Keisatsu no shikumi (Organisation of the Police)'. http: //www. npa. go. jp/koho I /sikumi. htm 
(cited 10 February 2003) 
IS1, Aoki, op. cit., p. 20. 
167 
CHAPTER3 
officers on a criminal investigation. 154 Also, as mentioned above. immigration officers 
can ask the police to detain suspects of, and deport those convicted, an Immigration 
Control Act offence. 
c. Policy on controlling crime committed byforeigners in the 1990s 
The National Police Agency's White Paper on the Police indicate key policy issues 
identified by the Agency. 155 An overview of the White Paper's description on crime 
committed by foreigners in the 1990s suggests that the focal points of controlling the 
crime have changed in the late 1990s in comparison to the early 1990s. The 1989 
version expected that the police would have to watch closely trends in crime committed 
by foreigners. In the 1990 version, published almost simultaneously with the revision 
of the Immigration Control Act, the White Paper associated foreign workers with 
potential criminals in a blanket manner. It used such terms as 'foreign workers', 'illegal 
residents', 'illegal workers' and 'rainichi gaikokujin (foreigners visiting Japan)' in 
almost interchangeable ways. 
After 1993, the focal point shifted to human smuggling from China, and 
professional criminal organisations. The White Paper ceased to associate 'foreign 
workers' categorically with crime. The shift in the conceptual isation largely coincides 
with the time when the number of entries from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Iran decreased 
in the early 1990s. Aoki reported that, in the 1990s, the foreign affairs section of the 
police (which constitutes a part of the security police) was working on the issue of 
154 Article 76, Keisafsuh(j, Articles 192 and 193, Code of Criminal Procedure. 
1.55 NPA, Keisatsu Hakusho (Whitc Paper on the Police) (Tokyo: bkurash6 insatsukyoku, 1989-2000). 
168 
CHAPTER3 
crime committed by foreigners, including undocumented Iranian workers, and human 
smuggling from China. 156 The Japanese government suspended the visa waiver 
agreement with those countries in 1991 and 1993. Between 1994 and 1998, the While 
Paper repeatedly reported the high incidence of crime among the rainichi gaikokqjin in 
comparison to the entire population in Japan. This has been criticised as weakly 
substantiated. 
157 
The While Paper's description of crime committed by foreigners varied in the 
last decade. The 1997 version of the White Paper began presenting three categories, 
namely (i) illegal residents and illegal workers; (ii) rainichi gaikokqjin criminals; and 
(iii) foreign/international crime organisations as the target for controlling foreign crime. 
The term international professional criminal group first appeared in 1993, and 
foreign/intemational criminal organisations have been a subject since the 1997 version. 
From 1997 onwards the White Paper reports that international organised crime has 
entered the agenda of the G8 Summit Meeting. The White Paper's conceptual 1 sation of 
crime relating to women migrant workers has apparently changed since 1999, when it 
began to use the term 'sexual exploitation of women and children. ' Until then, the issue 
was seen as one aspect of 'illegal employment. ' The recent characterisation may 
possibly be suggesting that the police see the issue as a human rights problem of women 
migrant workers. Such a shift in the characterisation. of controlling the crime committed 
by foreigners is similar to that of the Immigration Bureau reported in the previous 
156 
Aoki, op. cit., pp. 157-158. 157 For example, Nakamura Shinichir6, 'Kensh6 ishihara hatsugen: keisatsuch6 no rainichl gaikoku. 1 in 
hanzai bunseki hihan (Validity of Mr. Ishihara's remark examined: a critique of National Police Agency's 
analýsis of the rainichi gaikokujin crime), in Utsurm Aiko et al. (eds), 'Sangokujin 'hats ugen to --ainichi 
gaikokqjin ('The Third Paro, Nations'and the Foreigners in Japan) (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 200 1), pp. 
94-120; H. Richard Friman, 'Gai linhanzai: Immigrants and Drugs in Contemporarý Japan',. 4sian SurveY, 
, 16(10), 1996, pp. 964-978, p. 975. 
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subsection. Whether and in what way the human rights of women migrant workers 
were addressed by the police are the matters of future research. 
(4) Public Prosecutors 
a. Power given to Public Prosecutors 
The power and responsibilities authorised to the public prosecutor include the 
following: first, to bring an indictment against a criminal suspect and to request the 
court to justly administer criminal law to the defendant. Second, to supervise the 
execution of a sentence. Third, to act as a representative of the public interest as 
authorised by other relevant laws. ' 58 The public prosecutor is authorised to investigate 
any crime, 159and she/he can direct police officers to investigate a criminal case. 
b. Significance qf interpretation in the investigation 
Prior to pressing criminal charges against a suspect, a public prosecutor interviews the 
suspect and compiles a record of the interview into an interrogation protocol: the 
protocol is an edited record of interrogation, not a verbatim record. As David Johnson 
writes, Article 321-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
'enables prosecutors to shape 1he. form of confessions [ ... ] 
by permitting them to 
compose written summary of statements (ky6jutsu ch6sho or dossiers) of what the 
159 Article 4, kensatsuch(jh(j, author's translation. 
159 Article 6, Kensalsuch6h(j. 
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suspect says during interrogation. Thus, prosecutors are not required to record the 
suspects' words verbatim. ' 160 
As will be explained in Chapter 5, the protocol technically serves as evidence that 
constitutes the alleged crime. Prosecutors are required by law to compile the 
interrogation protocol in Japanese, not the language of the suspect. This may appear to 
be solely beneficial to the prosecution, but compiling the protocol in Japanese is in fact 
a double-edged sword. From the viewpoint of a foreigner suspected of an offence, there 
is a possibility of their statements being incorrectly registered due to imprecise 
interpretation, which could lead to a possible miscarriage of justice. The prosecution 
may also inadvertently compile an inaccurate protocol because of the possible 
incompetence, or bias of, the interpreter. This could possibly lead to a failure to convict 
the defendant, with two possible implications: first, it would be devastating for the 
public prosecutor who is likely to be proud of herself/himself for practicising the so- 
called 'precise prosecution. ' This is clearly illustrated by an account by Ornori Reiko, 
who used to be a public prosecutor from 1987 to 1994, and who investigated a number 
of foreigners suspected of offence. She wrote: 
'It would probably be the toughest challenge for a public prosecutor if the outcome 
of a criminal case is affected by a factor that is beyond the control of the investigator 
herself/himself' 161 
The second implication refers to the perception of the migrant receiving state. in which 
inigrants are considered as potential threats to domestic order. Failure to convict the 
160 David Johnson, TheJapanese Wqj, ofJustice. - Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p. 39. Emphasis in original. "I Omori Reiko, 'GaikokuJ in jiken ni okeru shih6 ts6yaku no genj6 (The Present Status of Judicial 
Interpretation for Foreigner Cases). ' http: /'reiko-ohmori-com/reiko/home. htmi (cited 13 January 2003) 
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defendants could mean that the state (i. e., the criminal justice institution representing 
the state) is not entirely successful in controlling crime. In other words, not being fully 
operational in responding to international labour migration as a force of globalisation. 
The significance of interpretation in criminal investigation will be discussed further in 
Chapter 5, where Japan's criminal law is examined in order to elucidate the basis of 
legal decisions by the court in criminal cases as to whether the defendant is guilty or not. 
(5) Defence Counsel 
a. Lawyers'stalus in Japan'S judiciary 
Lawyers in Japan are independent from, but have a close relationship with, the state. 
The mission of a lawyer is to protect basic human rights, to realise social justice, 162 and 
to endeavour to maintain social order and to improve the legal system. 163 Under the 
Meiji Constitution, lawyers used to register with the Shih&W, which retained the 
authority to take disciplinary action against lawyers, and Bar Associations were under 
the supervision of the Shih6 daýin (the Minister of the Shih&W). 164 Lawyers and the 
Bar Associations became independent of the Ministry of Justice after the introduction of 
the current Constitution. 165 The law requires lawyers to set up a Bar Association within 
the Itirisdiction of a District Court, ' 66 and the Bar Associations collectively form the 
162 
Article I-1, Bengoshih6, author's translation. 163 
Article 1-2, Bengoshih(j. 
164 Watanabe Fumiyuki, H(imush(i (Ifinistry qf. histice) (Tokyo: Intertnedia, 200 1), p. 187. 
165 Watanabe Fumiyuki. Mmush(j. p. 187. ' 166 
Article 32, Bengoshih(j. 
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Japan Federation of Bar Associations. 167 Even though the operation of lawyers and Bar 
Associations are outside of its jurisdiction, the MOJ maintains that it has indirect 
influence over lawyers to the extent that it is in charge of the management of the law 
regarding lawyers (bengoshiW). 168 
b. Defence lawyers'role in criminal cases 
Defence lawyers are severely limited in their ability to defend a criminal suspect 
because of the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Defence counsels are able 
to do relatively little before a suspect is indicted and public trial begins, by which time 
an investigation is usually over and the meticulously prepared investigation protocol as 
evidence is ready. Johnson writes that '[t]he legally ordained importance of defence 
lawyers places prosecutors in a position of "absolute and incommensurable 
advantage. "' 169 However, 'the introduction of the "t6ban bengoshi seido (duty counsel 
system)" in the early 1990s has improved the situation somehow. ' 170 It is probable that 
the quality of defence can be contingent upon the location and capabilities of the 
individual lawyer. This expectation can be supported by at least the following two 
points: first, the distribution of lawyers is geographically skewed. 171 Second, some of 
Japan's defence counsel occasionally 'assist' prosecutors to get the trial going rather 
167 
Article 45, Bengoshih6. 
168 Watanabe Fumiyuki, op. cit.. pp. 187-188. 169 
Johnson, The. Japanese Way qf'Juslicc. pp. 73-75. 17() 
Johnson, op. cit., p. 74, footnote 20. 171 Ibid., p. 79. 
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than remaining on the defendant's side. One possible reason for this can be attributed to 
the fact that there are lawyers who used to be judges or public prosecutors. 172 
(6) The Courts 
a. Post-war reform and the relation between the courts and the Ministry ofJustice 
The Japanese Constitution stipulates that the judicial power to make legal decisions 
belongs to the Supreme Court and the other lower courts, 113 and that judges are bound 
only by the Constitution and Japanese law. 174 The significance of the above will be 
more evident when the relation between the courts and Shih&W (Ministry of Justice 
under the Meiji Constitution) is compared with the one between the courts and 
Ll. ýZ 
llumusW (Ministry of Justice under the current Constitution). Under the Meiji 
Constitution, Shih&W supervised the courts, 175 and Shih6 da4in (Minister of Justice 
under the Meiji Constitution) retained the power to supervise the judiciary. 176 In 
addition, the court budget constituted a part of that of the Shih6sh6.177 With the 
enforcement of the Constitution of Japan and the Court Organisation Law in May 1947, 
the courts became independent from the Ministry of Justice. 178 
The conditions of the appointment of judges, provided in the Constitution, 
indicate that the judiciary should be accountable to Japanese citizens. The Emperor 
172 
Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
1'. " Article 76- 1, Constitution of Japan. 174 
Article 76-3, Constitution of Japan. 175 
Watanabe Furnlyuki, op. cit, p. 86. 176 
Ibid., p. 185. 177 
]bid., p. 185. 178 
Ibid., p. 86. 
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appoints the Chief Justice, who is nominated by the Cabinet; 179 and the Cabinet 
appoints the Justice of the Supreme Court, 180 and the judges of the lower courts who are 
recommended by the Supreme Court. 1 81 
b. Characteristics in the operation of the courts 
It is pertinent to note here that Japanese courts can make three kinds of legal decisions: 
(i) in criminal cases, (ii) in civil cases, and (iii) for the maintenance of the legitimacy of 
the state. First. ) 
in criminal cases, the Japanese state's interest is almost always upheld 
by the court. Johnson reports that in criminal cases, the judges' decisions are largely 
consistent with the expectations of the prosecutors, illustrated by the fact that more than 
ninety percent of indicted criminal cases result in a conviction. Judges rarely reject a 
prosecutor's request for arrest warrants, detention warrants, and do not admit bail unless 
the suspect is expected to maintain her/his confession. ' 82 In addition, the vast majority 
of a prosecutor's evidence is admitted and sentencing frequently complies with 
prosecutors' expectations. Hence prosecutors enjoy 'almost complete insulation from 
judicial scrutiny of their charged decisions. ' 183 Johnson argues, however, that even 
though they have 'commanding influence over judges'), prosecutors do not dominate 
judges. He claims that prosecutors 'understand the judiciary so well [that] they can 
calculate decisions to elicit agreement instead of opposition. ' 184 The above 
Article 6-2, Constitution of Japan. 
180 Article 79- 1, Constitution of Japan. 
181 Article 80, Constitution of Japan. 
182 Johnson, op. cit., pp. 61-62. 18.1 Ibid., p. 63. 184 
Ibid., p. 65. 
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4understanding' can be made during legal training, as well as through personnel 
exchange between judges and prosecutors. 185 
Second, when handling civil cases, the courts act as a neutral arbitrator between 
society and the administrative branch of the state, as well as between civil society actors. 
This is in contrast with the courts' role in criminal cases. Steinhoff described the 
Japanese court in this context as 'a forum for the resolution of social conflicts. ' 186 This 
is one manifestation of the complex and changing characteristics of the state, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, where it can both assist or prevent the interests of civil society 
actors. Lawsuits on basic human rights between civil society actors and the Japanese 
state are cases in point, as will be mentioned in the next section. Third, as shown in 
Chapter 2, the state tries to maintain its legitimacy to remain in power, and the judiciary 
performs an important role in such maintenance of legitimacy through making legal 
decisions. The courts could contribute to sustaining the legitimacy by endorsing the 
state's action; but in some cases, rejecting one of the state's actions (namely that of the 
administrative branch) may in the long run be instrumental in keeping the state 
legitimate, since that would give the state an opportunity to rectify the consequences of 
its previous actions. 
This section has demonstrated the historical background, the role defined by law, 
and the capability, of the state institutions in Japan's criminal justice administration. 
The above analysis provides a background for explaining the operation of those 
institutions involved in controlling crime committed by foreigners. These state 
185 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 186 Patricia G. Steinhoff, 'Protest and Democracy. in Ishida and Krauss (eds), op. cit., pp. 171-198, p. 
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institutions merit an analysis in this research, because their actions for controlling the 
crime constitute the Japanese state's response to the challenge from international labour 
migration as a force of globalisation. 
5. Continuity and Discontinuity in the Japanese State's Treatment of Foreigners 
from the Meiji to Contemporary Period 
Order and justice are two competing values in politics. Order reached without due 
attention to justice may be possible to sustain for some time, but could also be untenable 
in the long run without incurring additional maintenance costs. With regard to a 
migrant receiving state's response to the increase in the migrant population, controlling 
crime constitutes that state's practice for maintaining domestic order. This practice has 
to be counterbalanced by ensuring that those individuals subjected to crime control 
would not face an abuse of state power. In this connection, whether citizenship rights 
are realised, in particular equality before the law, is a yardstick to examine whether state 
power is abused or not. In addition, the pursuit of the realisation of citizenship rights 
requires both a legal structure and actual, daily practice. In the following, this section 
gives an overview of the developments in the legal structure and actual practice in 
modem Japan towards the realisation of citizenship rights, in particular protection from 
state power in the criminal justice process. It will be shown that there are both 
discontinuity and continuity in terms of state practice and transformation of the state as 
tar as the search for the realisation of citizenship rights for foreigners in Japan are 
concerned. This is particularly important, because the key question of this stud), is to 
test the Transforniationalist thesis of globalisation relating to Japan. 
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Citizenship rights nominally existed in Meiji Japan. The Meiji Constitution 
stipulated some rights of Japanese subjects, but those rights were easily superseded by 
imperial decree and other laws. 187 In contrast, the Constitution of Japan guarantees 
various citizenship rights, or 'basic human rights. ' 188 These include universal suffrage, 
rights to petition, human rights in relation to criminal procedure, social welfare, and 
rights to education. The above stipulation on the rights in criminal procedure reflects 
the abuse by the police state during the pre-war years. However, the fact that they are 
written in the Constitution or the relevant law did not automatically warrant that these 
rights materialised. Various kinds of basic human rights were contested in the post-war 
years between the civil society and the state through petition, or in the court. Such 
cases included: social welfare provision; environmental pollution (water pollution by 
mercury and cadmium and air pollution); religious freedom; anti-militarisation; and 
labour rights. 
189 
Citizenship rights have certainly been institutional i sed in Japan after the post- 
war refon-n. However, foreigners in Japan benefited from the Japanese Constitution 
only to a limited extent. 190 In this respect there exists continuity from the pre-war 
Japanese state to the contemporary Japanese state with regard to the differential 
187 Mori Hideki, 'Kihonteki jinken (Basic Human Rights)', in Watanabe Osamu (ed. ), Gendai nihon 
shakai ron. - sengoshi kara genzai o yomitoku (Contemporary Japanese Society: 30 essays on the post-war 
hisiorl) (Tokyo: R6d6junp6sha, 1996), pp. 366-399, p. 366. 188 There seems to be a considerable overlap between the notion of the citizenship rights discussed in 
Chapter 2, and the 'basic human rights (kihontekijinken)' that the Constitution of Japan provides, 
considering that the latter clearly reflects the notion of natural rights. As such, this study assumes the 
kihonteki. iinken as citizenship rights. (Chris Brown, 'Human rights', in John Baylis and Steve Smith 
(eds), The GloballZation of World Politics: An introduction to international relations (Second Edition) 
(Oxford: Oxford Un iversity Press, 200 1 ), pp. 599-614, pp. 604-607; Peter Burne 11, 'H uman rights', in 
McLean (ed. ), Concise Oxford Dictionan, of Politics, p. 228; Neary, op. cit., pp. 43-44. ) 
190 
Mori, 'Kihonteki j inken'. pp. .3 )84-389, 
Stockwin, op. cit., p. 195. 
Kajita Takamichi, 'Gendai nihon no gaikokujin r6d6sha seisaku saik6 - sei6 shokoku tono hikaku o 
t6shite - (Foreign Worker PolicN in Contemporary Japan Reconsidered: comparison with the West European countries)', in Kajita ýakamichi (ed. ), Kokusaika to aidentili (Internati onalisat ion and Idewit. 1) 
jokyo: Minerva shob6,200 1), pp. 184-219, pp. 208-209. 
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treatment of foreigners. To identify such continuity, this section focuses on Japan's 
nationalism, because it provided considerable justification to the differential treatment 
of the foreigners by shaping the structure of the pre-war Japanese state and its relation 
to the external world, which were reinforced by the 'family state' ideology. 
Japanese nationalism has developed since the nineteenth century. 191 The Meiji 
Japanese state formulated the notion of the 'family state' and educated its population 
accordingly, in order to establish social cohesion in the developing Meiji Japan. 192 
While there are different approaches to theorise nationalism, Yoshino argues that 
Japanese nationalism can largely be characterised as 'imagined race', 193 following 
Anderson's notion of 'imagined community'. 194 Because the notions of 'race' and 
nation are inter-related, 195 there was effectively no way for 'non-Japanese' to participate 
either in the society or polity in Meiji Japan: foreigners did not possess the 'blood- 
linkage' which is the theoretical underpinning of the notion of the 'family-state. ' One 
manifestation of the above ideology was differential treatment in the application of law 
"' David G. Goodman, 'Anti-Semitism in Japan: Its History and Current Implications', in Frank 
Dikoetter (ed. ), The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary 
Perspectives (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), pp. 177-198, p. 195; Michael Weiner, 'The Invention of 
Identity: Race and Nation in Pre-war Japan', in Dikoetter (ed. ), The Construction of Racial Identity in 
China andjapan, pp. 96-117, pp. 10 1- 102; Rodney Clark, 'The Company as Family: Historical 
Background', in Daniel Okimoto and Thomas P. Rohlen (eds), Inside the Japanese System: Readings on 
Confemporaiy, 5ocieo; and Political Economy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 102- 
105, p. 105. 
192 Kosaku Yoshino, 'The Discourse on Blood and Racial Identity in Contemporary Japan', in Dikoetter 
(ed. ), op. cit., pp. 199-211, pp. 200-20 1; Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan: 
A sociological enquiry (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 90-9 1; Richard Siddle, "The Ainu and the 
Discourse of 'Race"', in Dikoetter (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 136-157, p. 156; Weiner, 'The Invention of Identity', 
P. 102; Tetsuro Watsuji, 'The Family as Ethical System, extracted in Okimoto and Rohlen (eds), Inside 
the Japanese, 5ystem, pp. 3-6, p. 5. 19.1 Yoshino, 'The Discourse on Blood and Racial Identity in Contemporary Japan', p. 200: Yoshino. 
Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan, p. 85. 194 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and, ýpread (? f Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 199 1 ), pp. 5-7. 19.5 
Weiner, 'The Invention of ldentitN', p. 96. 
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as reported by Maruyama, 196 and Siddle also notes that Jr]acial inferionty justified 
legal inequality. ' 197 There was also an indifference to international law, since Japanese 
state officials were not able to comprehend the view on international relations behind 
international law, as against the international hierarchy perception derived from the 
notion of 'family-state'. 198 Maruyama attributed Japanese officials' irresponsible 
exercise of power to their belief in the hierarchical relations in domestic and 
intemational societies. 
199 
The above 'absence' of foreigners in the Meiji Japanese polity continued in 
post-war Japan. First, relations between states and people in Asia and Japan were 
discussed only to a limited degree, if any, during the post-war reform of Japan. The fact 
that Asian nations such as Malay or Indonesian were not represented by themselves in 
the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal but by their colonial masters 200 is a clear manifestation 
of the above point. Second, Japan's nationality law, an expression of the Japanese 
state's conception of who constitutes the nation, has been virtually unchanged from 
1899.20 1 Third, except for the immigration and criminal justice officials, Japanese 
people were detached from Asia after the defeat in the Asia Pacific War, as will be 
shown in Chapter 4. The post-war efforts to establish economic ties with Southeast 
Asia materialised only in the 1970s. 
1% Maruyama Masao, 'Theory and Psychology of Ultra-nationalism', In Maruyama Masao (Ivan Morris 
ed. ), Thought and Behaviour in Alodern Japanese Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 
1-24, pp. 12-13. 
197 Siddle, "The Ainu and the Discourse of 'Race"', pp. 146-147. 198 Maruyama, 'Theory and Psychology of Ultra-nationalism', pp. 20-2 1. 199 Maruyama, op. cit., pp. 12-13; pp. 16-17. 200 John Dower, Embracing Dýfeaf. - Japan in the. 4ftermath of World War 11 (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 
469-474. 
201 - Fessa Morris-Suzuki, 'Migrants, Frontiers and Asian Values: Japan's Identity in a Globalizing Asia', 
in National University of Singapore, Asian 1"alues andJapan's Options (Singapore: National Universit,, 
of Singapore, 2001 ), pp. 25-33. p. 26. 
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However, from the 1970s onwards, the developments in Japan's international 
structure, namely the ending of the Cold War and the progression of globalisation, 
provided conditions for change in the operation of social forces in Japan, and the 
Japanese perception about foreign residents within the territory. Developments that 
contributed to such change include the arrival of Indochinese refugees from May 1975 
onwards (10,133 refugees were granted permanent residency by September 1997), 202 
and Japan's subsequent acceptance of some of the international human rights norms 
concerning the treatment of refugees. These developments coincided with the protest of 
Koreans and other foreign residents about their treatment by the Japanese government 
concerning immigration control and foreign resident registration. Moreover, migrant 
women began to arrive in Japan at the end of the 1970s, followed by the increase in the 
'New Comer' migrants from the 1980s onwards. 
The interests of foreign residents began to be included in Japan's political 
agenda from the 1970s. This is, of course, very much different from such interests 
being fully realised. Nevertheless, being included in the political agenda is qualitatively 
different from being totally excluded, as was the case in pre-war and post-war Japan up 
to the 1970s. That contemporary Japan under globalisation came to include the interests 
of foreigners in its political agenda is in contrast to the exclusion of foreigners from the 
nation, which was the Meiji Japan's response to the international structure in the 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. 203 The above finding is also an important 
challenge to the orthodox understanding of the Japanese state, which sees the Japanese 
state as a static entity. 
202 Tanaka, op. cit., p. 144, Hatano et al., op. cit., pp. 137-139. 203 Louise Young, 'Rethinking Race for Manchuko: Self and Other in the Colonial Context', in Dikoetter 
op. cit., pp. 158-176, p. 158. 
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The fact that legal cases concerning the rights of minorities existed in post-war 
Japan with different degrees of achievement can be explained in the above context. 
Representative cases include: women; burakumin; Koreans; Okinawans; Ainu, and 
migrant workers . 
204 In particular, war-related apology and compensation cases 
constitute the most delicate and complicated cases in which the call for the realisation of 
human rights and the intention to maintain an existing national identity collide with 
each other. The representative cases include: the claim for medical assistance by 
Korean atomic bomb survivors who were Imperial Japanese subjects at the time of the 
bombing; 205 war compensation claims for Koreans and Taiwanese who were Imperial 
Japanese soldiers during the war; 206 apology and compensation for the forced labour 
migration of the Chinese, 
207 
and for the 'Comfort Women' survivors. 
208 
To recapitulate, the relation between the legal provision of citizenship rights and 
the status of foreign residents in modem Japan can be characterised in the following 
three phases. First, in pre-war Japan, the presence of foreigners in the Japanese society 
was known, but citizenship rights only nominally existed both for Japanese nationals 
and the then imperial subjects. Second, in the post-war years up to the 1970s, Japanese 
nationals were able to make attempts to realise citizenship rights, as the legal framework 
had been institutional ised as a consequence of the post-war reform. However, the 
presence of the foreign residents in Japan was almost forgotten among mainstream 
Japanese nationals, leaving little room for foreign residents to work towards the 
realisation of their citizenship rights. Third, after the 1970s, Japanese society became 
204 Stockwin, op. cit., pp. 199-200; Neary, op. cit., pp. 201-217. 20 Tanaka, op. cit., pp. 49-72. 206 
Ibid., pp. 95-1 18. 101 Sugihara, op. cit. 208 VAWW-Net Japan (ed. ), Joset kokusai senpan h5tei no -xnkiroku 11 (International Women's It ar Crimes Tribunal. - the whole record, vol. //) (Tokyo: Ryokuf6 shuppan, 2002). 
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increasingly aware of the presence of foreign residents, and began accommodating the 
interest of foreign residents, if not as much as expected by the residents themselves and 
civil rights campaigners. At least in theory, the possibility that foreign residents could 
try to realise their citizenship rights had increased. 
The above shows continuity and discontinuity in policy practice and capability 
of the Japanese state to transform itself as manifested in the treatment of foreigners in 
two respects. First, as to actual practice, the continued discriminatory treatments 
notwithstanding, the contemporary Japanese state after 1970s changed a part of its 
operation in comparison to the state in previous years, namely with regard to 
immigration control and foreign resident registration. The introduction of judicial 
interpreters in the criminal justice process, which will be reported in Chapter 5, is 
another crucial example of a policy change in the contemporary era. Those point to an 
important discontinuity in the state's practice in the treatment of foreigners. Second, 
there is also a discontinuity in the Japanese state's capability to transform its operation 
of key functions, in particular of criminal justice administration. The Meiji Japanese 
state was unable to change the way it worked when the number of migrant workers 
increased within the territorial jurisdiction; despite the fact that it did not officially 
acknowledge the presence of non-nationals, the Meiji state kept applying the criminal 
law to them as it would do to Japanese nationals. In contrast, the introduction of 
, judicial 
interpreters will indicate in Chapter 5 that the contemporary Japanese state has 
officially acknowledged that its population now includes non-nationals and that policy 
instruments specifically designed for them are necessary. This contrast suggests that, 
whereas the Meiji Japanese state was rigid and incapable of changing its operation, the 
contemporary Japanese state has been able to change the way it operates. The use of 
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this historical perspective is particularly important because it enables us to place in 
context and to compare the reaction of the Japanese state to external forces throughout 
various phases of the modem era. In turn, this enables an evaluation of the degree and 
differences of the Japanese state's response to forces of globalisation in the 
contemporary period as outlined in subsequent chapters, and testing to the full the 
transfon-nationalist thesis with relation to the Japanese state which forms the main 
subject of this dissertation. In this sense, there is clearly a discontinuity in the capability 
of the Japanese state's treatment of the foreigners: the contemporary Japanese state is 
able to transform some of its functions in the face of challenges from the currently 
ongoing globalisation. 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to apply the analytical framework developed in 
Chapter 2 to the contemporary Japanese context. Section 2 presented modem Japan's 
responses to its international structure and the subsequent developments in its domestic 
sphere in the pre-war period, post-war period up to the 1970s, and the contemporary 
period after the 1970s. Whereas Japan has intensified its re-engagement with Asia in 
the last three decades as a response to international structural changes, in its domestic 
sphere, Japan is undergoing industrial restructuring: some industrial sectors advocate 
economic liberalisation, while others oppose it. It Is the latter kind of industrial sectors, 
in particular the service sector, which is likely to accept migrant labour in order to adapt 
to globalisation. Consequently, the current international labour migration to Japan can 
184 
CHAPTER3 
be characterised as a manifestation of Japan's re-integration into the regional political 
economy, which had been inhibited during the Cold War order. 
Section 3 demonstrated a brief historical overview of the significance of 
international labour migration in modem Japan. Despite that the migratory flow was 
virtually absent during the post-war years (while the considerable number of Koreans 
and Chinese lived in Japan since the end of the war), this section showed that 
international labour migration has been an important part of the management of Japan's 
political economy. 
In section 4,, a theoretical framework was given to aid the understanding of the 
operation of Japan's criminal justice institutions that address crime, including ones 
committed by foreigners. Such institutions') action merits attention because it 
constitutes an example of the Japanese state's response to a force of globalisation, in 
particular the response of a domestic and political sector of the state towards 
international labour migration. The section found that the language barrier renders a 
challenge both to foreigners suspected of an offence, and to the state institutions in the 
criminal justice administration. Section 5 discussed the domestic conditions in which 
the Japanese state's exercise of power in the criminal justice system could be 
counterbalanced for foreigners in Japan, and it identified the continuity and 
discontinuity in the practice and capability of the Japanese state manifested in its 
treatment of foreigners. 
This chapter has demonstrated, theoretically, that by reacting to the issues 
related to the language barrier problem, actors in Japan responded to the challenge from 
international labour migration as a force of globalisation. Using this analytical 
frarnework concerning the language barrier problem, the two ensuing chapters carry out 
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empirical case studies. Chapter 4 looks at the following: how the globalisation force 
affected Japan in the 1970s; how Japan as a force of globalisation affected East Asia 
from the 1970s onwards; and how international labour migration occurred in East Asia 
(in this case in Thailand) as a response to globalisation. Chapter 5 then examines the 
causes and consequences of the language barrier problem, and responses to it, in Japan 
in the 1990s. 
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GLOBALISATION OF JAPANESE CAPITAL IN THE 1970S AND 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION FROM THAILAND 
1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to locate international labour migration from East Asia to Japan 
in recent decades within the context of interconnectedness of political economies 
in the region, which is intensifying under the currently ongoing globalisation 
process. More specifically, it intends to demonstrate the existence of interactions 
between mobility of Japanese capital since the 1970s on the one hand, and 
population mobility from recipient countries of capital on the other. By 
investigating connections between different political economies at different times, 
this chapter is going to present that capital mobility mediates developments in 
countries that are geographically separated and legally independent, which is a 
characteristic of manifestation within globalisation process. 
In Chapter 1, this study has set out the five types of interactions for 
analysis concerning developments in international labour migration, which are 
reproduced below: 
CHAPTER 4 
Table 4-1. Interactions of the state, civil society and the individuals within international 
labour migration 
Actors involved Example of interactions 
State - State Trade and financial liberalisation 
State - Civil society/ 
Civil society - State 
Increased influence of international market 
force on national economies 
Civil society - Individuals Employment contracts; commercial contracts 
(iv) Civil society -Civil society Commercial transactions; trafficking of goods 
(v) State - Individuals Immigration control and citizenship politics 
The above analytical framework is employed in this chapter in the following ways. 
First, Section 2 looks at US-Japan economic relations between 1945 and 1970, 
and shows that Japan's response to the substantial shift in the international 
economic policy of the US in the 1970s culminated in its decision within its 
international structure to export capital. In terms of the above-mentioned 
interactions, this section is concerned with (i) and (ii). Second, Section 3 exhibits 
that the complex combination of the workings of the following economic forces 
created structural conditions for international labour migration from East Asia 
after the 1970s, in particular the case of Thailand: the Thai government's 
economic development policy; Chinese-Thai capital; US capital (in particular in 
the forrn of war-related spending); IMF and the World Bank; and Japanese capital. 
Covering all of the above-mentioned five interactions, Section 3 will point out 
that capital exported from Japan (which was Japan's choice under its international 
structure, as mentioned above) constituted an international structure for the Thai 
political economy. Prospective migrants made the decision (or were 'forced' to 
do so) to migrate within these structural conditions. The following tables indicate 
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factors and their manifestations that are relevant to international labour migration 
from Thailand to Japan. 
Table 4-2. Contributing factors in labour mobility in Thailand 
(i) 1945-1970 
Factors Manifestation 
a. Social and demographic factors Supply of Chinese migrant workers 
discontinued 
b. Thai government Rice premium, investment in industrial 
sector 
c. Chinese-Thai capital Introduction of commercial agriculture 
d. US capital Military spending 
e. Japanese capital Introduction of commercial agriculture, 
FDI in textile and retail industries 
(ii) 1970s onwards 
Factors Manifestation 
a. Social and demographic factors Population increase 
b. Thai government Rural development plan 
c. US capital Withdrawal of the military 
d. Japanese capital FDI in industries 
e. IMF/WB Structural adjustments 
Among the migration flows to Japan from various origins, this study pays 
particular attention to the case of international labour migration from Thailand to 
Japan. There are three reasons for this analytical focus. The first and second are 
concerned with the structural conditions that can culminate in international labour 
mobility. The third is related to the way the language barrier problem manifested 
in Japan in the 1990s. These three factors collectively render a peculiar 
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characteristic to the language barrier problem that Thai migrant workers and the 
Japanese state officials faced, which merits analysis as an issue in world politics. 
Chapter 2 identified that the presence of the following two factors suggest 
that international labour migration could take place between two countries or 
regions: (i) inflow of foreign capital; and (ii) prior colonial relationships, the 
prevalence of common languages, the intensity of trade relations, the existence of 
transportation and communication links between the migrant sending and 
receiving countries. In the following, the significance of the Thai-Japan 
relationship is examined against the above factors. First, there is a considerable 
economic relationship between the two countries. The volume of export from 
Japan to Thailand is the largest among the ASEAN 4 countries; Japan's import 
from Thailand is the third largest within the ASEAN 4, but it is comparable to 
Malaysia; as for the volume of FDI from Japan, Thailand was the largest recipient 
country in the ASEAN 4 in the late 1980s, and remained the second largest in the 
1990S., 
Second, the above economic linkage mediated by ODA, as well as through 
FDI and trade, can be seen as a relationship similar to the one between the early 
colonisers and the former colonies. According to Hook et al., the Japanese state 
employed ODA 'as a substitute for military power and [ ... ] to 
draw the states of 
the region into a relationship of both political and economic interdependency. ' 2 
Further, transportation and communication links between Thailand and Japan 
have increased as economic relations have intensified in recent decades, which 
1 Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson; Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson, Japan 's International 
Relations. - Politics, economics andsecurhý, (London: Routledge, 200 1), pp. 442-457, Tables I and 
I 
2 Hook et al., Japan's International Relations, p. 195. 
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will then provide the migration industry and individual migrants access to these 
technologies. 
The third point is with regard to the manner in which the language barrier 
posed a challenge for Thai migrant workers and Japan. In terms of their number, 
Thai migrants are much smaller than the migrants in Japan from other origins: in 
2000, the Thai people constituted 1.4 percent of the entire number of foreigners 
entering the country, and 1.7 percent of the total foreigners registered. However, 
the Thai migrants' presence is more evident in the following sectors of foreigners 
in Japan. For example, within the foreigners registered as spouse of Japanese, 
Thai people's share is 4.4 percent in the same year, fifth in this registration 
3 
category in 2000 . 
Further, the following two points are more relevant for the purpose of this 
study. (i) Among the foreigners who were arrested, the number of Thai workers 
was substantial (19.7 percent in 1993), in particular in the first half of the 1990S. 
4 
(ii) As such, comparison between Philippine migrant workers and Thai migrant 
workers is possible: 
e Both of those two countries have had economic links with Japan since the 
nineteenth century (including labour migration from Japan to the Philippines). 
* The populations of these two countries do not usually speak Japanese, 
partly due to the fact that Imperial Japan did not carry out extensive 
education in the Japanese language, as it did in Korea and Taiwan (Japanese 
3 MOJ, Dai 40 shuts un_vfik oku kanri 16kei nenp6 heisei 12 nen (Annual Report (? f Slatistics on 
Legal Aligranisfior 2000) (Tokyo: Zaimush6 insatsukyoku, 200 1 ), p. v and p. xvi; Immigration 
Bureau, MOJ, Heisci 13 nenhan.: aii: vfi gaikokujin t6kei (Statistics on the Foreigners Registered in 
. Japan) (Tokyo: Zamiush6 insatsukyoku, 200 1), p. 15. 4 Yoko Sellek, Migrant Labour in. Japan (Basingstoke: Palgrave. 2001), pp. 32-33, Table 1-3. 
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attempts to teach Japanese in the Philippines were less than successful). 
Meanwhile, to a certain degree it is possible to expect that Philippine migrant 
workers would speak English, leaving some possibilities whereby a 
Philippine migrant worker and Japanese state officials could communicate in 
English. 
Peak periods of apprehension are different in timing. Whereas the 
Philippine migrant workers were most frequently apprehended by the 
Japanese police in the 1980s, for the Thai workers it was in the early 1990s 
(after the 1990 revision of Japan's Immigration Control Act), hitting a peak 
5 in 1993. 
These characteristics - linguistic background and the timing of their interactions 
with the Japanese state - suggest that the language barrier could have influenced 
the cases of Thai women migrant workers more strongly than others. The 
following table shows the comparison between Philippine and Thai migrant 
workers within the context of the current study. 
5 Sellek, Migrant Labour in Japan, pp. 32-333, Table 1-3. 
192 
CHAPTER 4 
Table 4-3. Characteristics of Philippine and Thai migrant workers 
Philippine migrant workers Thai migrant workers 
Mi I itary occupation Yes Yes 
Japanese language No No 
English Possible Less likely 
Majority of migrant workers 
in Japan 
Women Women 
Peak period of apprehension 1980s Early 1990s 
Before moving on to the main parts, the argument of this chapter is as 
follows. International labour migration from Thailand to Japan from the1980s is 
both a consequence and cause of globalisation. It is a consequence, because the 
export of Japanese capital served as a force of globalisation for the Thai political 
economy. Meanwhile, migration is also a cause of globalisation, for it renders 
manifold effects on Japan's political economy, in particular on operation of its 
criminal justice administration, and the constituents of Japan's national identity, 
as will be explained in the next chapter 
migration from Thailand to Japan 
In this respect international labour 
reflects an increasing degree of 
interconnectedness between political economies in East Asia within the context of 
globalisation. 
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2. Globalisation of Japanese Capital in the Post-War Years 
(1) From 1945 to the 1970s 
The period from 1945 to the 1970s can be characterised as the institution building 
of the East Asian political economy led by the US, since the presence of the US in 
East Asia played a crucial role in the maintenance of the regional order. Selden 
writes that the development of Japan's political economy in these years was 
'profoundly influenced by the outcomes of the Second World War and the U. S. - 
Soviet conflict. ' 6 Hoogvelt also states that economic growth in East Asia in the 
post-war years is closely related to 'the geo-political reality of US Pacific 
dominance. ' 7 
The US policies concerning Japan's economic recovery from 1945 to 1947 
concentrated on demilitarisation and democratisation. Implementation of the new 
economic recovery policy in Japan began with aid programmes and economic 
reforrns. During these years, the Occupation Force thought that Japan should not 
be given help for economic revival and reintegration with East Asia. It was 
against the above backdrop when the Dodge Line deflationary economic reforms 
were implemented in 1947 to curb the hyper-inflation, and to establish Japan's 
fiscal and monetary system on a firm basis. 8 
6Mark Selden, 'China, Japan and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945-1995", in 
Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (eds), Network Power: Japan andAsia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), pp. 306-340, p. 306. 
7 Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalisaiion and the Postcolonial World: The Neu, Political Econoln, V of 
Development (Basingstoke: Macmi Ilan, 1997), p. 2 10. 
8 William R. Nester, Japan's Growing Power over East Asia and the World Econonij-. - Endv and 
Means (London: Macmillan, 1990). pp. 19-24. 
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However, Japan's reconstruction policy directed by the US changed after 
1947. In accordance with the 1947 Containment Doctrine ('the creation of a pan- 
Asian structure of U. S. based alliances deployed to counter Soviet and Chinese 
regional power and prevent the spread of revolution' 9 ), the US recognised that 
Japan had the potential to become an 'engine of growth in East Asia, ' and that the 
economic recovery of Japan was necessary for the advancement of a free trade 
system. Hence the core goal of Japan's recovery became 'the reconstruction of 
Japan as the economic and financial linchpin of Asia within the framework of U. S. 
strategic and economic supremacy. " 0 
The development of Japan's international trade framework in East Asia in 
the post-war years involved the following three points: (i) establishment of trade 
links between Southeast Asia and Japan; (ii) promotion of Japanese trade; and (iii) 
international immobility of Japanese capital. These three points are explained 
below in turn. First, the US policies aimed at integrating Japan into the free world 
economY included transformation of the trade framework in East Asia. ) which 
rendered Japan's international economic environment of the post-war years 
distinct from that of the pre-war years. The US planned the role of the Asian 
countries as being the providers of raw materials to Japan, as well as potential 
markets for Japanese products. ' Therefore, despite the fact that it wished to 
maintain its trading interests with mainland China that existed before the war, 
. Japan officially abandoned 
hope as the Peace Treaty was put at risk by the US 
9 Selden, 'China, Japan and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia', p. 308. 
10 Selden, op. cit., p. 308. 
11 Nester, Japan's Growing Power over EastAsia and the World EconomY. pp. 22-23. 
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unless Japan recognised Taiwan. ' 2 Selden writes that restoring Japan's economic 
ties with the countries in Southeast Asia was 'critical to a Japanese economic 
recovery consistent with the U. S. attempt to isolate China. " 3 Second, the US 
promoted trade between Southeast Asia and Japan through such measures as 
dollar aid tied to the purchase of Japanese goods, or establishing a government 
office that promotes Japan's trade interests in South East Asia. In addition, the 
US awarded the most favoured nation status to Japan in 1953. It also persuaded 
member countries of international organisations to allow Japan's entry into IMF, 
the World Bank, GATT and OECD. Japan's trade with South East Asia began to 
increase after the mid-1960s, 14 due to these measures. The beginning of the 
maturing of the South East Asian market, and the increased competitiveness of 
Japanese products, also contributed to the above increase in the volume of trade. 
As for Japan's own actions, war reparation, aid and FDI are the mechanism with 
which Japan established economic linkage with the political economies in 
Southeast Asia. ' 5 
Third, Japanese capital was internationally immobile during this period. 
In order to secure its economy from international financial influences (namely, to 
protect the Japanese industries from international competition), Japanese 
government controlled foreign exchange and banned capital export. A fixed 
exchange rate was introduced in 1947 as Part of the Dodge Line economic 
reforms mentioned above. The exchange rate of 360 yen to a dollar was designed 
12 Nester, op. cit., p. 33- 13 Selden, op. cit., p. 309. 
14 Nester, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
15 Dominic Kelly, dapan andthe Reconstruction (? fEast Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 
81-84. 
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to assure Japanese industries to produce export profit. The Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Control Law of 1949 provided the government with the power to 
regulate trade within the amount of foreign exchange reserves available to Japan. 
The Foreign Investment Law in 1950 prevented retrieval of profits to the 
investors' home country, with the effect of protecting Japanese industries from 
foreign investors. 16 
(2) 1970s Onwards 
The 1970s saw a series of events that have reconfigured the international political 
economy in comparison to the post-war years up to the beginning of the 1970s. 
The following events, drawn from the list compiled by Selden, are relevant for the 
analysis of this section, since these developments contributed to 'a transition in 
the hegemonic politics and the regional political economy of East Asia': (i) the 
collapse of the U. S. dollar and the end of the gold standard (1970); (ii) the 
proclamation of the Nixon Doctrine, U. S. inability to prevail on the battlefield in 
Indochina (1969), the scaling back of U. S. strategic commitments in mainland 
Asia, and a new approach toward China (1970); and (iii) the beginning of 
significant Japanese overseas manufacturing investment in Asia, particularly in 
the NIEs (early 1970s). 
17 
The background factors of the above events during the early 1970s 
include the following matters. Mendl argues that such factors as the constant 
16 Nester, op. cit., p. 26. 
17 Selden, op. cit., pp. 31 -3 14. 
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trade deficit, the material and psychological cost of the Vietnam War, and the 
decreasing competitiveness of US products contributed to US policy changes and 
the subsequent exchange rate adjustments in 1971 and 1973.18 Selden writes as 
follows. ) sharing a similar view with Mendl: '[p]rotracted wars in Korea and 
Indochina, together with the costs of maintaining a high-flung network of bases, 
undermined the strength of the dollar and fiscal foundation of U. S. hegemony. ' 19 
Mendl reported that the decline in the US gold reserves, the cause of the 
devaluations of the US dollar, had been going on since the end of the 1950s. 20 
Meanwhile, Nester claims that, despite the fact that it took such measures as 
'import barriers, export subsidies, direct and indirect economic technological and 
military aid, and open world economy', the US failed to contain the Japanese 
economy that the US had developed in the post-war years. 21 Mendl further argues 
that the end of the Cold War revealed conflict over economic interests between 
the US and Japan, which had been contained when these two states gave priority 
to shared security concerns. 22 The impact of capital mobility on the US economy 
in the 1970s has already been discussed in Chapter 2. It has to be noted here that 
capital mobility (that of overseas US dollars) affected the US economy, 
culminating in these policy shifts. As will be shown below, these shifts in US 
policy then influenced the operation of Japan's political economy during the 
1970s onwards. The above linkage clearly indicates that capital mobility is 
instrumental toward globalisation. 
18 Wolf Mend 1. Japan's Asia Policy (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 4 1. 
19 Selden, op. cit., p. 3 13. 
)() Mend 1, Japan's Asia Policy, p. 40. 
21 Nester, op. cit., pp. 42-43. 22 
Mendl, op. cit., p. 43). 
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The impact of the above exchange rate adjustments and the oil crises led to 
the restructuring of Japanese industries. Having undergone an increase in 
production costs after the first oil crisis, the METI (then MITI) announced the so- 
called 'Long Term Vision' in 1974, advocating for transforming the Japanese 
domestic economy from heavy industry based economy to a 'post- industrial 
economy, ' which meant that the economy consisted of industries that would be 
less exposed to the fluctuations of raw material prices. In this connection, the 
government encouraged the Japanese multinational corporations to implement 
foreign direct investment, in order to: (i) find a cheaper and more stable supply of 
raw materials; (ii) shift labour-intensive industries to foreign countries; and (iii) 
find a cheaper labour force. 23 
Prior to publication of the above industrial policy shift, the Japanese state 
had cleared the ground for making its capital internationally mobile. After foreign 
exchange surplus accumulated during the 1960s, the Bank of Japan relaxed the 
regulation on foreign direct investment in 1969, and effectively removed it in 
1971 . 
24 Thus Japan's FDI, which had begun in the mid-1950s, increased in the 
1970s. 2 -' FDI from light industries, the industrial sector that was severely hit by 
the first oil crisis, began in the 1970s. However, FDI from other sectors of the 
Japanese economy, such as car, electric and electronic industries, did not take 
place at this time. This was because they managed to respond to the changes in 
the international economic environment in the 1970s by increasing exports of 
products and manifold cost-cutting measures. 
2 3, Nester, op. cit., p. 71. 
24 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
25 Kelly, lapan andthe Reconstruction of East Asia, p. 84. 
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Nevertheless, the impact of the 1986 exchange rate adjustment after the 
Plaza Accord of the previous year, which was 'an attempt to bring under control 
Japan's enormous trade surplus with the United States and other nations', 26 was 
substantial to the Japanese economy. Appreciation of the yen in 1986-87 almost 
doubled the value of the currency, and reduced Japan's export markets in the US 
and Europe, because export price in those markets increased by twofold. Japan's 
political economy tried to compensate for the loss of the export market by 
expanding the domestic market, but it eventually failed to do so (burst of the 
'bubble' economy), and consequently export of Japanese capital began. 27 It was 
against the above backdrop that Japanese business began to advocate 
'internationalisation' and foreign direct investment. 28 
From the above it has become clear that the progression of globalisation 
and the ending of Cold War in East Asia have contributed to an increased degree 
of interconnectedness between the political economies of the region. Selden 
writes that after the 1970s, 'greater autonomy, regional unification, rapid 
integrative regional growth, and redefinition of the regional position of both 
superpowers' became possible in East Asia. 29 Consequently, the increased degree 
of interconnectedness was evident in terms of 'intensification of diverse forms of 
intra-regional economic exchange, including flows of trade. loans, direct and 
indirect investment, technology, communications, transportation. labor. and 
I(, Selden, op. cit., p. 32 1. 
27 Rob Steven, dapan and the New World Order: Global Investments, Trade and Fiiiance (London: 
Macmillan, 1996), pp. 58-67. 
28 Steven, lapan and the New World Order, p. 69. 
29 Selden, op. cit., p. 313. 
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travel. 530 Japan played a key role in this process. Japan has taken an initiative 
(primarily led by the then MIT131) in the economic regionalisation of East Asia, as 
Kelly points out below. This role that Japan played merits attention here, because, 
as will be shown in next section, economic regionalisation provided a basis for 
international labour migration: 
'[T]his deepening regional influence [ ... ] 
is no accident, and has in fact been 
driven along by, amongst other things, the conscious actors of the Japanese 
government and bureaucracy in reaction to events and circumstances in the 
domestic environment. ' 
32 
Having seen that international economic structure affected Japan's export of its 
capital, and then such capital export influenced the regionalisation of the East 
Asian political economies, the next section examines the impact of Japanese 
capital exported to Thailand in the 1970s, with particular attention to its influence 
on the mobility of labour. 
3. International Labour Migration from Thailand 
(1) Period of Analysis in This Section 
Section 2 demonstrated the way the shift in international economic structure in the 
1970s induced Japan's political economy to reformulate its operation through cost 
reduction and industrial restructuring, and eventually, by exporting its capital. 
30 
Ibid., p. 321. 
Kelly, op. cit., p. 86. 
Ibid., p. 86. 
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Making another analytical step from the above, this section aims to present the 
way the capital exported from Japan affected the political economy of Thailand 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, creating structural conditions for labour 
mobility there. The analytical framework for international labour migration. 
which was presented in Chapter 2, includes the following two aspects of 
migration: (i) occurrence of population mobility; and (ii) perpetuation of this 
mobility. The focal point of analysis of the current section is the first of the above 
two aspects, namely initiation of labour migration. In particular, the section pays 
attention to the following three factors: (i) changes in the production process, 
which mobilises parts of labour; (ii) wage differentials, which affect a migrant's 
(and migration brokers') intention to move; and (iii) demographic trend as a 
general background. 
As for the focal period of analysis, this study looks at the years from 1970 
to the early 1980s. The reason for this focus is as follows. In terms of total 
volume, FDI from 1970 to the early 1980s is much smaller than that of the late 
1980s. However, as will be shown later in this section, this study finds the direct 
impact of FDl on the agricultural sector (major source of labour mobility) to have 
been more significant during the 1970-early 1980s period, than the latter. This 
coincides with the data that the volume of Japanese FDl invested in the Thai 
agricultural sector was between 1.2-1.6 percent of the entire FDl flow during the 
1980-1991 period. 33 Hence it is possible that FDl in the late 1980s could havc 
'3 Suphat Suphachalasai, 'Export-Led Industrialisation', in Mehdi Krongkaew (ed. ), Thailand's 
Industrialkation and its Consequences (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 66-84, p. 80. 
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rendered indirect influence on agriculture, through secondary and tertiary sectors, 
and also perpetuated the existing population flow. 34 
Table 4-4. Japan's FDI to ASEAN 4 Countries (US$ millions) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1995 1997 
Indonesia 49 585 529 408 631 1,105 1,569 2,514 
Thailand 13 14 33 48 1,276 1,154 1,224 1,867 
Malaysia 14 52 146 79 673 725 573 791 
Philippines 29 149 78 61 202 258 718 524 
Source: Hook et al., Japan's International Relations, pp. 450-457, Table 
(2) 1945-1970s 
a. Social and demographic factors 
The following dernographical factors that existed during the post-war years were 
relevant to the labour mobility in the political economy of Thailand: the lack of 
supply of Chinese migrant workers in Bangkok and population growth since the 
1950s. First, Chinese immigrant labour used to be available in non-agri cultural 
34 This does not at all downplay the significance of Japan's capital export to East Asia in the late 
1980s. Its implications are clear as Bowie and Unger write on the export of Japanese capital. 
According to them, an important characteristic of the Japanese capital imported in Southeast Asian 
countries was that it was used for the introduction of export-oriented agriculture and/or export- 
oriented manufacturing. The capital exported from Japan to Southeast Asian countries in the late 
1980s have compensated the latter's loss of access to capital, and also have contributed to 
economic growth of those countries. The above capital export took the form of ODA (which 
began to increase in the 1980s and surpassed that of the US in 1989) and FDI from Japan. East 
Asian NICs also carried out FDI into the region in the same period. The importance of the above 
capital export becomes much more clearer when compared with the conditions of other developing 
countries: during those years, the other developing countries other than East Asia were often 
unable to obtain capital from commercial financial markets after the two oil crises, while 
simultaneously the direction of net capital flow reversed towards the North (Alasdair Bowie and 
Danny Unger, The Politics of Open Economies: Indonesia, A4alaj, sla, 1he Philippines, and 
Thailand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 14, pp. 37-42). 
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sectors, namely 'in developing Bangkok, in the mines of the south and iii a range 
of small industries' from the late 1880s up to the 1930s. 35 But the establishment 
of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 meant that this labour supply 
was no longer available. 36 Second, distribution of population was sparse and rural 
income was 'relatively high' until the 1950s. But since then, population growth 
and 'pressure on rural incomes' changed the above population balance, which 
paved the way for 'labour- intensive, urban-based industrial development , 37 
whereby migrant labour will be required. 
b. Thai gOvernment 
During this period, the Thai government's economic development policy 
contributed to the creation of structural conditions for labour mobility, through 
transferring economic resources from the agricultural sector to the industrial 
sector. Taxation on rice was the main instrument for such a policy. Collected tax 
was 'used to finance government expenditure', 38 as well as having been an 
effective subsidy for Bangkok residents, 39 while reducing the return on rice 
production . 
40 One consequence of such a policy could be the creation of a 
35 Kevin Hewison, 'Thailand: Capitalist Development and the State', in Garry Rodan. Kevin 
Hewison and Richard Robison (eds), The Political Economy of Soulh-East. 4sia. - an introduction 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 93-120, p. 99. 
36 Malcolm Falkus, 'Thai Industrialization: An Overview', in Krongkaew (ed. ), Thailand's 
Industrialization and its Consequences, pp. 13-32, p. 30. 
37 Falkus, 'Thai Industrialization: An Overview', p. 3 1. 
38 Kunio Yoshihara, The Nation and Economic Growth: The Philippines and Thailand (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 10 1. 
39 Robert J. Muscat, The Fýflh Tiger: A %4, of Thai Development Policy (Tokyo: United Nations 
Universitý Press, 1994), p. 99. 
40 Ibid., pp. 75-77. 
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domestic income difference, which could culminate in the generation of a 
structural condition for labour mobility. 
Thailand's first economic development plan (1961-66) promoted private 
investment, with the government concentrating on infrastructure building. 41 
Despite the plan targeting both agricultural and industrial sectors, in practice 
domestic and foreign investment concentrated on industrial sectors, where there 
was no state intervention or foreign competition. 42 Hewison wrote: 
JT]he majority of capital invested with governmental promotional privileges 
went into import substituting industries. The taxation and export of 
agricultural production and the extraction of savings from households into the 
commercial banking sector provided a pool of funds for industrial 
development'. 43 
Despite such treatment, the Thai agricultural contributions to the economic 
growth during the import substitution inclustrialisation were multiple. The first of 
such contributions was export income. During the 1960s and 1970s, agricultural 
exports constituted the major source of foreign exchange income for Thailand, 
and provided the government and manufacturing with finance machinery. 44 
Second, as mentioned above,, agriculture supplied food at a relatively low price to 
the industrial sector. Third, it supplied seasonal labour force. Fourth, it also gave 
savings and revenue source to the urban area. 45 During this period, the Thai 
41 Hewlson, 'Thailand', p. 102. 
42 Hewison, op. cit., p. 102. 
43 Ibid., p. 102. 
44 Suphat Suphachalasai, 'Export-Led Industrialization', p. 67; Medhl Kron-, -, 
kaew. 'Contributions 
of Agriculture to Industrialization', in Krongkaew (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 33-65, pp. 43-50. 
45 Krongkaew, 'Contributions of Agriculture to Industrialization', pp. 43-50. 
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economy recorded 7 percent GDP growth, on average, under 'a very stable price 
environment' that benefited the agriculture. 46 
While making such contribution, the Thai agriculture experienced negative 
impacts for decades: 
'It is estimated that from 1963-1984 there was a net transfer of 30,000 million 
baht from agricultural sector f ... ], resulting in rural poverty and income 
disparities and negatively affecting the growth of rural industry. , 47 
The significance of such a limit on income may become clearer when the 
following points are taken into account: while its share in GDP has continued to 
decline since 1960, Thailand's agriculture continued to be the major source of 
48 
employment and livelihood . Hewison wrote: '[a]mong the poorer classes, 
farmers faced very low prices and wages were eroded by inflation and increased 
government charges. ' 49 By the time the First Economic Development Plan ended, 
the Thai government was aware of the uneven distribution of input and output 
between agricultural and industrial sectors. 50 From this, it is evident that the Thai 
govemment"s post-war economic policy has created a difference in domestic 
income between the agricultural and industrial sectors (largely coinciding with 
rural and urban areas), which constitutes a condition for labour mobility. How the 
Thai government addressed the consequence of uneven distribution will be 
reported later in this section. 
46 Muscat, The Fýfih Tiger, p. 97. 
47 Nipon Poapongsakorn, 'Rural Industrialization: Problems and Prospects', in Krongkaew (ed. ), 
op. cit., pp. 116-140, p. 133. 
48 Krongkaew, op. cit., pp. 34-36. 
49 Hewlson, op. cit., p. 104. 
50 Muscat, op. cit., pp. 96-97. 
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c. Chinese- Thai capital 
The role of Chinese-Thai capital in this period can be characterised in the 
following two respects: introduction of commercial agriculture; functioning as 
intermediary for introducing foreign capital. Social incorporation of the Chinese 
population into the Thai society since the 1950s was a potential political concern 
for the Thai state, but it also had positive implications for the Thai economy. 
According to Falkus, the Chinese-Thai were 'encouraged' to invest in Thailand 
after 1949., as their links with mainland China were disrupted after the 
establishment of the PRC. 51 Suzuki Noriyuki, one of Japan's leading Sociologists 
specialised in economic development in Thailand, reports such an example: in one 
district of the northeast region of Udon Thani a Chinese trader introduced sugar 
cane production in around 195 0,52 working as 'a principal channel through which 
joint ventures with overseas firms have developed in Thailand. -) 53 Similarly, 
Yoshihara writes that after the establishment of the PRC, the Thai government 
was 'liberal towards the Chinese and foreign capital. ' Consequently it managed 
to let the Thai economy 'benefit from the business acumen of the Chinese, who 
accounted for over 10 per cent of the population, and to rely on foreign capital 
extensively in pioneering manufacturing'. 54 Thai nationality law, which operates 
on thejus soli citizenship principle, also allowed Chinese residents to assimilate 
51 FaIkus, op. cit., pp. 28-29. 
52 Suzuki Noriyuki, Daisan sekai ni okeru mou hitotsu no hatten riron (Alternative Development in 
the Third World -A Case 5tudi, qf Thai Villages) (Tokyo: Kokusai shoin, 1993). p. 85. 53 FaIkus, op. cit., pp. 28-29. 
51 Yoshihara, The Nation and Economic Development, pp. 3-4. 
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in society and get involved in the economy. 55 These Chinese-Thai residents thus 
formed provincial businesses, which acquired extensive sources of income in the 
later years. Phongpaichit and Baker reported such sources of income available for 
provincial businesses: 
'First, from the cash crop expansion in which local merchants played a 
critical and profitable linking role between the agribusiness company and the 
cultivator. They leased tractors, sold farming inputs, provided loans, handled 
crop marketing. Second, from investing in trading and service business 
buoyed up by local demand. [ ... ] Third, 
from government contracting for 
construction work and the supply of materials. [ ... ] Fourth, from any array of 
semi-legal and illegal businesses including logging, smuggling, gambling, 
gun-running and drug-trading. 56 
The above indicates that, it is possible to expect that the operation of Chinese- 
Thai capital during this period was instrumental for industrial restructuring in 
agriculture and the introduction of commercial loans, probable consequences of 
which include the creation of conditions for labour mobility. 
d US capital 
The US has provided Thailand with economic, military and technical assistance 
since the 195 OS. 57 US aid for Thailand in the 1950s and 1960s was mainly spent 
55 Ibid., p. 5. 
56 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, 'Power in transition: Thailand in the 1990s', in Kevin 
Hewlson (ed. ), Political Change in Thailand. - democracy and participation (London: Routledge, 
1997), pp. 21-41, pp. 29-30. This fourth source of income appears to indicate a possible link to 
human smuggling in Thai rural economy. 
57 Bowie and Unger, I'lie Politics of Open Economies. p. 135. 
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51 in the Northeast region, a representative case being the Friendship Highway. 
Lack of data available prevents elaborating on this point, but it is likely that the 
above US aid (one form of capital mobility) resulted in domestic labour migration 
in Northeast Thailand, with the consequence that some of the agricultural 
population were employed for aid- and military-related projects. The region 
benefited from such aid for decades, but then saw adverse effects, as will be 
shown later in this section. 
e. Japanese capital 
Unlike its relation with other countries of East Asia after the defeat in the Asia 
Pacific War, the period in which Japanese capital was absent from Thailand was 
relatively brief Japanese trading companies returned to Thailand in 1951 after the 
conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. 59 Japanese banks (Mitsui Bank in 
1952 and Bank of Tokyo in 1962) were also allowed to re-enter Thailand, when 
there were restrictions put in place by the Thai government on the new-entry of 
foreign banks. 60 Inter-state relations between Thailand and Japan have been 
instrumental to Japanese capital's return to the Thai economy, as shown below. 
Thailand and Japan normalised their diplomatic relations in 1952 ,61 and the 
relation between two governments was 'friendly'. 62 Negotiation for war 
compensation between the two countries was unusually favourable for Japan. 
58 Muscat, op. cit., p. 120, Bowie and Unger, op. cit., p. 13 1. 
59 Yoshihara, op. cit., pp. 41-42. 
60 Ibid., p. 4 1. 
61 Ibid., op. cit., p. 54. 
62 Ibid., op. cit., pp. 54-5-5. According to Yoshihara, Prime Minister Phibul Songkram ýýas 
accepted in Japan after he was ousted in 1957, and stayed there until his death. 
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Yoshihara. wrote that Thailand could have sought substantially more by claiming 
that Thailand suffered from Allied bombing after being 'forced to become Japan's 
ally. ' 63 However,, the only issue on the war compensation negotiation was 'the 
BI. 6 billion worth of obligations the Japanese military had incurred through the 
issues of yen military scripts. ' 64 Nevertheless, the final settlement was reached in 
1961, and Japan was supposed to provide Y 9.6 billion ($26.7 million) in 
Japanese goods and services for 8 years. 65 
The Japanese capital that returned to post-war Thailand soon began to 
collaborate with Chinese-Thai businesses. Yoshihara reported how Japanese 
trading companies and Chinese business networks modernised Thai agriculture to 
become able to export non-rice products. 
'It was through this Chinese network that foreign price signals were 
transmitted to the rural sector, finances were arranged, and processing was 
undertaken. ... [When they were needed for starting export crop production, 
small tractors] were imported by Japanese trading companies from Japan, and 
distributed by Chinese middlemen with their finances. The Chinese 
distribution network also made further mechanization. ' 66 
The above indicates that operation of Japanese capital in the post-war years up to 
the 1970s has contributed to industrial restructuring in agriculture, which is a 
condition that renders labour mobility possible. In this respect, the following 
account by an NGO in Thailand is instructive, because it supports the above 
theoretical expectation (even if it refers to recent decades in general, and is not 
63 Ibid., pp. 54-5-S 
64 Ibid., p. 54. 
65 Ibid., p. 54. 66 Ibid., p. 104. 
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necessarily specific to the years that this section has been discussing, namely the 
years preceding the 1970s): (i) operating costs of agriculture in Thailand have 
increased to exceed agricultural income, one major reason being the introduction 
of agricultural machinery; (ii) the decline of traditional small credit among 
peasants, and the subsequent reliance on a third party's commercial credit, caused 
difficulties among peasants. 67 
Impact on labour migration 
To recapitulate the findings so far, there were at least three factors that could have 
contributed to the creation of structural conditions for labour mobility in the Thai 
political economy. The first was the income transfer from agriculture to 
manufacturing by the Thai government's rice premium policy (domestic income 
difference). The second was the modemisation of agriculture and the introduction 
of commercial loans (industrial restructuring). The third was demographic 
conditions in Thailand during the period, namely population growth among ethnic 
Thais and the discontinued supply of Chinese immigrant workers. 
67 Tai-nichi iju^ Josei nettowdku and Takrai (Thailand-Japan Network for Migrant Women and 
Takrai), Enpawdmento o mezashite: ýiijoseimondai kaiketsu no tameno nettowAn zukurt, 
iiýAushqppu hikokusho (4iming for the Empowerment: Report (? f the workshop on problem 
solving network building fior immigrant women's issues), Chiang Rai, Thailand, 24 and 25 
November 200 1, p. 23. 
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(3) 1970s Onwards 
a. Social and demographic factors 
The Thai government continued import substitution industrialisation in the 1970s, 
but transition to export oriented industrial i sation was called for by businesses at 
the end of the 1970s, on an assumption that domestic markets were thought to 
68 have been exhausted. Hewison identified six major events that influenced the 
transition: (i) appreciation of the value of the baht since the 1970s and the 
subsequent relative loss of export competitiveness; (ii) the beginning of East 
Asian business relocation; (iii) continued decline in international prices for 
agricultural commodities from the late 1970s; (iv) increase in the public sector 
debt after the government sought a loan to finance the cost of oil that soared after 
the second oil crisis; (v) reduction in US military assistance after the mid-1970s; 
and (vi) the spending spree by the Thai military, claiming that new arms were 
needed to prepare for the increased concern about regional conflict . 
69 As will be 
presented below, some of these developments were instrumental in creating the 
conditions for labour migration. 
68 Bowie and Unger, op. cit., p. 146. 
69 Hewison, 'Thailand', p. 104. 
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b. Thai government 
During this period, the Thai government implemented policies to rectify the 
negative consequences of skewed resource distribution in the preceding decade, 
which most evidently manifested in the agricultural sector. However, those 
measures achieved a limited degree of success, thus the structural conditions for 
labour mobility remained in place in the Thai agricultural sector. There are two 
significant events for Thai agriculture during the 1980s. First, non-agri cultural 
production outnumbered agricultural production. In terms of sectoral volume in 
export, 'manufactured exports began surpassing agricultural exports' in the mid- 
1980s. 'o Hewison writes: 
JI]n 1960s [agriculture] was the most important economic sector. It 
accounted for almost 40 per cent of GDP, most exports, and employed the 
bulk of the population. [ ... 
] By 1993, while agriculture was probably still the 
larger employer of labour, it produced just 10 per cent of GDP, ranking lower 
than manufacturing, trade and services. ' 71 
Implications of the above development were twofold: (i) the output that may be 
distributed to the population in the agricultural sector has declined in relation to 
the non-agri cultural sector. It is possible that this made the agricultural 
population seek non-agricultural income. Official employment figures on the 
economically active population (8.2 percent in 1960 and 60 percent in the early 
1990s) indicate the extent of substantial changes that the population in the 
70 Yoshihara, op. cit., p. 47. 
7' Hewison, 'Thailand', p. 105. 
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agricultural sector have undergone. As a consequence, the search for non- 
agricultural employment began. 72 (ii) In addition to the above, the takeover of 
agricultural output by the non-agri cultural also means the emergence of the need 
for the Thai political economy to seek alternative foreign exchange income. The 
above takeover in industrial output sources and the subsequent foreign exchange 
deficit meant that, even though non-agricultural output had increased from before, 
it was not yet possible for Thailand to earn sufficient amount of foreign exchange 
to cover the entire amount it spends. That is why the government formulated 
export promotion measures to attract foreign direct investment. The need for 
foreign exchange will also form a backdrop of migration promotion policy. 
Second, rural development was put on the political agenda after two 
decades of skewed resource distribution that favoured the manufacturing sector. 
The measures included those concerning rice premium, cultivating land, and 
credit allocation are relevant here: (i) In 1985, rice premium was withdrawn as a 
part of the structural adjustment program. 73 However, reduction in the rice 
premium to zero 'has increased the exposure of rice-dependent farm households 
to swings in annual income'. 74 This could have constituted another potential 
condition for labour mobility. This finding coincides with the report by a Thai 
NGO on economic conditions of Thai peasants. It states that in recent decades 
income from agriculture is limited and unstable, because agricultural commodity 
prices remain low and yet volatile; in addition, unlike urban employees who 
receive monthly salaries, peasants may receive agricultural income only once or 
72 Ibid., pp. 105-107. 73 Muscat, op. cit.. p. 192. 74 
1 Ibid., p. 242. 
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twice a year, which makes it more difficult for them to manage their cash floW. 
75 
(ii) Legal procedures to increase cultivating land were planned and implemented 
with a limited degree of success, 76 so was the government's plan to divert credit to 
agriculture. 77 Therefore, despite the Thai state planning and implementing 
income redistribution policy for the benefit of the agricultural sector, the extent of 
the income difference reduction was limited, leaving the possible conditions for 
labour mobility. 
c. US capital 
The presence of US capital in Thailand between the 1950s and 1970s rendered 
both positive and negative consequences to the Thai economy. As referred to 
earlier, US aid in the form of economic, military and technical assistance began in 
the 1950s, and its volume increased in the 1960s. In addition, US military 
spending related to its air and naval bases in Thailand also contributed to the Thai 
economy, as well as spending by the US troops, either those stationed in Thailand 
or those on vacation. 
78 
'From 1950 to 1975, US military aid amounted to over half of total Thai 
defence expenditures; between 1966 and 1971 US military aid along with 
World Bank loans provided some one-third of public capital spending. 
75 Tai-nichi ij6 josei nettowdku and Takrai, Enpawdmento o mezashile: 4ýjoseimondai kal'ketsu no 
lameno nettowAu : ukuri, wAushoppu h5kokusho, p. 23 
76 Muscat, op. cit., pp. 192-193. 
77 Yoshihara, op. cit., pp. 117-118. 
78 Bowie and Unger, op. cit., p. 13 5. 
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Increasing US military spending in Thailand after 1965 helped boost the 
construction sector through the 1960s. ' 79 
However, after the ending of the Vietnam War, US military bases in Thailand 
were closed, and aid was withdrawn as well. The impact of US withdrawal is 
evident in the case of a village in Udon Thani, the northeast region. Udon Thani 
had lost two of its economic income sources by the middle of the 1970s. First 
was withdrawal of the US military, which stationed in the region, in 1976. 
Second, Udon Thani used to be an access point for trade with Laos; but it has 
ceased to be so since 1975, when commerce between Laos and Thailand stopped 
after the establishment of a socialist state in LaoS. 
80 The withdrawal of US aid 
and war-related spending thus led to the loss of income for the residents in the 
Northeast region of Thailand, which could constitute a condition for labour 
mobility. 
d Japanese capital 
In contrast to US capital, the presence of Japanese capital in Thailand continued to 
expand during the two decades of import substitution industrial isation. In 
79 Ibid., p. 135. 
80 Suzuki, Daisan sekai ni okeru mou hitotsu no hatten riron, p. 83. The end of the Vietnam War 
affected Thai military economically as well as in its military roles. During the war years, Thai 
military allowed operations of non-formal trade, with financial benefits from the trade in return. 
But after the ending of the war, the Thai military is 'criticized for such entanglements, and 
especially those with the Khumer Rouge and the military Regime in Burma' (Chai-Anan 
Samudavanija, 'Old soldiers never die, they are just bypassed', in Hewison (ed. ). Political Change 
in Thailand, pp. 42-57, p. 51). This indicates that Thai military's income from border trade maý 
have decreased. 
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manufacturing, investments were made in textileS,, 8 'automobile assembly and 
automobile parts manufacturing. 82 For example, Toyobo invested in Thailand to 
set up Erawan Textile Co. and Dusit Textile CO. in the 1960s, with Marubeni as a 
minor equity holder. 83 The following account shows the extent of the presence of 
Japanese capital in the Thai economy during the import- substitution 
industrial i sation. 'Under the growth-oriented Sarit and Thanan-Prapart regimes'. 
Thai-Japanese joint venture companies 
4 accounted for 40 per cent of cotton spinning, 70 per cent of synthetic 
spinning, 100 per cent of synthetic fibre, 71 per cent of motor car, 100 per 
cent of motor cycle, 51 per cent of battery, 53 per cent of wire rod, 100 per 
cent of sheet glass, 100 per cent of printing ink, 83 per cent of refrigerator, 75 
per cent of air conditioner, 47 per cent of electric fan, and 38 per cent of tyre 
production'. 84 
In the Thai retail industry, where minority investment up to 49% of total 
shareholding was pen-nitted, various Japanese retailers opened their stores, such as 
Daimaru, Jusco, Sogo, Tokyu and Yaohan in Thailand. 85 As Japanese investment 
became ubiquitous in the Thai economy, the anti-Japanese movement occurred in 
the early 1970s, its peak was the Anti-Japanese Product Week organised by the 
National Students Center of Thailand in November 1972.86 From the above 
81 Pasuk Phongpaichit, 'The Thai Economy in the Mid-1990s', in Robert Ash and Anne Booth 
(eds), The Economies qf Asia 1950-1998 (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 184-197, p. 186; 
Hewison, op. cit., p. 10-3 ). 82 Hewison, op. cit., p. 103. 83 Yoshihara, op. cit., p. 44. 84 Ibid., p. 44. 85 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 86 Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
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industrial restructuring in which Japanese capital operated, it is possible to expect 
that labour mobility was generated as a consequence of such restructuring. 
e. IMF and World Bank 
As was mentioned earlier, Thailand's economic development strategy shifted 
from import substitution industrial i sation to export oriented industrial isation at 
around the beginning of the 1980s. The impact of the second oil crisis is relevant 
to this shift. The Thai economy largely managed to offset increase in the price of 
oil after the 1973 oil crisis with the commodity export price increase. 87 However, 
after the second oil crisis of 1979, concerns over Thailand's foreign exchange 
reserve emerged. 88 Trade and current account deficit forced Thailand to borrow 
from the IMF in 1981 and 1985, and the government also asked the World Bank 
for structural adjustment loans in 1982 and 1983 ($150 million In March 1982; 
$175.5 million in April 1983 ). 
89 
Consequently structural adjustment measures, that aimed to promote 
export of manufactured products, were incorporated in the Fifth Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1981-86). These measures included: 
(i) Devaluation of the baht in 1981 and 1984, from B20 per dollar before 
devaluation to B27 in 1985. 
(ii) Liberalisation of foreign ownership of Thai companies to allow up to 100 
percent share in export-oriented industries. 
87 Bowie and Unger, op. cit., p. 139. 88 
Ibid., p. 139. 
89 Ibid., p. 142, Muscat, op. cit., pp. 180-182. 
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(iii) Tax exemption for export companies. 
(iv) Lifting of the restrictions on commodity agriculture export in 1981.90 
FDI in Thailand increased substantially in the late 1980s against the above 
background: it grew from $164 million in 1985 to $2.5 billion in 1990, which 
occupied 2.3 percent of GDP. 91 Yoshihara attributes these export promotion 
measures to the concentration of Japanese and Taiwanese investment in Thailand 
in the late 1980s, among other origins of FDI. 92 Financial deregulation was also 
implemented in the late 1980s. 93 Thailand's foreign exchange crisis in the early 
1980s had twofold consequences for creating conditions for labour mobility. 
Removal of the rice premium, one of the structural adjustment measures 
mentioned above, exposed Thai agriculture to world commodity price fluctuation, 
which meant the reduction of income available for the sector. Another 
consequence was the Thai state's promotion of international labour migration in 
the hope of increasing foreign exchange income. Hence, the Thai government's 
compliance to policy prescriptions the IMF and World Bank led to the emergence 
of two factors that could serve as conditions for labour migration: increased 
difficulties in the agricultural sector in sustaining the previous income, and the 
state's promotion of international labour migration. 
90 
Bowie and Unger, op. cit., p. 143. 91 
Ibid., p. 15 1. 92 
Yoshihara, op. cit., p. 59. 
931 Bowie and Unger, op. cit., p. 152. 
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Impact on labour migration 
Because of the complex workings of the above factors, as have been demonstrated 
in this section, labour became mobile in the Thai political economy. The 
following table presents the findings of this section on the contributing factors and 
their influence on labour mobility: 
Table 4-5. Contributing factors and the conditions for labour mobility created 
Contributing factor Conditions created 
Social and demographical conditions Decline in mortality and the subsequent 
population growth 
Thai government's economic policy Lack of cultivatable land; domestic income 
difference 
Chinese-Thai capital Industrial restructuring in agriculture 
(introduction of commercial agriculture, 
commercial loan; provincial business) 
US capital Aid and construction; the subsequent 
withdrawal from Thailand 
Japanese capital Industrial restructuring in agriculture and 
manufacturing 
IMF and World Bank Thai government policy compliant to the 
structural adjustment: commodity price 
fluctuation; promotion of labour 
immigration 
It must be noted here, however, that the above factors refer to the structural 
conditions for labour mobility. The actual decision to migrate is contingent upon 
other factors as well, such as another structure (patriarchy), and the factors 
attributable to individual migrants as active agents. 
The following accounts on labour mobility in the Thai political economy. 
drawn from existing sociological studies on contemporary Thailand, clearly 
reflect the influence of the above factors on labour mobility. For explanatory 
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purposes, it is possible to classify the mobility of Thai labour in the following four 
phases: 
(i) 1960s onwards: domestic and seasonal labour migration 
(ii) Mid-1970s onwards (after the Vietnam War): international labour 
migration to the Middle East 
(iii) 1990 onwards (after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait): international labour 
migration to East Asia 
0 1960s onwards 
Population increase and the decreasing availability of new land available for 
cultivation are attributed to pressure on the rural economy in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Such pressure was manifest in 'the fragmentation of farms and the growing 
incidence of tenancy, landlessness and indebtedness in some regions; [and] 
migration from poorer areas. ' 94 Agricultural production in Thailand is 'seasonal 
and heavily dependent upon the monsoon rain - which is concentrated in only 
four months'. 95 Nevertheless, about 85 percent of the cultivated area is not 
irrigated. Consequently in the dry season 'a few million workers become idle' 
96 
and seek temporary jobs. 
The above need for domestic labour migration is illustrated in the 
following case of the Udon Thani area, northeast Thailand, where labour 
migration most frequently occurred in the country. Suzuki reported that from 
1960 onwards, the need for non-agri cultural employment, particularly during the 
dry season, became evident among the residents of Udon Thani. Domestic labour 
94 Falkus, op. cit., p. '30; Sidney Goldstein and Alice Goldstein, 'Migration in Thailand: A Twenty- 
Five Year Review', Papers of the East-West Population lnstitute, Number 100 (Honolulu: East- 
West Center, 1986), p. 46. 
95 Poapongsakom, 'Rural Industrialization', p. 13 1. 
% Ibid., p. 13 1. 
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migration to Bangkok or transportation of sugar cane was available for such 
97 
additional employment . Domestic labour migration to Bangkok from the village 
peaked in the 1970-1975 period; after that, several alternative employment 
opportunities emerged, such as international labour migration (as shown above) or 
local paid employment. However, among the younger generation of village 
residents, it was becoming common even after 1975 to leave the village to work in 
Bangkok. Wages in Bangkok have not always been as competitive as those of 
other local employment; but if there was no desirable job for them, young and 
unmarried villagers, including women, left the village. 98 Once agricultural labour 
had become mobile as shown above, it was possible for those domestic migrant 
workers to move beyond the state border. According to Suzuki, international 
labour migration to the Middle East began in 1974, with land ownership being a 
determinant of international labour migration (i. e., ability to finance the initial 
cost for the migration). 99 
0 Mid- I 970s onwards 
International labour migration began in this period as an attempt to provide the 
former US military base workers with alternative working opportunities in the 
Middle East. There were both public and private migration agencies: a parliament 
member whose constituency was Udon Thani set up a private migration agency 
97 Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 90-92. In addition, tourism was another alternative employment since this 
period. 'in the late 1960s tourism emerged from beyond the horizon of official policy. In 1970 
tourist earnings were estimated at B2 billion, equal to 15 per cent of merchandise export earnings 
(Muscat, 1994, op. cit, p. 102). 
98 Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 100- 10 1- 99 Ibid., p. 93. 
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for the first time. 100 Suzuki cited 1985 data that showed that the number of 
emigrants from Udon Thani was the largest in the whole Thailand. 101 The number 
of emigrants from Udon Thani was estimated at around 20-30,000 in 1988, 
whereas the officially registered emigrants from the area numbered 10,600.102 
Foreign exchange remittance sent to the region was B1.046 million in 1987. and it 
had grown to B468.6 million for the period from January to July in 1988.103 
0 1990 onwards 
International labour migration from Thailand continued from the 1970s, but in the 
1980s there were some changes in the characteristics of population movement. 
First, the destination changed in the late 1980s from the earlier concentration to 
the Middle East to East Asian countries. Second, women increasingly migrated, 
in contrast to the 1970s when migrant workers were predominantly men. Third, 
exploitation of migrant workers by migration agents became more frequent in the 
1980s than had been in the 1970s. 104 Fourth, the Thai government published 
guidelines for international labour migration in its Fifth and Sixth Plans, and 
promoted migration for increasing foreign exchange income. 105 
100 Ibid., p. 83. 
101 Ibid., p. 83. 102 Ibid., p. 83. 103 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
'0' Supang Chantavanich, 'Issues from Thailand', in Patrick Brownlee and Colleen Mitchell, Asia 
Pacýfic Migration Research Network Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. /, Migration 
Issues in the . 4sia 
Pacýfic (Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Multicultural Studies, Institute for 
Social Change and Critical Inquiry, University of Wollongong, 1997), pp. 161-174, pp. 163-164. 
105 Amara Pongsapich, 'International Migrant Workers in Asia: The Case of Thailand', 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Transnalional Migration in the . 4sia Paýfic 
Region: Problems & Prospects, December 1-2,1994 (Bangkok: Asian Research Resource Center 
for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1995), pp. 47-66, p. 59. 
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The above change in the characteristics of international labour migration 
can be found once again in the case of a village in Udon Thani, as reported by 
Suzuki. The following two events induced the villagers to shift their attention 
from the Middle East to East Asia as a destination: (i) the Saudi Arabian 
government suspended issuing visas to Thai workers after a Saudi diplomat was 
murdered in 1990; and (ii) the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 made 
migrant workers from Asian countries, including Thais, refugees. According to 
Suzuki, migration to Hong Kong from the village in Udon Thani occurred in 1990 
for the first time, followed by migration to Taiwan and Japan in 1991.106 Women 
were among those who migrated to these destinations. 
Skrobanek reported that some of those women who worked in the 
domestic sex industry took another step to migrate internationally. 107 The 
following account on women's labour migration, from rural areas to big cities like 
Bangkok, describes how women are part of domestic migration, and also how 
some women migrant workers take the first step that may lead to the second step 
to international migration. 
'Today women comprise half of the active labour force of the country. There 
were 1.9 million women workers in 1992, most of whom were employed in 
the rural agricultural sector. [ ... 
]A great number of rural women labourers 
have migrated to Bangkok to find work in factories, where they are more 
likely to be exploited by employers than are male workers. The plight of 
Thai women workers never ceases to make newspaper headlines, both inside 
10" Suzuki, op. cit., p. 98. 
107 Siriporn Skrobanek, 'Traffic in women, forms and remedies: the case of Thailand', Proceedings 
qf the International Conference on Transnational Migration in theAsia Paýfic Region. - Problems 
& Prospects, December 1-2.1994, pp. 37-45, p. 4 1. 
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and outside the country, to the point where people have started to take their 
exploitation granted. This is not to mention those who have been pushed or 
lured into prostitution as a result of the rapid expansion of tourism and 
service industries in Bangkok and tourist spots such as Pattaya, Chiang Mai 
and Phuket'. 108 
4. Conclusion 
Sections 2 and 3 of this chapter have demonstrated the following points, 
respectively: 
(i) Changes in Japan's international economic environment in the 1970s 
resulted in the beginning of capital export from Japan, one of the 
destinations being Thailand; and 
(ii) Operation of the Thai political economy, to which the capital exported 
from Japan constituted an important part of its structure, led to the mobility 
of labour both domestically and internationally. It must be noted here that 
Japanese capital did not determine such population mobility. However, this 
section has shown how Japanese capital, among other economic forces in 
Thailand, contributed to the creation of structural conditions for 
international labour migration since the 1970s, if it was not deliberate, direct 
or the sole reason'09 for the labour mobility. 
The above findings indicate that the following three political economies were 
interconnected after the 1970s, mediated by different forms of globalisation force 
'08 Suntaree Komin, 'Changes in Social Values in Thai Society and Economy: A Post- 
Industrialization Scenario', in Krongkaew (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 251-266, pp. 254-255. 
109 Influence of migrants' family and the establishment and operation of migration nemork are 
also pertinent to the population movement, in addition to the factors discussed in this section. 
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at different times: (i) capital flow from US to Japan; 110 (ii) capital flow from 
Japan to Thailand; and (iii) labour migration from Thailand to Japan. Therefore. 
capital mobility and population mobility are, if with some time lag and in non- 
linear process, related. Consequently, it is possible to argue here that international 
labour migration from Thailand to Japan in the 1990s was a force of globalisation, 
in that Japan's capital mobility had created structural conditions. By corollary, 
analysed in terms of the workings of the East Asian political economy, the 
migration is not entirely an external force for Japan, as is often assumed, based 
upon the legal-territorial conceptual i sation of the state. 
Having demonstrated that international labour migration from Thailand is 
a consequence of globalisation, the next chapter shows that migration then 
operated as a cause of globalisation at a later period of time. In other words, 
Chapter 5 investigates how international labour migration worked as an 
international structure for Japan in the 1990s, and also how Japan's state and civil 
society acted in response to a challenge from the international structure, namely 
the language barrier. 
110 It can also be recalled here that, moving backwards chronologically, the change in the US 
international economic policy was triggered partly due to the working of the offshore US dollars, 
or mobile capital, as demonstrated in Chapter 2. 
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THE LANGUAGE BARRIER AND THE JAPANESE STATE: 
IMPACT AND RESPONSES 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the impact of the challenge from 
globalisation for Japan in the 1990s. To do so, the chapter examines how 
international labour migration as a force of globalisation affected Japan in terms 
of. (i) capabilities of actors in the Japanese state to respond to new developments 
in their environment; (ii) national identity; and (iii) the Japanese state's relation 
with its foreign population. More specifically, the chapter's focal point is the 
language barrier problem in Japan's criminal justice system. 'Language barrier' 
refers to the difficulties in communication and the subsequent legal and political 
problems experienced by investigators, defence counsel and judges operating in 
Japan's criminal justice administration on the one hand, and foreigner suspected 
of crime on the other. 
The language barrier problem constitutes an important challenge for the 
Japanese state for the following reasons. International labour migration is a cause 
and consequence of globalisation, as Chapter 4 identified. In addition, Chapter 2 
tI ound that international economic forces such as international labour migration 
are capable of affecting the operation of the sector of the state of the migrant 
receiving country which is in charge of 'political' issues, in particular law 
CHAPTER5 
enforcement. One of the core tasks of the law enforcement sector of the migrant 
receiving state is to maintain domestic order by controlling crime committed bN- 
foreigners through investigation, indictment, public trial and punishment. 
public trial is a crucial stage both for the state and the defendant, because at the 
end of the trial, the court makes a legal decision as to whether or not the defendant 
is guilty, and if so, to what extent she/he should be punished. When making this 
important legal decision, it is a common practice in the criminal justice 
administration to convict the defendant based on the facts that constitute offence 
and applicable law, which in theory would not involve many technical difficulties' 
as long as the suspect/defendant and the state officials of the criminal justice 
administration speak the same language. Such has been the case in the nation 
state, in particular in contemporary Japan, reinforced by the alleged notion of 
ethnic homogeneity. However, when a new environment emerged in which the 
above two parties speak different languages, there are instances where they are 
unable to communicate with each other as is assumed in the context of the nation 
state: the arrival of migrants is clearly an important case in point. One possible 
consequence of the inability to communicate fully will be that the defendant could 
be unjustly based on false facts. Such a use of state power is not only illegal, but 
also lacks legitimacy and consent, which are indispensable for the continued 
operation of that state in the long run, and would indicate that the state was unable 
' This is a theoretical assumption made solely for explanatory purpose to highlight the implications 
of the language barrier problem for criminal justice administration. The author is aware of at least 
the following two problems in criminal justice process, which will be addressed in Chapter 6: (1) 
contests over the delivery of criminal justice, and (ii) related to the previous point, the problems 
arising from the gender-blindness of law. 
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to respond effectively to the challenges from globalisation, namely international 
labour migration. 
This chapter discusses the language barrier in two ways: The first is to 
describe and analyse the following three points concerning the language barrier 
problem: (1) how the problem emerged in Japan; (ii) how the problem affected the 
Japanese state; and (iii) how Japan responded to the problem? The second 
objective is to consider the implications of Japan's response to the language 
barrier problem with regard to the following issues: (i) the Japanese state's 
capability to operate in the face of the challenge of globalisation; (ii) the relation 
between civil society and the state in Japan; and (iii) Japan's national identity. 
The latter three points merit analysis because the problem underlying the language 
barrier is that the constituency of political authority and the actual extent where 
such political power can influence do not correspond with, as has been (or 
assumed to have been) the case within the context of the nation state. This is a 
situation where 'a deficit in [ ... ] the delivery of collective goods' 
2 could take place. 
Hence this chapter is going to examine whether and to what extent such a 'deficit' 
in the exercise of political power and legitimacy was filled in the Japanese case in 
the 1990s. 
Before moving on to the above three tasks, however, the next section 
discusses the cases of Thai migrant women, because their cases clearly illustrate 
the connection between the following two key themes of this dissertation: the 
linkage between intemational mobility of capital and labour as discussed in 
2 Richard Devetak and Richard Higgott, 'Justice Unbound? Globalization, states and the 
transformation of the social bond', Inlernational Affairs, 75(3), 1999, pp. 483-498, p. 495. 
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Chapter 4 with relation to Thailand, and the impact of international mobility of 
labour on the Japanese state's practice and capability to transform itself. as will be 
demonstrated later in the current chapter. 
2. International Labour Migration of Thai Women and the Language Barrier 
The aims of this section are threefold. The first aim is to show that the 
progression of globalisation contributed to make Thai migrant women 
conspicuous in the statistics of crime committed by foreigners in Japan in the 
early 1990s, and therefore they are a prominent illustration of the language barrier 
problem. The second aim is to highlight the complex identities of Thai migrant 
women who were investigated in the above context. In the official statistics of 
detected crime, Thai migrant women primarily appear as offenders. However, 
during the criminal justice process, it also became evident that prior to the 
commission of offence they were also victims of crime and violence by other 
foreigners. Being the victim of crime and violence is an important issue within 
the context of globalisation, but this will be discussed in Chapter 6 as it is 
subsidiary to the main question for this chapter. Meanwhile, having been a focus 
of the investigation, the Philippine migrant women share some of the 
characteristics similar to the Thai migrant women: they were both from Southeast 
Asian countries, and a considerable number of them of both groups were in the 
entertainment and the sex industry in Japan. However, there are some differences, 
and it is because of the following points the Thai migrant women demand 
attention in this section: (i) the Phillipine migrant women were the target of crime 
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control in the 1980s; the Thai migrant women were the target in the early 1990s. 
when Japan's crime control against foreigners became considerably tighter 
following the revision of the Immigration Control Act. (ii) the interaction 
between capital mobility and international labour mobility is more evident in the 
Thai cases than in the Philippine cases, as was seen in Chapter 4. (iii) The 
language barrier could have manifested more severely to the Thai migrant women 
than it did for the Philippino migrant women: it was more difficult for the Thais to 
communicate in English; the extent of the support network available for the Thais 
likely to have been smaller than for the Philippines. The third aim is to point out 
that, notwithstanding the fact that the cases of Thai migrant women raised 
Japanese society's awareness about it, the language barrier problem was also 
manifested in Japan in the 1990s for migrants from other areas such as East Asia 
and South America, among others. This finding makes it necessary to document 
the Japanese state's response to the language barrier problem in generic terms in 
this chapter, in other words, in terms of all migrants including both Thais and non- 
Thais. 
(1) Thai Migrant Women in Japanese Statistics 
International labour migration of women to Japan is unique in that a considerable 
number of them are concentrated in the service sector, 3 including migrants from 
Thailand. Tables 5-1 and 5-2 show that the number of people from Thailand is 
3 Mike Douglass, 'The singularities of international migration of women to Japan: Past, present 
and future', in Mike Douglass and Glenda S. Roberts (eds), Japan and Global Afigration: Foreign 
workers and the advvnt (? f a multicultural society (London: Routledge, 2000). pp. 91-119, p. 92. 
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relatively small in comparison to the entire foreign population in Japan. Within 
the total number of foreigners who visited Japan in 1999 and 2000 less than 1.5 
percent were Thai nationals. A similar trend is evident in the registration of 
foreigners with local government. Thai nationals constituted 1.6 to 1.7 percent of 
all the foreigners who registered. 
Table 5-1. Foreigners Arrived in Japan (Selected Origins) 
1999 (H 11) 2000 (H 12) 
South Korea 1,160,034 23.7 1,286,583 24.4 
Taiwan 963,701 19.7 9445019 17.9 
USA 720,142 14.7 749,343 14.2 
China 327,005 6.7 385,296 7.3 
UK 188,036 3.8 198,675 3.8 
Hong Kong 208,172 4.2 192,946 3.7 
Philippines 144,305 2.9 169,755 3.2 
Australia 137,558 2.8 150,046 2.8 
Canada 109,651 2.2 122,260 2.3 
Brazil 70,794 1.4 101,513 1.9 
Germany 89,355 1.8 90,605 1.7 
France 72,356 1.5 81,528 1.5 
Singapore 68,676 1.4 74,967 1.4 
Thailand 64,246 1.3 73,472 1.4 
Malaysia 53,961 1.1 64J57 1.2 
Total 4,901,317 100.0 5,272,095 100.00 
Source: Ministry of Justice, Dai 40 shutsynyflkoku kanri 16kei nenp6 heisei 12 nen (Annual Heport 
qf Statistics on Legal Aligrantsfor 2000) (Tokyo: Zaimush6 insatsukyoku, 200 1 ), p. v, Tabie 6. 
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Table 5-2. Foreigners Registered in Japan (Selected Origins) 
1999 (H 11) 2000 (H 12) 
Korea 636,548 40.9 635,269 37.7 
China 294,201 18.9 335,575 19.9 
Brazil 224,299 14.4 254,394 15.1 
Philippines 115,685 7.4 144,871 8.6 
Peru 42,773 2.7 46ý 171 2.7 
USA 42,802 2.8 44,856 2.7 
Thai 25,253 1.6 29! 
1289 1.7 Indonesia 16,418 1.1 19,346 1.1 
Vietnam 14ý898 1.0 16,908 1.0 
UK 15,402 1.0 16,525 1.0 
Total 1,556,113 100.0 1,686,444 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Justice, Dai 40 shutsynyfikoku kanri 16kei nenp6 heisei 12 nen, p. xvi, Table 
22. 
In contrast to their relatively less noticeable status in the foreign population in 
Japan, some of the migrants from Thailand were conspicuous in the official crime 
statistics in the early 1990s. 
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Figure 5-1 Undocumented Migrant Workers Arrested in Japan, 
Selected Origins (1981-1998) 
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Source: Yoko Sellek, Aligrant Labour in Japan (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 32-33. 
Figure 5-1 shows the number of foreigners arrested in Japan for unauthorised 
employment and/or overstaying the visa expiry date. In the 1980s the ma*ority of j 
the arrests were of people from the Philippines. In the first half of the 1990s, 
migrants from South Korea, Iran, Malaysia and Thailand were among the majority. 
In the second half of the decade, those from South Korea and China were the 
mEkjor groups arrested, whereas the number of those from other origins decreased. 
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Figure 5-2 Undocumented Migrant Workers Arrested in Japan, by Sex 
(1981-1998) 
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Source: Sellek, Migrant Labour in. lapan, pp. 32-33. 
Figure 5-2 shows the trend in the arrests of female and male migrants. In the 
1980s the majority of foreigners arrested were women. The male migrant figure 
overtook that of female migrants between 1987 and 1988. Since then, the number 
of arrests of male migrants increased by more than nine times by 1992. After that, 
however, the number declined, and in 1998 was almost half the 1992 peak. In 
contrast to the male figure, the female figure kept growing throughout the 1990s, 
with two peaks in 1987 and 1993. 
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Figure 5-3 Undocumented Migrant Workers Arrested in Japan (Female, 
1981-1998) 
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Source: Sellek, op. cit., pp. 32-33. 
The breakdown of the two peaks in the female figures in Figure 5-2 is shown in 
Figure 5-3: over the last two decades, the main group of migrant women arrested 
for unauthorised employment has shifted from women from the Philippines in the 
late 1980s, to Thais in the early 1990s, and to South Korean women in the late 
1990S. 
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(2) Some Background of Thai Women's Involvement in Criminal Cases 
The above concentration of Thai migrant women's arrests is conditioned by long- 
term and short-term factors that have operated in the international political 
economy in East Asia since the ending of the Cold War. The influence of Japan's 
political economy in Thailand through capital exports has created crucial material 
(long-term and indirect) conditions for labour mobility, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 4. Alongside the state and the 'official' economic sectors, the working of 
the migration industry is also directly instrumental to the migration of women 
from Thailand to Japan, as will be shown in this subsection. In other words, non- 
state actors and 'unofficial' economic sectors operate as well, for whom Japan's 
immigration control policy is conductive to the migration industry's operation. 
Furthermore, capital mobility and the development and operation of transnational 
networks of the migration industry, are both manifestations of the globalisation 
process. 
The origin of the international migration of Thai women to Japan can be 
traced back to the late 1970s, when the internationalisation of the sex industry in 
Thailand began as the number of male tourists from the Middle East and Japan 
increased. 4 Sex tourism was then converted to the trafficking of women from 
Thailand to Japan. 5 Despite the fact that they were in Japan from the early 1980s, 
' Kyoto YWCA APT (ed. ), Jinshin baibai to ukeire taikoku Nippon: sonojillai to h6teki kadal 
(Trafficking in Persons and Japan as a Major Recipient Country,: .4 ctual condilions and 
legal 
problems) (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 200 1 ), p. 45. 
5 Kinsey Alden Dinan, 'Trafficking in Women From Thailand to Japan', HarvardAsia QuarferIv. 
Summer 2002 (http: //www. fas. harvard. edu/-asiactr/haq/200203/index. htm 
. 
1i Cited 3 October 2002), pp. 4-5. Human Rights Watch, OwedJustice: Thai Women Trqf cked into 
Debt Bondage in Japan (London: Human Rights Watch, 2000), p. 15. 
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the presence of Thai women only drew the attention of Japanese society in the late 
1980s. A possible explanation for this is as follows. In the 1980s, the majority of 
migrant women working in Japan were from the Philippines. However, the 
Japanese government tightened the processing of entertaiment visa applications 
in 1988, affecting the flow of migration of women from the Philippines. 
Meanwhile, international networks for trafficking women from Thailand to Japan 
were thought to have been established by 1988.6 This timing coincides with the 
increase in the number of Thai women who escaped from the extremely harsh 
treatment of their employers. For example, the women's shelter HELP reported 
that the number of Thai women who sought refuge at the shelter was 144 in 1988, 
as opposed to only 51 women from the Philippines. 7 
The migration industry, or the transnational trafficking network of Thai 
women, usually consists of local recruiters and migration agents in Thailand, 
escorts from Thailand to Japan, migration brokers, and employers and managers 
of bars where the trafficked women eventually work. 8 Organised crime groups in 
Japan and East Asian countries perform the core roles in the international network 
of trafficking of women. 9 The participants in the migration industry are able to 
exert influence upon the prospective migrant's decision to go abroad and also the 
destination. For example, it is the migration recruiter or agent who employs the 
notion of a possible large income to persuade the prospective migrants to go to 
6 Ajia no onnatachi no kai, Ajia toj'osei kaih6 (Asian Women's Liberation) (Tokyo: Ajia no 
onnatachi no kai, 1989), October, No. 20, p. 2. 
Aj ia no onnatachi no kai, Ajia tojosei kaih6, p 12 &21. 
Dinan, 'Trafficking in Women From Thailand to Japan', pp. 33-42,58. 
9 Dinan, op. cit., pp. 3-5- 
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Japan. ' 0 In addition, the destination depends more on the network that the 
migration agent maintains, rather than the prospective migrant's preference. '' 
Major destinations of Thai migrant women include Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia 
and Singapore, in addition to Japan. ' 2 In this respect, as argued in Chapter 2, it is 
inaccurate to assume that the individual migrants are entirely responsible for their 
migration. 
The migrant women trafficked into Japan are driven into 'debt bondage" 
despite the fact that there is no legal obligation for the women to pay money. The 
'debt' accumulates in the following way: a migration agent sells trafficked women 
from one and a half to two million yen to a broker. The mark up for the migration 
broker in Japan is between one and a half and three million yen. These make the 
total amount of 'debt' unloaded on the woman at three to five million yen. 13 This 
is an equivalent to ten years' salary of an ordinary Thai women worker. 14 In the 
late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s it took the trafficked women about six 
to seven months to pay off the 'debt', but they have to serve much longer in the 
late 1990s as the turnover in the sex industry decreased significantly as the 
'bubble' economy ended. 15 Compliance with the above 'responsibility to pay the 
'0 Josei no ie Saalaa, Josei no ie Saalaa 10 nen no ayumi: gaikokusekijosei eno b6ryoku nojittai 
(The Ten-year Histon, qf Women's Home, 5aalaa. - Actual conditions of violence against the women 
qfforeign origins) (Yokohama: Josei no ie Saalaa, 2002), p. 24; Human Rights Watch, Owed 
Justice, p. 62. 
" Chinami Kasama, 'Tainichi gaikokuJinjosei to "gender bias": nihon teki ukeire no ichisokumen 
to mondaiten (Women Migrant Workers in Japan and 'Gender Bias': An aspect of Japan's 
reception of the migrant workers and the problems)', in Miyajima, Takashi and Kajita, Takamichi 
(eds), Gaikokqjin r6d(3sha kara shimin e (From Foreign Workers to Citizens) (Tokyo: Y(ihlkaku, 
1996), pp. 165-186, p. 17 1. 
12 Saa I aa, Josei no ie Saalaa 10 nen no ayum 1, p. 115. 
13 US$25,000-42,000 at $1 ýY 120. 
14 Kyoto YWCA APT, Jinshin baihai to ukeire taikoku Nippon, pp. 49-50; Saalaa, op. cit., p. 109; 
Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 87 and p. 90. 
'5 Kyoto YWCA APT, op. cit., p. 56. 
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debt' is warranted by the possible and actual use of violence by bar owners or 
managers, or members of organised crime associated with the bar owners. 
Awareness of 'illegal stay' in Japan also hinders the migrant women from seeking 
help from the Japanese authorities. ' 6 
Because of their proximity to members of organised criminal groups, Thai 
women face greater dangers than Thai men who work illegally in construction or 
manufacturing. 17 At the end of the network of trafficking operates the bar 
managers, who directly control the trafficked women and keep them under 
uninterrupted surveillance. Such bar manager (called 'mama' or 'mama-san') are 
often women who have themselves worked in the industry previously. 18 Due to 
the nature of their work, the bar managers are also vulnerable (if relatively less so 
than the migrant women under debt bondage) if and when the trafficked women 
thought that there was no other alternatives than to resort to the use of force in 
order to escape from the debt bondage. 
The trafficked women can be sent anywhere in Japan, but in some cases 
they are sent to a location that already has or had sex industry: commercial 
districts; former red light districts; hot spa and other tourist resorts; areas adjacent 
to industrial area/military bases/local government offices. 19 Sending migrant 
women to succeed Japanese women, and possibly Philippine women, who used to 
work in these places could be interpreted as the service industry's adaptation to 
globalisation through restructuring. 
16 Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 90. 
17 Saalaa, op. cit., p. 10. 
18 Kyoto YWCA APT, op. cit.. p. 55, Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 82. 
19 Kasama, 'Tainichi gaikokuj in josei to "gender bias"', p. 169. 
240 
CHAPTER 5 
The following statistics corroborate with the above finding on the 
international network of trafficking of Thai women. The statistics are compiled 
by a women's shelter Saalaa, based on interviews with migrant women who 
sought refuge after escaping from debt bondage. Between 1992 and 2001,183 
women were sheltered after escape. Among them there were 164 Thai women 
whose arrival was concentrated in the period between September 1992 and 
1995.20 
Table 5-3. Debt Bondage of Trafficked Migrant Women Sheltered at Saalaa 
(1992-2001) 
(1) Migrant Women's Country of Origin 
Origin Number Percentage 
Thailand 171 93.4 
Philippines 6 3.3 
Columbia 4 2.2 
Others 2 1.1 
Total 183 100.0 
(2) Who Suggested Migrating to Japan? 
Number Percentage 
Migration Broker 77 42.1 
Friend/Acquaintance 71 38.8 
Family 1 0.5 
Others/Don't Know 34 18.6 
Total 183 100.0 
20 Saalaa, op. cit.. pp. I -'-1 31 - 
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(3) Location First Posted in Japan 
Prefecture Number Percentage 
lbaragi 36 19.7 
Chiba 26 14.2 
Nagano 24 13.1 
Tokyo 19 10.4 
Gunma 16 8.7 
Saitarna 14 7.7 
Kanagawa 12 6.6 
Others 36 19.6 
1 Total 183 100.0 
(4) Amount of 'Debt' Unloaded 
Amount (million yen) Number Percentage 
Less than 1.00 1 0.5- 
1.01-2.00 2 1.1 
2.01-3.00 10 5.5 
3.01-3.50 42 23.0 
3.51-4.00 82 44.8 
4.01-5.00 1 6.0 
5.01 or more 3 1.6 
Unknown 32 17.5 
Total 183 100.0 
(5) Origins of the Bar Manager 
Origin Number Percentage 
Taiwanese 56 30.6 
Thai 51 27.9 
Japanes 21 11.5 
Others 55 30.0 
Total 183 100.0 
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(6) Experience of Being 'Resold' to Another Bar Owner/Manager 
Number Percentage 
Yes 45 24.6 
No 88 48.1 
Not Su e 50 27.3 
Total 183 100.0 
Source: Josei no ie Saaiaa, Josei no ie Saalaa 10 nen no ayumi: gaikokusekijosei eno b6ryoku no 
jittai (The Ten-year History of Women's Home Saalaa: Actual conditions of violence against the 
women o reign origins) (Yokohama: Josei no ie Saalaa, 2002), Appendix 1-14. )ffo 
Some of the Thai women trafficked and driven into debt bondage may 
have paid up their 'debt'. There are others who decided to get out and managed to 
seek refuge at the Thai Embassy or private shelters such as HELP and Saalaa, 
among others. In addition, there were also those who were involved in criminal 
cases either as victim or offender. 21 Sugiura Akimichi, a civil rights campaigner, 
compiled a chronology of detected murder cases in Japan from January 1989 to 
February 1994. Table 5-4 summarises Sugiura's data, and demonstrates the 
extent of violence involving Thai women. 
Table 5-4. Thai Women in Detected Murder Cases in Japan (1989-1994) 
(1) Number of the murder cases in which Thai woman was a victim or the 
perpetrator 
1989 3 
1990 N/A 
1991 6 
1992 8 
1993 3 
1994 3 
Total 23 
Kyoto YWCA APT, op. cit., p. 4. 
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(2) Victim's country of origin and sex 
Thai women 19 
Japanese men 4 
Taiwanese woman 
Singaporean woman 
Total 25 
(3) Victim's characteristics 
Bar manager or owner II 
Migrant women 10 
Procurer of the service 2 
Unknown 1) 
Total 25 
(4) Location and frequency of incidence 
Location Cases 
Tokyo 5 
Chiba 3 
lbaragi, Kanagawa and Nagano 2 each 
Tochigi, Saitama, Niigata, Aichi, Mie, 
Osaka, Ehime, Wakayama and 
Kumamoto 
I each 
Source: Kyoto YWCA APT (ed. ), Jinshin baibai to ukeire faikoku Nippon: sonofittai to h6teki 
kadai (Trqfficking in Persons and Japan as a Major Recipient Country: Actual conditions and 
legal problems) (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 200 1), pp. 125-127. 
It was among these cases in which accuracy of the interpretation, the validity of 
investigation and the public trial were questioned, in particular the so-called D6go 
Incident (1989), 22 Shimodate Incident (1991) and the case of N (1992). In the 
22 Fumi Fukami, Tvfiyaku no hilsuy6 wa arimasen. - D6go ta4injosei satsujinjiken saihan no 
kiroku (There is No Need. for 1nierpretation: the record Qf murder case in D(igo oj'a Thai woman) 
(Matsuyama: S6f6sha shuppann, 1999), and Makiko M izuno, 'Gaikokuj in i iken to tsclyaku 
mondai: -136go j iken" to "Meruborun j 1ken- ni mirareru tsOyaku mondai (Problems of 
Interpretation of Criminal Cases of Foreigners: the interpretation problems in the D6go Incident 
and the Melbourne Incident)% A4atskvama shinonomejoshi daigaku. jinhungakuhu kiYo, No. 9, 
2001. 
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Shimodate Incident, the defence argued that the investigators failed to notify the 
arrested women of their rights as suspects; moreover, the investigation and 
evidence collection were unlawful because there was effectively no consent from 
the suspects to do so. In the N's case, the defence argued that the suspect's 
testimony, 'I stabbed the victim with a knife' was inaccurately interpreted during 
the investigation as, 'I stabbed the victim with a knife to kill her. ' This difference 
meant that the defendant was convicted for murder, even though it could have 
been manslaughter. In the D6go Incident, the interpreter was thought to be 
incompetent by civil rights campaigners because the interpretation did not make 
clear sense and the interpreter spent one-third of court hearing time looking up 
words from a Thai-Japanese dictionary. In each case the court dismissed the 
defence's claim over inaccuracy of the interpretation. 
Having shown the reasons why the Thai migrant women cases demand 
attention in relation to the language barrier problem, in particular in the early 
1990s, the next subsection demonstrates that other migrants also merit analysis as 
they were very much influenced by the language barrier problem in similar ways, 
namely experiencing difficulties in communication with Japanese state officials. 
and potential problems (possibly real in some cases) in the delivery of criminal 
justice. 
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(3) Extent of the Foreign Population that Faced the Language Barrier Problem 
While the Thai migrant women cases revealed the grave consequences of human 
trafficking that took place in Japan, the reported number of criminal case 
involving Thai women began to decrease by the middle of the 1990s. The shift in 
the reasons for seeking refuge at Saalaa reflected this development. 23 Whereas by 
1994 the majority of the women who reached Saalaa to escaped debt bondage, 
after 1995, domestic violence by a Japanese boyfriend or husband was the main 
reason to seek refuge, in particular for Philippine women. 
Table 5-5. Number of Women Sought Refuge by Origin (1992-2001) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Thailand 40 72 52 17 7 6 5 16 6 10 
Philippines 2 5 6 13 12 10 9 25 18 14 
Central/South 
America 1 1 6 5 4 5 7 14 
Source: Saalaa, Josei no ie Saalaa 10 nen no ayumi, p. 122 
The reasons for the above decrease in the number of the sheltered Thai women 
must be various, and only two possible ones are mentioned below. Migration 
from Thailand to Japan peaked in 1993 and declined thereafter, '14 and the 
responses of both Thai and Japanese governments have possibly contributed to 
this decline, among other factors. Thailand revised its labour laws in 1994 and 
23 Saalaa, op. cit., p. 17 and p. 84. 
24 Human Rights Watch, op. cit., p. 3, fn 2. 
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1995 to dissuade the Thai nationals from migrating abroad, 25 partly due to a lack 
of domestic labour, but also because Thai nationals were exploited while working 
in Japan. 26 At the same time there was speculation that frequent reports of violent 
incidents in which Thai migrant women were involved may have influenced the 
Japanese government to tighten their inspection of visa application in Bangkok 
and immigration control at Japanese ports. 27 
The remainder of this chapter analyses and discusses Japan's response to 
the language barrier in generic terms. As far as the language barrier is concerned, 
keeping the analytical focus solely on Thai migrant women cases could miss some 
developments in Japan's response to the problem. Such an extension of the 
analytical focus will also be justified, because the language barrier in the criminal 
process matters not only for Thai speakers, but also to speakers of other languages. 
The origin countries of human trafficking victims in the late 1990s included 
Columbia, former East European countries and Russia, 28 as the international 
network of trafficking extended in particular to the countries of the former Soviet 
Union. 29 Moreover, the language barrier confronts not only first generation 
migrants such as Thai migrant women discussed above, but also second- 
generation migrants in Japan. 
There is a reported relative decline in debt bondage of trafficked women, 
but whether such practice is actually disappearing is quite another. There are 
25 Saalaa, op. cit., p. 24. 
26 Noriyuki Suzuki, 'Tai seifu syakai no taiou (The responses of the government and the society in 
Thailand)', in Hiroshi Kornai (ed. ), Shinrai teijzi gaikokqjin ga wakarujilen (An Enoclopedia oj- 
Understanding the New Comer and the Settling Foreigners in Japan) (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 
1997), pp. 240-24 1. 27 Ibid., p. 24. 
18 - Ibid., p. 85. 
29 Dinan, op. cit., p. 5. 
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indications that the practice continues today, while the control and sunvillance of 
women by migration brokers and employers has become tighter than ever before, 
making it more difficult for the women to escape and seek refuge outside. 30 In 
this respect, the need to considering the safety of people of foreign origins within 
the Japanese territory continues to exist at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
In sum, this section has argued three main points. First, it showed that the 
progression of globalisation in East Asia, in particular capital mobility and the 
subsequent social reconfiguration, and the operation of the migration industry 
who benefited from the technological developments, contributed to making Thai 
migrant women conspicuous in Japan's crime statistics in the early 1990s. 
Second, the significance of Thai migrant women concerning the language barrier 
problem was twofold: (1) the existence of the problem was more clearly uncovered 
than the cases of foreigners from other countries; and (ii) their cases also showed 
that within Japan"s territorial jurisdiction the safety of foreign nationals was not 
always ensured. Third, the section has argued that, while it is important to focus 
on Thai migrant women, the analytical focus has to be expanded to include other 
groups of migrants. This is because the language barrier affected other migrants 
throughout the 1990s as much as it did Thai women in the early 1990s when such 
women were the targets of human trafficking as well as crime control by the 
Japanese state. The analysis of the characteristics of the language barrier and 
Japan's responses will therefore be demonstrated below in generic terms, namely 
30 Saalaa, op. cit., p. 18. 
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both for Thai and non-Thai migrants, rather than focusing on any particular 
groups of migrants in Japan. 
3. Emergence of the Language Barrier 
(1) Characteristics of Current Labour Migration in Comparison to Previous Flows 
The characteristics of international immigration to Japan in the last two decades 
include three main points. First, the volume of immigration flow to Japan 
increased significantly: the total number of foreigners visiting Japan was on 
average 300,000 per year in the 1960s, 31 but increased to 4-5 million annually in 
the 1990S. 
32 Second, the number of foreigners who registered with local 
governments also expanded from 783,000 in 1980 to I million in 1990, then to 1.5 
million between 1997 and 1998. In 2000 the figure was 1.7 million. 33 Third, the 
composition of the origin of registered foreigners changed in the 1990s: Koreans, 
who used to represent the majority of resident foreigners, were outnumbered by 
those from China, Brazil and the Philippines in the 1990s (Table 5-6 and Figure 5- 
4). 
" Seigo Hirowatari, 'Foreign Workers and Immigration Policy', in Junji Banno (ed. ), The Political 
Econom 
,v qfdapanese 
Socieýy volume 2: lnternational and Domestic Issues (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 81-106, p. 8 1. 
32 Immigration Bureau, MOJ, Heisei 13 nenhan zaliý, fi gaikokqjin t(jkei (Statistics of registered 
fibreigners in 200 1) (Tokyo: Zaimush6 insatsukyoku, 200 1 ). p. II and p. V 11. 
33 MOJ, Dai 40 shulsfaýyzikoku kanri 16kei nenp(j heisei 12 nen (Annual Report qf Statislic%ý on 
Legal Aligrants. for 2000) (Tokyo: Zaimush6 insatsukyoku, 200 1), p. iii. 
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Table 5-6 Origins of registered foreigners, 1991 and 2000 (thousands) 
1991 (H3) 
Registration 
2000 (H 12) 
Registration (%) 
Korea 693.1 56.9 635.3 37.7 
China 171.1 14.0 335.6 19.9 
Brazil 119.3 9.8 254.4 15.1 
Philippines 61.8 5.1 144.9 8.6 
Peru 26.3 2.1 46.2 2.7 
USA 42.5 3.5 44.9 2.6 
Others 104.8 8.6 225.3 13.4 
Total 1,218.9 100.0 1,686.4 100.0 
Source: Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, Heisei 13 nenhan zuitj, fi gaikokqjin 16kel 
(, ýIalislics of registered foreigners in 2001) (Tokyo: Zaimush6 insatsukyoku, 200 1), p. vill, Table 
4. 
Figure 5-4 Composition of registered foreigners by origin 0 991-2000) 
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(, ýIalislics qfregivered. foreigners in 2001). (Tokyo: Zaimush6 insatsukyoku, 2001). p. viii, Table 
4. 
One implication of the above shift in foreigners' origins is that an increasing 
number of foreigners are from places where Japan did not carry out extensive 
Japanese language instruction as it did in Korea and Taiwan in the first half of the 
twentieth century. This also means that Japanese people, including officials, who 
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meet foreign visitors and residents, are now less likely to assume that such 
foreigners of non-Western origin would understand Japanese. 
(2) Statistics of Foreigners Suspected of an Offence 
It is against the demographical background mentioned above that the reported 
number of offences committed by foreigners increased in the 1990s. At least two 
points should be taken into account when discussing the offence figures of 
foreigners in the last decade. First, not every 'foreigner' in Japan is included in 
the statistics. The National Police Agency defines rainichi gaikokqjin as all 
foreigners in Japan, but this term excludes US military personnel and long-term 
residents. 34 The distinction between rainichi gaikokujin and migrant workers is 
ambiguous, and in the 1990s the police did not clearly distinguish those two 
groups. 35 Since the middle of the 1990s, however, the police considered that 
transnational organised criminals were responsible for an increase in serious crime. 
Second, foreigners in Japan may be held responsible for the same offences as 
Japanese nationals, but also for ones that are specific to foreigners, namely a 
breach of the Immigration Control Act, in particular unauthorised employment 
and visa overstay (hereinafter 'the Special Law offence). As will be shown later 
in this section, most suspected offences by foreigners are related to the latter kind. 
The official statistics indicate the trend in offences by foreigners in Japan 
in the last decade as follows. The cases of criminal offences detected by the 
34 NPA, Keisalsu hakusho (While Paper on the Police) (Tokyo: bkurash6 insatsukyoku, 1989), p. 
M. 
NPA, Keisatsu hakusho, 1990, pp. 7-8. 
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police increased by 7 times between 1989 and 1999. However. in terms of the 
number of arrests, the figure grew by 2.4 times between 1990 and 19933. and this 
number has remained stable since then (Figure 5-5). 
Figure 5-5 Rainichigaikokujin suspected of criminal offences, 
1988-1999. 
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Source: National Police Agency, Keisalsu hakusho (White Paper on the Police) (Tokyo: Okurash6 
insatsukyoku). Heisei 10 nenban (1998), p. 259, Table 9-1; Heisei II nenban (1999), p. 9, Table 
I- 10; Heisei 12 nenban (2000), p. 240, Table 7- 1. 
As for the Special Law offence, both the number of suspected cases and of arrests 
hit a peak in 1997. After that the figures decreased until 1999. The increase in 
1997 may be attributed to law regarding the criminalisation of human smuggling 
which was enacted the same year (Figure 5-6). 
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Figure 5-6 Rainichigaiokujin suspected of special law 
offences, 1988-1999 
12,000 
10,000 
8,000 
6,000 
4,000 
2,000 
0 
S63 ý 
JH19 
ý 
JH2 
ý 
JH31 
ý H4 ý 
JH5 
H6 ý 
JH7 
H8 Hý H10 ý H11 
1988 98 990 99 992 99 994 99511996ý 7 
9 
13 99 1998 1999 
Source: National Police Agency, Keisatsuhakusho (White Paper on Police) (Tokyo: bkurash6 
insatsukyoku). Heisei II nenban (1999), p. 13, Table ]- 13; Heisei 12 nenban (2000), p. 242, 
Table 7-2. 
The sum of the above two sets of figures shows the following: whereas the 
number of suspected cases continues to rise, the number of rainichi gaikokujin 
suspected of offences became largely stable, having grown threefold between 
1988 and 1997. In the late 1990s, the total number of rainichi gaikokqjin arrested 
on suspicion of criminal or special law offence was approximately 14,000 (Figure 
5-7). 
Figure 5-7 Rainichigaikokujin: total cases of suspected 
offence and persons arrested, 1988-1999 
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Foreigners arrested and investigated for the suspicion of an offence may be 
indicted by the public prosecutor. The number of prosecutions against foreigners 
in Japan followed a trend similar to the above offence figures. One notable 
development was that the number of prosecutions against non-Korean foreigners 
surpassed that of Koreans between 1991 and 1992 (Figure 5-8). This is 
significant within the contemporary Japanese context, because the majority of 
public trials (and investigations) of foreigners is now for those who are unlikely to 
understand Japanese, in contrast to Koreans who have grown up speaking 
Japanese. 
14,000 
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Figure 5-8 Prosecution against foreign nationals, 1988-1999 
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Source: Saik6saibansho jimus6kyoku keijikyoku, 'X nen ni okeru keiji jiken no galy6 (General 
lahon Journal), various situation of criminal cases for the year X)', Hos(jjih(j (Laviyers Assoc 
issues, 1987-1999. ('Gaikokujinjiken no kokusekibetsu kisojin'in (chi kansai s6s6)') 
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(3) Explosion of the Language Barrier Problem 
The Japanese state acknowledged the language barrier problem in the late 1980s. 
For example, the National Police Agency set up a working group on the problem 
36 in 1988 . The police admitted in the next year that interpreting foreign languages 
became indispensable during many investigations. 37 The issue affected not only 
the investigation but also any subsequent public trial. According to Watanabe, a 
professor in Japanese criminal law, the number of first instance public trials in 
which interpretation was required was 344 in 1984 (0.5 percent of the entire 
defendants), 463 in 1988, and 2,273 in 1992 (4.8 percent). 38 The General 
Secretariat of the Supreme Court stated in 1992 that until the late 1980s 
interpretation was rarely required for foreign defendants, because until then the 
majority of 'foreigners' had been Koreans. 39 The issue was a concern of civil 
rights campaigners, too. According to Herbert, who studied the social mechanism 
of constructing the 'foreign crime crisis' conception in Japan in the late 1980s and 
also reported the campaigners' activities, 'interpreting is the most demanding 
problem in criminal procedure for foreigners. ' 40 
36 Kitamura Shigeru and Hayakawa Osamu, 'Keisatsu ni okeru tsOyaku no genj6 to kongo no 
tenb6 (The Present Condition and a Prospect in the Future of Interpretation in the Police), 
Keisalsugaku ronshu (The Journal of Police Science), 42(6), 1993, pp. 20-3 7, p. 2 1. 
37 N PA, Keisatsu hakusho op. cit. ( 1989), p. 115. 
38 Watanabe Osamu, 'Gaikokuj in j iken to keij i shih6 kenky0sha no shiten (The foreigner cases and 
criminal procedure: reflections of an academic)', in Watanabe Osamu and Nagao Hiromi (eds), 
Gaikokqjin to keýji tetsu.: uki - tekiseina t. 6 , vaku no 
tameni - (Criminal procedures forfibreigners: 
toivardsfiýir interpretation) (Tokyo: Seibund6,1998), pp. 285-296, p. 285. 
39 Saik6saibansho jimus6kyoku keijikyoku, A nen ni okeru keiji jiken no gaikyo (General 
Situation of criminal cases for the year X)', H6s6jih6,1992, p. 119. 
40 Wolfgang Herbert, Foreign lVorkers and Law Enforcement in Japan (London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1996), p. 247. 
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The technical reason for this problem is because Japanese laws stipulate 
that the language used in investigations and public trials must be Japanese. 
Article 175 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads: 'In case a person or persons 
not versed in the Japanese language are required to make a statement, an 
interpreter or interpreters shall be caused to interpret. ' 41 In addition, article 74 of 
the Court Organisation Law provides that 'In the court the Japanese language 
shall be used. 
42 
Watanabe's reports of two trials are testimony to the emergence and 
'explosion' of the language barrier problem. During the trial of a foreign 
defendant conducted in 1987 and 1988, Watanabe noticed that among the public 
prosecutor, the defence counsel, and the judge, none appeared to have understood 
that interpretation mattered to the operation of the trial. The judge reportedly told 
the interpreter that it was enough for the interpreter to convey a rough outline of 
the exchanges and opinions made during the trial. In contrast to the above 
indifference, the language barrier 'exploded' in 1991, when the Osaka High Court 
quashed a first instance ruling in which the defendant was convicted for robbery 
and murder. The reasons for this decision were as follows: interpretation in the 
court was incomplete; the interpreter was biased towards the public prosecutor, it 
was impossible to re-examine the defendant's testimony during the first instance 
trial, because audio recording of the original court hearings was not produced. 43 
41 Fukio Nakane (trans. and ed. ), 'The Code of Criminal Procedure of Japan', EHS Law Bulletin 
Series No. 2600 (Tokyo: Eibun-Horei-Sha, 200 1 ), p. RA4 1. 
42 Fukio Nakane (trans and ed. ), 'Court Organization Law', EHS L", Bulletin Series No. 20 10 
(Tokyo: Eibun-Horei-Sha, 1995), p. AA24. 
43 Watanabe, 'Gaikokujinjiken to keiji shih6 kenkyfisha no shiten', pp. 285-287. 
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In 1994, the Supreme Court published the number of complaints upheld by 
the first instance courts over the accuracy of interpretation during investigations 
and/or public trials from 1991 to 1993.44 This was an official acknowledgement 
of the frequent problems in its operation. Such admission is significant, as it 
appears that Japan's criminal justice institutions decided that they had to admit 
officially the existence of the problem. Coleman and Moynihan, criminologists in 
Britain, argue that criminal statistics are 'records (? f decisions (of which they are a 
very careful and detailed account) [ ... ] rather than an attempt to represent aspects 
of crimes and offenders. ' 45 Since both Britain and Japan maintain a bureaucracy, 
including the judicial branch, the above characterisation applies to the Japanese 
context as well. 
4. Significance of the Language Barrier 
(1) Japan's Criminal Justice Administration: a Brief Outline 
In order to highlight the significance of the language barrier problem to Japan's 
criminal justice process, the first two phases of the process, namely investigation 
and public trial, are briefly described here. 46 The police and public prosecutor 
investigate in the first phase of the criminal justice process. The main tasks of the 
44 MOJ, Hanzai hakusho (While Paper on Crime) (Tokyo: Okurash6 insatsukyoku, 1994), p. 264. 
'5 Clive Coleman and Jenny Moynihan, Understanding crime data: Haunled h-v the darkfigure 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 2001), p. 135. Emphasis in original. 
46The Language barrier at the correction phase, the third in the process, also has important 
implications for the convicts, the state, and the society. Discussing this phase will be beyond the 
scope of this research, however, for the data relevant to the third phase was more difficult to obtain 
than that for the first two. 
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police include: identifying a possible criminal offence; interviewing witness(es); 
arresting a suspect(s); interviewing the suspect(s) and collecting evidence. Upon 
completion of their investigation, the police decide whether or not to send the case 
to a public prosecutor. This decision must be made within 72 hours of the arrest, 
and the public prosecutor may request a judge to grant permission to detain the 
suspect for up to 20 days. After completing the investigation, the public 
prosecutor decides whether or not to charge the suspect. In the second phase of 
the criminal justice administration, namely, at a public trial, a judge examines the 
evidence presented to the court by the public prosecutor. After considering all the 
evidence presented, and cross-examination by the defendant and the defence 
47 
counsel, the judge decides whether the defendant is guilty or not . 
(2) Implications of the Language Barrier Problem 
The implications of the language barrier problem to the operation of Japan's 
criminal justice system are twofold, namely legal and political. The legal 
implication is that the language barrier may affect the result of the criminal justice 
administration. To account for this point requires reference to the core principles 
of the criminal justice system: 
47 Ida Makoto, Kiso kara manabu keijih6 (dai 2 han) (Basics ql'Crinnnal Law and Procedure) 
(Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2002), pp. 203-232-, Kamiguchi Yutaka et aL, Ke#ivoshJhJ (dai 3 pan) 
(Criminal Procedure, 3rd edition) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2002), pp. 31-212,262-263, Yanagawa 
Sh6ji, 'Rainichi gaikokujin no keiji jiken tojinken (Criminal cases of rainichi gaikokuJin and their 
human rights)', in Ebashi Takashi and Tanaka Hiroshi (eds), Rainichi gaikokqjinjinken hakusho 
(11 Idle Paper qfhuman rights of rainichi gaikokqj . in) (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1997), pp. 274-298, 
pp. 278-290. 
258 
CHAPTER5 
(i) A judge may convict a defendant based on the following three sources: 
the fact that constitutes the offence; evidence that supports this fact, and 
identification of the applicable law (Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) Article 
335-1 ). 48 
(ii) The judge recognises the offence-constituting fact based on evidence. 
Confession by the suspect or testimony of a witness not accompanied by evidence 
will not be recognised as an offence-constituting fact (CCP 317) . 
49 The j udge 
examines the alleged offence and the evidence only to the extent requested by the 
public prosecutor. In exceptional circumstances, however, ajudge can collect and 
examine evidence by herself/himself. 50 
(iii) There are three rules in the criminal justice system that can void or 
limit the validity of the evidence submitted to the court by the public prosecutor: 
(a) hearsay evidence is in principle prohibited (CCP 320-1 ), 51 even though 
investigation protocol is accepted by the court as evidence in day-to-day practice 
on the condition that the suspect gave consent to such submission; (b) forced 
. 
52 
confession is not recognised as evidence (Constitution of Japan, Article 38-2, 
CCP 319-1 53 ); and (c) 'evidence that [was] collected through illegal invest'gation 
will not be accepted as evidence to be examined in court as to whether the 
defendant is guilty or not. ' 54 
48 Nakane (trans and ed. ), 'The Code of Criminal Procedure of Japan', p. RA83. 
49 Nakane, op. cit., p. RA89; Ida, Kiso kara manabu keýjih(j, p. 219. 50 Ida, op. cit., p. 220. 
5' Nakane, op. cit., p. RA79, Ida, op. cit., p. 222. 
52 Glenn Hook and Gavan McCormick, Japan's Conlested Constitution: Documents and analysis 
(London: Routledge, 200 1 ), p. 194. 
S 11 Nakane, op. cit., RA79-, Ida, op. cit., p. 223. 
5' Ida, op. cit., pp. 223-224. 
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Two legal implications of the language barrier emerge from the above 
principles. First, evidence based on inaccurate interpretation will not be 
recognised as offence-constituting facts. Second, when interpretation is biased for 
some reason, this also fails to form a crime-constituting fact. The accuracy and 
neutrality of interpretation can thus affect the conviction or acquittal of foreign 
defendants. 
The above possible influence of interpretation on the administration of 
criminal justice carries further political implications. The criminal justice 
administration is an exercise of the sovereign power that is monopolised by the 
state. In Japan, unlike civil lawsuits, only public prosecutors are authorised to 
institute a criminal prosecution 55 as 4representative of public interests. ' 56 
Similarly, only judges are granted authority to make legal decisions as to whether 
the defendant is guilty or not guilty, and to decide to what extent the defendant 
should be punished. Ida, a professor of Japan Is criminal law, argued that this 
practice is underlined by the rationale that the clarification of the truth of a case 
and administering the right sentence to the offender should be of prime 
importance in the criminal justice administration. For this purpose, the court is in 
charge of finding the 'objective truth' of the case. 57 In other words, it is assumed 
in Japan's criminal justice system that the state, not civil society, should control 
conviction and punishment, because maintenance of domestic order is one of the 
core tasks of the state. 
55 Ibid., p. 214. 
56 David Johnson, The Japanese Way qfJuslice: Prosecuting Crime inJapan (Oxford: Oxford 
University, 2002), p. 237, Karniguchi et aL, KeUi. 5osh(jh(j, p. 91. 
57 Ida, op. cit., pp. 193-194. 
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However, shortcomings in investigation and public trial may breach the 
three rules of the validity of evidence shown above, which may possibly lead to 
an acquittal. Since the criminal justice officials aim to control crime to maintain 
domestic order, 58 failure to convict a foreign defendant could imply to the 
criminal justice officials that Japan's criminal justice system is unable to operate 
in the way that they wish it to. Considering that the language barrier is a 
manifestation of globalisation, as this chapter demonstrated earlier, being unable 
to control foreign crime due to the inefficient operation of the criminal justice 
system could suggest that the state is partially constrained by the language barrier. 
This clearly shows that the operations of globalisation forces are dialectical. 
International labour migration is a consequence of globalisation (mediated by 
capital mobility, as argued in Chapter 4), and now it works as a cause of another 
force of globallsation, namely the language barrier problem. 
(3) Expression of the Language Barrier 
From the above discussion it should be clear that investigators should collect 
evidence in compliance with the following three rules: to acquire the defendant's 
agreement on the contents of the investigation protocol and its submission to the 
court as evidence; to obtain a voluntary confession; and to conduct the 
investigation with due process of law. In the current Japanese context, this means 
finding out whether due process was enforced during investigation, and whether 
the investigation protocol was drawn up properly. Insufficient instruction to. or 
58 N PA, Keisalsu hakusho op. cit. ( 1999), p. 1. 
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monitoring of, interpreters can lead to shortcomings in the investigation of foreign 
suspects and in the public trial of foreign defendants, which can eventualk, - 
undermine the validity of the criminal justice administration. 
Such shortcomings can take three forms. First, with regard to the 
suspect's consent to submitting investigation protocol as evidence to the court, 
such consent may be fictitious if the interpretation during the investigation was 
inaccurate. Second, the voluntary confession principle will not be fulfilled if 
investigators forced or cheated the suspect into 'confessing. ' Third, compliance 
with legal procedures during the investigation and public trial includes: the 
criminal justice officials' responsibilities to notify and explain to foreign suspects 
and defendants their rights to remain silent and to provide access to a defence 
counsel and to their consul in order to enable the suspect/defendant to exercise 
her/his rights. Thus, if insufficient attention is paid to interpretation, it is possible 
that the language barrier may surface at any of the steps in criminal justice 
administration (see Table 5-7). 
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Table 5-7. Possible Expressions of the Language Barrier during the Criminal 
Justice Process 
Police investigation Public prosecutor's 
investigation 
Public trial 
" Questioning by the Judge's hearing of 9 Service of transcript 
police as a possible suspect's statement of indictment 
initiation of before sanctioning 0 Notification of the 
investigation committal right to appoint 
" Inspection of investigation counsel 
personal effects of 0 Notification of the 
the suspect by the Compilation of right to remain silent 
police investigation 0 Examination of 
" Voluntary protocol evidence 
presentation to 0 Statements of public 
police accompanied prosecutor, defence 
by police officer(s) counsel, and 
" Arrest with or defendant 
without warrant Pronouncement of 
" Notification of the j udgement and 
right to remain penalty 
silent, and the right 
to retain defence 
counsel 
" Compilation of 
investigation 
protocol 
Source: Ida, op. cit., pp. 203-232-, Kamiguchi Yutaka et al., op. cit., pp. 31-212; pp. 262-263, 
Nakane, Code of Criminal Procedure; Yanagawa, 'Rainichl gaikokujin no keiji jiken to jinken 
(Criminal cases of rainichi gaikokujin and their human rights)', pp. 278-290. 
In contrast to the cases when the interpretation was insufficient as demonstrated in 
the above table, when a reasonably competent interpreter is assigned to a public 
trial, that fact will be illustrated by the following developments, according to 
Judge Tsuneo Suzuki: (i) the expression on the face of the foreign defendant 
would brighten from the previous puzzled and anxious look, and (ii) whereas 
incompetent court interpreters would miss points, a capable court interpreter 
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would be able to bring out the points clearly, thus interviews in the court ývould 
flow smoothly. 
59 
5. Manifestations of the Language Barrier and the Japanese State's 
Responses 
The previous section showed that the core issue arising from the language barrier 
problem was the breach of the three principles concerning the validity of evidence 
submitted to the court. Such a breach can be attributed either to the shortage in 
the number of interpreters, shortcomings in the quality of interpretation, or both. 
In order to account for how the Japanese state responded to these shortages and 
shortcomings, this section discusses the following four points: first, the actions 
taken by the Japanese state and civil society actors to address the shortage in the 
number of interpreters; second, the actions carried out to rectify the qualitative 
shortcomings of the interpretation; third, the Diet debate on developing a new 
legal framework to address the language barrier problem; and fourth, an 
assessment on the current status of the language barrier. 
(1) Quantitative Shortages 
Since Japan's criminal justice administration had not been aware of the need for 
them '60 it was unfortunately inevitable that the availability of interpreters was 
59 Interview with Judge Mr. Suzuki Tsuneo, 25 May 200 1. 
60 Nakagawa Kiyoaki. 'Gaikokujin higisha no keiji tetsuzuki o meguru mondaiten (Issues related 
to criminal procedures of foreign suspects)', Writsu no hiroba, 46(7), 1993, pp. 21-28, p. 28. 
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limited in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Consequently, the criminal justice 
process operated without interpretation in many cases during this period. For 
example, in 1988, approximately 40 percent of rainichi gaikujin suspects (1.521 
cases out of 3,745) were investigated by the police solely in Japanese .61 Among 
the investigation records of rainichi gaikokujin cases in the Kinki area in Western 
Japan between 1988 and 1992 (n=-30; this is the number of records made available 
to the researchers by the public prosecutor's office), a substantial number of the 
62 
records indicated that interpretation might not have happened . Similarly, among 
the 8,018 cases for which the defence counsel considered one necessary, an 
interpreter was assigned to only 838 cases in the early 1990S. 
63 As for the court, 
research for this study so far has not identified published accounts that a public 
trial of rainichi gaikokujin was conducted without interpretation. Judge Kitani, a 
former Tokyo High Court judge, remarked that there had not been such a case as 
far as he was able to recall. 
64 
The police took two measures to address the interpreter shortage. The first 
was to train officers to work as interpreters. 65 Those who held the second grade 
certificate of the Eiken English proficiency examination were qualified as internal 
6' Kitamura and Hayakawa, 'Keisatsu ni okeru ts6yaku no genj6 to kongo no tenbV pp. 3 1-33, 
Muraoka Keiichi, 'Aru gaikokujinjiken no ky6kun (Lessons from the criminal case of a 
foreigner)', Xyzi to seigi, 44(l), 1993, pp. 72-79, p. 74; Mitsui T6ru, 'Rainichi gaikoku. jin no keiji 
j iken to tsOyaku (I ) (Criminal cases of rainichi gaikokuj in and interpretation, part I)% Wgaku 
ky6shitsu, 195, December 1996, pp. 99-104, p. 99. 
62 Tsuda Mamoru and Miyawaki Setsu, 'Gaikokujin keiji tetsuzuki ni okeru tsbyaku honyaku ishl 
sotsQ no genj6 - firipin jin no jiken kiroku no ch6sa kara - (The present condition of interpretation, 
translation and communication in criminal procedures fore foreigners: a case study of the 
Philippine suspect)', Jiyfi to seigi, 44(l), 1993, pp. 27-4 1, pp. 3 1-34. 
63 Tanaka Hiraku; Taniguchi Seisaku; Matsuo K6ya; Miura Masaharu; Yanagawa Sh6ji; and 
Yamada Toshio, 'Gaikokujin jiken to keij] tetsuzuki (Foreigner cases and criminal procedure)', 
. Jurisulo, 1043,15 April 1994, pp. 8-30, p. 11. 64 Interview with Judge Mr. Kitani Akira, 4 April 2002. 
65 Mitsui, 'Rainichi gaikokujin no keijljiken to tsOyaku (1)', p. 101. 
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interpreters. 66 Second, the police asked the private sector to supply interpreters. 
At the end of the 1980s the majority of interpreters working for the police were 
the internally trained officers, 67 but by the early 1990s those from the private 
sectors outnumbered the in-house interpreters. 68 The NPA testified to the Diet 
both in 1988 and in 2000 that it found it difficult to recruit interpreters of foreign 
languages 'not so often spoken in Japan' (namely, non-English languages such as 
Filipino and Thai). 69 In addition, the police compiled an interpreter roster, and 
shared with the officers in neighbouring jurisdictions the information on 
interpreters who may be able to assist in investigations. 'O 
Research for this study indicates that public prosecutor's office would first 
identify university teachers or local leaders who can recommend possible 
candidates to be interpreters, 71 while it would also contact police or the public 
prosecutor's office in the neighbouring jurisdictions in order to compile the 
interpreter roster. 72 Initially each public prosecutor's office compiled the rosters, 
but since late 1997, the MOJ has maintained the roster to which all the public 
prosecutor's offices have access. 73 The roster is updated monthly and it includes 
such information about registered interpreters as languages they can interpret, the 
66 Tanaka Hiraku et al., 'Gaikokujinjiken to keiji tetsuzuki, p. 19. 
67 Kitamura and Hayakawa, op. cit., pp. 31-33. 
68 Tanaka H iraku et al., op. cit., pp. 19-2 1. 
69 Minutes No. 11, LAC/HOR, the 109th Session, 16 September 1988 (S62), p. 4, Minutes No. 11, 
Local Governance and Police Affairs Committee, HOC, the 147th Diet, 18 May 2000 (H 12), p. 14. 
70 Mitsui, op. cit., P. 101 - 
71 Minutes No. 3, LAC/HOC, the 147th Session, 15 March 2000, p. 8. 
72 Mitsui, Op. CIt., P. 10 1; Tanaka Hiraku et al., pp. 19-2 1, Nakagawa, 'GaikokuJIin higisha no kei. 1 i 
tetsuzuki o meguru mondaiten', p. 22. 
73 Minutes No. 5, LAC/HOC, the 140th Session, 27 March 1997, p. 8. 
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extent of their understanding of legal procedures, and awareness about their 
neutral ity. 
74 
In the 1980s the courts used to appoint interpreters of English chosen from 
the roster that the courts had already compiled. For the interpreters of other 
languages such as Cambodian and Tagalog [Filipino], the courts consulted such 
institutions as universities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon H6s6 Ky6kai 
(NHK), and foreign embassies in Japan. 75 In the 1990s, the courts also contacted 
such institutions as language colleges, Kaky&6kai (Chinese residents association), 
76 
and Nittai b6eki ky6kai (Thai-Japan Trade Association) , and international 
exchange associations in prefectures or municipalities. 77 They also placed 
advertisements for court interpreters in the public media, and on the Supreme 
Court website . 
78 The screening process of interpreters for district courts is, 
according to Judge Yasuro Tanaka, as follows: first, a primary screening based on 
an applicants' CV; second, those who were short-listed are asked to observe 
public trials a couple of times before submitting an essay explaining why the 
candidate thinks she/he is capable for the job, and how she/he would do it; and 
third, the court selects interpreters and registers them on the court interpreter 
74 Minutes No. 8, LAC/HOC, the 141 st Session, 4 December 1997, p. 6. 
75 Minutes No. 11, LAC/HOR, the 109th Session, 16 September 1988 (S62), p. 6. 
76 Nakayama Takao, 'Y6 tsOyaku gaikokujin keiji jiken to saibansho no torikumi (Measures that 
the courts have taken for criminal cases of foreigners requiring interpretation)', . 1iYu loseigi, 
44(l 
1993, pp. 42-53. p. 44. 
77 Minutes No. 5, LAC/HOC, the 140th Session, 27 March 1997, p. 8. 
78 Minutes No. 5, LAC/HOC, the 140th Session, 27 March 1997, p. 8. 
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roster. 79 Each High Court compiled a roster to enable the District Courts in its 
jurisdiction to share the information. 80 
As a consequence of the recruitment during the last decade, the capacity 
for judicial interpretation has expanded as follows, according to the official 
accounts. In 2000, the police had 8,700 interpreters in total on their rosters, 
consisting of 3,400 police officers and 5,300 private interpreters. 81 For the Public 
Prosecutor's Office, approximately 1,900 interpreters were registered in 1994, and 
82 by late 1997 the number had increased to 3,700 .A Supreme Court official 
testified in 2002 that the number of interpreters on their rosters was 414 in 1990, 
2,703 in 2000, and 3,037 in 2001.83 In terms of the number of languages they 
should be able to interpret, the police and the external interpreters collectively 
have command of 70 to 80 languages. 84 The 3,037 interpreters on the rosters of 
the courts in 2001 totalled 44 languages. 85 However, for twenty of these 
languages, there were less than ten interpreters, and for the other eleven, there was 
only one interpreter each. 86 The limited availability of interpreters, in particular 
79 Interview with Judge Mr. Tanaka Yasur6,19 June 2001. 
80 Murase Hitoshi, 'Gaikokujin hikokunin no saibanj6 no mondaiten to taisaku (Problems in 
criminal trials of foreigners and their measures)', H6ritsu no hiroba, 46(7), 1993, pp. 29-34, p. 3 1. 
Minutes No. 5, LAC/HOC, the 140th Session, 27 March 1997, p. 8. 
81 Minutes No. 11, Local Governance and Police Affairs Committee, HOC, the 147the Session, 18 
May 2000 (H 12), p. 14; Minutes No. 6, Accounting Committee, HOC, Post-session meeting of the 
149th Session, 20 September 2000 (H 12), p. 4. 
82 Minutes No. 8, LAC/HOC, the 14 1 st Session, 4 December 1997, p. 6. 
83 Minutes No. 9, LAC/HOC, the 154th Session, II April 2002 (H 14), p. 10. At the same meeting, 
the number of foreign defendants who received court interpretation was also reported to the Diet: 
689 (1.3% of the entire defendants judgement was given) in 1989 (H 1); 5,331 (10.70, o) in 1994 
(H6)-, 7,219 (12.6%) in 1997 (1-19); and 6,281 (9.2%) In 2000 (H 12) (p. 10). 
84 Minutes No. 11, Local Governance and Police Affairs Committee, HOC, the 147th Session, 18 
May 2000 (H 12), p. 14. 
85 Minutes No. 9, LAC/HOC, the 154th Session, II April 2002 (H 14). p. 10. 
86 Minutes No. 6, Accounting Committee, HOC, Post-session meeting, the 149th Session. 20 
September 2000 (H 12), p. 4. In 2000, number of foreign defendants sentenced at the first-instance 
trial was 6,328. Number of their country of origin was 76, and 36 languages were interpreted this 
year. Constituents of these languages were: Chinese (38.80, o of the entire cases with interpretation 
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those of the relatively less frequently spoken languages in Japan, is illustrated in 
the account of a former Thai-Japanese interpreter who was a student of a 
university in Japan. Demand for judicial interpretation (both for investigation and 
public trial) was so heavy that from a certain point of time he had to decline 
requests to interpret due to concern that he might not be able to complete his 
research he was conducting in Japan if he kept sparing time for judicial 
interpretation. 87 
By the end of the 1990s, judicial interpretation had become a 'one billion 
yen industry. ' 88 According to the MOJ, the amount it had spent on interpreter fees 
was Y82.2 million in 1993; Y432.4 million in 1997; and Y464 million in 1998. 
The annual budget for 1999 was Y504 million 89 and was Y 556 million in 2000.90 
In addition, the Ministry allocated Y 13 million for Workshops for Interpreters in 
2000.91 According to the testimony by the SC in 1999, the amount that the courts 
spent on the court interpreter fees was as follows: Y 167 million in 1993; Y 580 
million in 1997; Y 580 million in 1998. The budget for 1999 was Y 580 
given), Korean (15.6), Filipino (Tagalog) (6.8), Persian (6.4), Thai (6.2), Portuguese (5.3), Spanish 
(4.7), English (3.9), Vietnamese (2.3), Bengalese (1.9), and other languages (8.1). In addition the 
4other languages' include the following: Arabic, Italian, Indonesian, Urdu, Dutch, Cambodian, 
Singhalese, Swahili, Tamil, German, Turkish, Nepalese, Hungarian, Punjjabi, French, Hebrew, 
Polish, Malay, Myammarese, Mongolian, Laotian, Rumanian and Russian. Yokohama District 
Court, 
http: //courtdomino2. courts. gojp/ 
- 
49256b52003556d8. nsf/0/617c 10450136BM49250500 I 31c4 
dI ? Open Document& High I ight=O, 
_f229ck44muc89OrO_ 
(cited 22 January 2003) 
87 Interview with Mr. Sittha Sanfeungfung, 19 March 2002. 
88 Approximately $83 million at US$I=Y 120. 
89 Minutes No. 2, LAC/HOC, the 145th Session, 15 March 1999 (H 11), p. 15. 
" Minutes No. 2. LAC HOC, the 147th Session, 14 March 2000 (H 12), p. 14. 
91 Minutes No. 2, LAC HOC, the 147th Session, 14 March 2000 (H 12), p. 14. 
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million, 92 and Y24 million was allocated to H6tei tsfiyakunin semind (Workvhop 
for Court Interpreters), and Y8 million for the Manual for Interpreters. 93 
(2) Qualitative Shortcomings 
A qualitative improvement in judicial interpretation was also required in Japan's 
criminal justice institutions, since the increase in the number of the interpreters 
recruited did not automatically warrant the quality of interpretation they were able 
to provide for the criminal justice process. Two kinds of actors engaged in such 
improvements. The first were the members of the criminal justice institutions 
themselves, namely the police, public prosecutor and the court. The second were 
the judicial interpreters. In other words, whereas the officials themselves could 
change the way they operate, they could also design training programmes for 
judicial interpreters. Whichever way was chosen, preparation for these qualitative 
improvements was likely to have involved a restructuring of the operation of 
Japan's criminal justice administration. In this respect, the internal sector of the 
Japanese state has certainly responded to the external impact rendered upon its 
operation in Japan's geographical territory. One of the fundamental obstacles to 
removing the language barrier was the lack of understanding among the officials 
that interpretation does indeed matter to the administration of criminal justice, and 
it should be taken seriously as such. 94 The developments shown below in this 
92 Minutes No. 2, LAC/HOC the 145th Session, 15 March 1999 (H 11), p. 15. 
93 Minutes No. 2, LAC/HOC, the 145th Session, 15 March 1999 (H 11), p. 15. 
94 Watanabe Osamu-, Tanaka Hiraku et al, op. cit., p. 15. 
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and the next subsections indicate that such indifference appears to have decreased 
- at least to a certain degree. 
a. Providing translation of the investigation and court documents 
The police, public prosecutor, and the court should enable the suspect/defendant 
to understand what sort of legal process she/he is going through, in order to be 
able to defend herself/himself with the assistance of the defence counsel. These 
arrangements should ensure that state power is not unduly exercised. For the 
above purpose the investigators and the courts have compiled translations of the 
documents to present to foreign suspects and defendants at different stages in the 
criminal justice administration, including the following three documents. First, 
the police provide the suspects with translations of legal documents whose 
contents are fixed regardless of the case, such as notification of the right to retain 
defence counsel. 95 Second, the court explains to the foreign defendants the 
implications of the judge's questioning prior to detention, and the availability of 
duty counsel. 96 Third, the court sends a translation of an outline of the indictment 
to the defendant before the public trial begins. 97 Yanagawa, an attomey-at-law. 
requested to investigation officials that the following should be enforced: the 
police should orally inform a suspect of the reason for the arrest in the language 
that the suspect understands. If they were unable to do so at the time of arrest, 
such notification should be made as soon as possible after the arrest, through an 
95 Fujimoto Tetsuya, Keýiseisaku gairon (zentei dai 3 pan) (Criminal policy. - an outline Ord and 
rcviscd edition)) (Tokyo: Seirin shoin, 200 1), p. 340. 96 M Itsui, op. c it., p. 103. 
97 Ibid., p. 104. 
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interpreter over the phone if necessary; in either case, notification of the suspects' 
rights should be made in a practical manner, not as a token measure. The fact that 
such request was made indicates that those notices were not always made during 
the early 1990s. 
The following two events may have been influential in ensuring 
distribution of the translation of the documents. First, in October 1990, Urawa 
District Court acquitted a foreign defendant who was charged on suspicion of 
arson, while he was simultaneously convicted for overstaying the visa expiry date. 
The reasons for this acquittal were manifold, but one point that is most relevant to 
this study is that the Court, presided over by Judge Kitani Akira, found that the 
confession of the defendant submitted to the court did not constitute valid 
evidence of an offence, for it was made involuntarily. According to the Court, the 
investigators did not inform the defendant of the right to remain silent and to 
retain a defence counsel in a practical manner which was understandable to him, 
but only as a mere formality. In addition, the investigators led the suspect to 
make a false confession, taking advantage of the defendant's misunderstanding of 
Japan's criminal justice system. 98 The Court warned the investigators that, 
notwithstanding the resource constraints under which the investigators were 
operating when dealing with the cases of foreigners, the practice of the 
investigators in this case should be corrected immediately. Forcing a foreigner. 
who has at best a limited understanding of Japanese law and the language, to 
make a false confession is unacceptable both on humanitarian grounds and 
"' Urawa chih6 saibansho, 'Misatoshi no gaikokujin ap5to h6kajiken hanketsu (urawa chisai sh6 
63 (wa) 707 g6,782 g6, hei 2.10.2 kei sanbu hanketsu), Hanreijiho, 1376, pp. 24-54, pp. 40-41 
p. 45. 
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according to international morality. 99 At least in the Urawa court case, the 
investigation failed to convict the suspect whom they thought was responsible for 
a suspected crime. Three years after the Urawa ruling, an official from the 
Ministry of Justice alluded to the above judgement and wrote that, even though 
that official himself was convinced that it was the practice of investigators to 
inform suspects of their rights, translations of notice of such rights should be 
prepared. In this way, it was argued that, the investigators will be able to prove to 
third parties that they guarantee defendants' rights, and also will be able to 'avoid 
unnecessary disputes during public trial. "00 The failure to inform suspects of 
their rights, as seen in the above case, was not uncommon in the early 1990s. One 
of the interviewees for this study, who was arrested in Japan in 1992, told the 
author that at the time of the arrest there were no explanations given in a 
comprehensible way pertaining to the rights of the suspect. 10 1 
In contrast to the judiciary's influence upon the administrative branch of 
the Japanese state as shown above, in a second event, civil rights campaigners 
were able to affect the operation of the courts. X fi finken ky6kai (Japan Civil y 
Liberties Union, JCLU) is an NGO that advocates the promotion of international 
human rights. In 1991 JCLU published a proposal to call for the protection of the 
rights of foreigners in Japan, including those within the criminal justice process. 
One of the suggestions in this proposal stated that translation of legal documents 
99 Urawa chiho saibansho, 'Misatoshi no gaikokujin apdto h6kajiken hanketsu'. pp. 53-54. 
100 Nakagawa, op. cit., p. 27. 
101 Interview with Khun P, Tai-nichi josei nettowdku (Thailand-Japan Network for Migrant 
Women), on 10 March 2002. 
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should be provided to foreigners during investigation and public trial. 102 Hashiba, 
a senior member of the Union reported that, based on the proposal, the JCLU 
managed to discuss frankly with the Supreme Court the issues relating to 
foreigners and criminal justice. He also noted that all the District Courts and the 
Summary Courts began providing translation of legal documents thereafter. 
Another example of a civil society actors' contribution in reducing the 
extent of the language barrier problem is the working of the t6ban bengoshl' (Duty 
Counsel) system in Japan, according to Kawaguchi Kazuko, an attomey-at-law. 
The system was first set up in Fukuoka in western Japan in 1990, and then was 
further introduced throughout the country in 1991. Because the defence counsels 
are now able to contact a suspect during the investigation stage, the possibilities 
for inaccurate interpretation and investigation protocol have probably decreased in 
the 1990s. 
103 
b. Training. forjudicial interpreters 
Shortly after the introduction of interpreters began in the early 1990s, it was 
discovered that some of the interpreters from outside the judiciary did not know 
basic legal ten-ns that are frequently used in investigation and public trial. To 
reduce the extent of this problem, the police, public prosecutor, defence counsel 
102 Japan Civil Liberties Union, Criminal Procedure and the Human Rights qfForeigners in 
Japan: Problems and Suggestions (Tokyo: Japan Civil Liberties Union, 1991), p. 7, p. 10, and p. 
12. 
'0' Interview with Kawaguchi Kazuko, 5 March 2002. 
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and the courts respectively compiled a glossary of legal terms and also held 
training sessions for interpreters. ' 04 
The training and recruitment of interpreters became intertwined by the end 
of the 1990s, as illustrated by the following three developments. First, the police 
both trained their officers intemally, and also delegated some of their training to 
external institutions. While the NPA administered language training (mainly 
English) to the officers at Kokusai s6sa kensyfisho (International Research and 
Training Institute for Criminal Investigation, National Police Academy), local 
police authorities asked private institutions (presumably language schools) to give 
language lessons to their officers. ' 05 Second, the MOJ, which has jurisdiction 
over the public prosecutor's office, provided interpreters with a glossary of legal 
terms in several different languages. ' 06 The Criminal Affairs Bureau of MOJ 
delegated H6mu s6g6 kenkyfisho (Research and Training Institute of Ministry of 
Justice) to hold Tsfiyakunin seminj (Workshops for Interpreters) in Tokyo. 
Instructors for these workshops included public prosecutors from the Ministry, 
and prosecutors operating in public prosecutor's offices. These workshops had 
been held four times from 1994 to 1996 (once in 1994 and 1995, twice in 1996), 
and the high public prosecutor's offices select the attendants of these workshops 
from interpreters within their jurisdiction. 107 By 2000, MOJ increased the 
frequency of meetings between interpreters and public prosecutors held at the 
District Prosecutor's Office; it also sent the officials to Shih6 Isfiyaku loreming 
semind (Workshops for Judicial Interpreters) held by a university and sought 
104 M itsui, OP. Cit., pp. 10 1- 102. 
'05 Minutes No. 11, LAC/HOR, the 109th Session, 16 September 1988 (S62), p. 4. 
106 Minutes No. 5, LAC/HOC, the 140th Session, 27 March 1997 (H9), p. 8. 
107 Minutes No. 8, LAC'HOC, the 141st Session, 4 December 1997 (H9), p. 7. 
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possible future interpreters. ' 08 In 2001, Komura Masahiko, the Minister of Justice. 
told the Diet that the Ministry was considering the establishment of a Tvfiyukunin 
shien sentd (Support Centre for Judicial Interpreters) to coordinate the registration 
and management of interpreters. 
109 
Third, the training of interpreters given by the courts became more 
systematic in the late 1990s than it had been in the late 1980s, when training was 
left to individual courts. New practices included the judge or the court officials 
explaining to the interpreter the procedures of the trial and the relevant legal terms 
and asking the interpreters to observe public trials other than their own cases as 
preparation. The courts also supplied a manual for court interpreters, which was 
originally compiled for the courts in Okinawa in the early 1970s when the 
territory was returned to Japan. '' 0 Since 1995, the courts have held 'H(itei 
Isfiyakunin seminj (Workshops for Court Interpreters)' in different places which 
were effective in identifying and recruiting in each region in Japan new 
interpreters of especially the non-English foreign languages. The courts have also 
made videotapes that explain the outline of the Japanese criminal procedure; 
compiled H6tei tsfiyaku gaidobukku (A Manual for Court Interpreters), and made 
sure to assign new interpreters to cases that are relatively simple and easy to 
interpret. ' '' In the meantime, the SC acknowledged to the Diet the efforts that 
private organisations had made when working on judicial interpretation issues, 
and that the courts were ready to cooperate with such private parties towards the 
10' Minutes No. 2, LAC, HOC, the 147th Session, 14 March 2000 (H 12), p. 14. 
109 Minutes No. 10, Budget Committee. HOC, the 151st Session, 19 March 2001 (H13), p. 31. 
110 Minutes No. 11, LAC/HOR, the 109th Session, 16 September 1988 (S62). p. 8. 
"' Minutes No. 5, LAC HOC, the 140th Session, 27 March 1997 (H9), p. 8. 
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improvement of the capability of interpreters. 112 Unlike similar workshops that 
the MOJ holds, District Courts in the prefecture where there is a High Court 
organise and hold H6tei tsfiyakunin semind (Workshops for Court Interpreters). ' 13 
Meanwhile, though not a result of deliberate training, the emergence of 
ýsecond-generation' interpreters has also contributed to improvements in court 
interpretation. According to Miki Emiko, an attomey-at-law. at the end of the 
1990s an increasing number of interpreters' first language is the same as that of 
the suspect/defendant/witness. Some of those interpreters are foreign residents 
who have settled down in Japan. It is probable that such interpreters would 
clearly understand the crucial points that the suspect, defendant or witness, made 
in the court. Even if expressions used in her/his interpretation into Japanese were 
somehow less fluent in comparison to native Japanese speakers, this can be 
rectified by the lawyers in the court whose first language is Japanese. The 
significance of the above development becomes clearer in comparison to common 
practice in the early 1990s. At the time the first language of the judicial 
interpreter was often Japanese and despite the fact that she or he was able to 
express themselves accurately in Japanese, on certain occasions the contents of 
the interpreted testimony did not fully make sense. 114 It is possible to speculate 
that the reasons for the above included a lack of professional training as a court 
interpreter, and of understanding about the social and cultural backgrounds of the 
defendant. 
112 This appears to be referring to the Japan Judicial Interpreters Association, among others. 
113 Minutes No. 8, LAC/HOC, the 14 1 st Session, 4 December 1997 (1-19), p. 8. 
'" Interview with Miki Emiko, 16 November 2002 
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c. Assigning at least two interpreters in one case 
Different stages in investigation and public trial carry different legal implications. 
When discussing the case with the defence counsel, or during a public trial, there 
are possibilities that the foreigner suspected of offence may be able to 
successfully defend herself/himself with the help of counsel, which is more 
difficult to achieve during the investigation. Understanding the difference 
between the investigation and public trial could therefore be crucial for the 
suspect/defendant. Mitsui, a professor in Japanese criminal law, argued in this 
connection that the interpreter at a public trial should be a different person from 
the one in the investigation, so that the defendant would understand the 
implications of each stage, and thus effectively be able to defend herself/himself. 
In the early 1990s that was not always possible, probably because interpreters 
were less easily available than in later years. 115 But Mitsui reported that 
increasingly different interpreters have been assigned at the different stages of 
police investigation, public prosecutor investigation, and public trial. ' 16 This is 
possibly because the number of available interpreters has increased for some of 
the languages. 
I 15Mitsui, op. cit., p. 103; Yanagawa, op. cit., pp. 283-284. 
"' Mitsui, op. cit., p. 103. 
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d Use ofplain, clear and logical Japanese 
The aim of using plain language is similar to the above, namely to assist the 
suspect/defendant to understand what is going to happen to her/him. Some judges 
have urged their colleagues to use plain and easily understandable Japanese 
expressions, so that the interpreters and the defendant may better comprehend the 
public trial process, and also the implications of the actions taken during public 
trial. 1 17 Some of the public prosecutors and judges appear to have learned that the 
preparation prior to the public trial is effective and indispensable in making the 
Japanese used in the court clearer and more comprehensible. First, by the mid- 
1990s, public prosecutors from the Tokyo District Prosecutors' Office began 
supplying advance summaries of evidence to be examined during a public trial. 
This made the examination of evidence more comprehensible to the interpreters, 
and by extension, to the defendants. ' 18 Second, in his article published in 1998 
and circulated among judges and judicial interpreters for training purposes, '' 9 
Judge Tanaka YasurO argued that the problems in the administration of a public 
trial arising from the language barrier can, to many extents, be effectively 
addressed by taking the following measures: (i) institutional i se systematic training 
to improve the capability of interpreters. (ii) Ensure that the public prosecutor, 
defence counsel and judge in a case make full preparations in advance so that the 
administration of the trial transparent and comprehensible. (iii) Inform defendants 
of their rights to defend themselves. (iv) Provide the defendant with a one-way 
H7 Nakayama, 'Y6 tsOyaku gaikokujin keiji Jiken to salbansho no torikumi', p. 47; Nakagawa, op. 
cit., p. 27. 
'"' Watanabe, op. cit., pp. 288-289. 
119 Interview with Judge Mr. Tanaka Yasur6,19 June 2001. 
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wireless receiver in order to reduce the time required for interpretation. 120 There 
is some evidence such training may be having an effect: in one public trial at a 
branch office of the district court, the author of this study confinned that exactly 
the same language as in the Tanaka article was used by the presiding judge during 
proclamation of the sentence. 121 
e. Audio recording of testimony in the courtforfuture re-examinaiion 
Since court-hearing protocol is written in Japanese, there is no way to confirm 
retrospectively, be it at a later stage of the same public trial or during the second 
instance, whether interpretation in the court was accurate. This problem may now 
be possible to amend, as the presiding judges have been allowed since November 
1989 to record the testimony of the foreign defendant to whom interpretation was 
provided. 
122 
Interpretation costs 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the courts used to charge interpretation costs for a 
public trial of foreign defendants. This practice changed after the Tokyo High 
Court ruled in February 1993 that courts should not charge foreign defendants 
120 Tanaka Yasur6, 'Gaikokuj in jiken m okeru seikakuna h6tei tsOyaku no jissen to tekisetsuna 
sosh6 unei (Practicing Accurate Court Interpretation and the Appropriate Court Administration in 
Foreign Cases)', in Harada Kunio ; Kawakami Takuichi; and Nakatani Y6jlr6 (eds), Keýji saihan 
no riron lojitsumu (Theorj, and Practice in Criminal Trial) (Tokyo: Seibund6,1998), pp. 139-19 1. 
121 Judge Mr. Amemiya Norio, Urawa District Court, Kawagoe Branch, 5 June 200 1. 
122 Hashiba Shun, -Kokusai jinken kijun kara mita keij itetsuzuki m okeru gaikokujin no jinken 
JCLU 'telgen' o chOsin ni - (An assessment of human rights of foreigners in criminal procedure 
by the interriational human rights standard: in connection with the JCLU proposal)", jivil to sel . gi . 
1993,44(l), pp. 60-65, p. 63. 
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interpretation costs, on the grounds of Article 14-3-(t) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A senior official of the Supreme Court 
wrote in 1993 that, as a member of international society, Japanese courts should 
continue making efforts towards meeting the requirements of international human 
rights standards, notwithstanding opposition within the courts based on the 
negative understanding of the applicability of international law on Japan's 
domestic law. 123 Civil rights campaigners welcome this decision, 124 since this 
ruling provides the legal basis for the similar treatment of foreigners and Japanese 
in future cases. However, there could be judges, who would also order that the 
MOJ should bare the interpretation cost, but based on a different legal justification 
adapted from Japan's Code of Criminal Procedure, 125 rather than the international 
covenant. 
(3) Public Certification of Judicial Interpreters 
The previous two subsections showed how the police, public prosecutor, defence 
counsel and the court have worked to reduce the constraints from the language 
barrier on Japan's criminal justice administration by increasing the number of 
interpreters and improving the quality of interpretation. In contrast, this 
subsection is going to show the response to the language barrier by the legislative 
branch of the Japanese state. The legislature's action is as significant as those by 
123Nakayama, op. cit., p. 42. 
12' Nihon bengoshi reng6kai, Kokusaijinken kýyaku to nihon no shih(i shimin no kenri 
(lnternational human rights covenants, Japan's judiciary, and citizens' rights) (Tokyo: K6chi 
shob6,1997), p. 97, p. 348, Watanabe, op. cit., pp. 288-289. 
'25 Tanaka Hiraku et aL, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
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the administrative branch of the state: if and when a new law was approved and 
enacted by the legislature, this would give new powers to the bureaucracy 
(namely the police, public prosecutor, defence counsel and the court) to address 
the language barrier. In other words, whereas the above-mentioned quantitative 
increase and qualitative improvements can be seen as a first stage of the Japanese 
state's response to the language barrier, the legislature's action constitutes the 
second stage of the response. 
Lawmakers questioned the government and the judiciary about the 
language barrier problem 19 times from 1988 to 2001, once in the House of 
Representatives and the remaining 18 times in the House of Councillors. 6mon 
Reiko, a member of the House of Councillors, played a key role in this debate, 
posing questions in the Diet ten times out of the nineteen. She was influenced by 
her own experience when she, as a public prosecutor, had processed cases of Thai 
migrant women. Being a lawmaker from a junior coalition partner in the 1990s 
may also have given her an additional capability to bring the language barrier 
issue to the agenda of the parliamentary debate. ' 26 
126 Omori Reiko, 'Tekisei tsOyaku no hosh6 to kuni no shisei, kokusei no shiten (Japanese state's 
attitude manifest in national legislature about guaranteeing the appropriate interpretation)', in 
Watanabe and Nagao (eds), Gaikokujin to keýi tetsuzuki - tekiseina isiiYaku no tameni - (Criminal 
proceduresfiorfioreigners. - iowardsfair interpretation), pp. 297-313, pp. 297-298; 6mori Reiko, 
'Gaikokuj in jiken ni okeru shih6 tsOyaku no genj6 (The Present Status of Judicial Interpretation 
for Foreigner Cases). ' http: //www. reiko-ohmori. com/reiko/home. html Cited 13 January 20033. 
Minutes No. 5. Legal Affairs Committee (LAC), House of Councillors (HOC), the 140th Session, 
27 March 1997 (1-19), p. 7. Shiroishi Makiko, '30 sai o sugite sengy6 shufu kara shih6 tsoyaku no 
michie (Interview with Hiromi Nagao. From a full time housewife to ajudicial interpreter: the 
choice made after 30 years of age)', Sd iou (Let's talk), Juk, 1999. 
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a. Significance of interpretation to criminaIjustice 
At the end of the 1980s, the Japanese state saw the relevance of judicial 
interpretation primarily in terms of efficiency in crime control. The police and 
public prosecutors considered the language barrier as causing difficulties in 
collecting evidence of offence 127 and controlling unauthorised foreign residents 
efficiently. 128 However, by the early 1990s the police accepted that interpretation 
was not solely for investigation, and that the measures should be enforced to 
protect the rights of foreign suspects in practical terms and not in a token 
manner. 129 T is contrasts with their statements in previous years. 
In the late 1990s, the Japanese govemment officially acknowledged that 
judicial interpretation was indispensable in order to control crime committed by 
foreigners as well as to guarantee the rights of the foreigners involved. The 
Commissioner of the National Public Safety Commission said that it was essential 
for the police to improve interpretation, both in order to 'listen carefully' to the 
testimony of any foreigners suspected of offences, and also to take their human 
rights into consideration. ' 30 An official from the MOJ reported that recruiting 
competent interpreters was crucial for performing investigations as precisely as 
possible, and for guaranteeing the rights of suspects and witnesses. ' 31 The above 
position was further endorsed by Ministers. In March 1999, Jinnai Takao, 
127 Nakagawa, op. cit., p. 22. 
128 Matsumoto Mitsuhiro, 'Rainichi gaikokujin ni kakaru hanzai no d6k6 to kongo no kadai 
(Present situation and the future problems in crimes relating to visiting foreigners)', Writsu no 
hiroba, 46(7), 1993, pp. 4-13, pp. 12-13. 
1)() Kitamura and Hayakawa, op. cit., pp. 34-36; NPA, op. cit. (1992 edition), pp. 91-92. 
'10 Minutes No. 11, Local Governance and Police Affairs Committee, HOC, the 147th Session, 18 
May 2000 (H 12), p. 13. 
131 Minutes No. 5, LA0'HOC, the 140th Session, 27 March 1997 (H9), p. 8. 
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Minister of Justice, told the Diet that ensuring the recruitment of competent 
interpreters was important for legal process: accurate and impartial interpretation 
was salient for just and efficient investigation and trial, and also for protecting the 
rights of suspects and defendants. 132 Two months later. Prime Minister Obuchi 
Keiz6 went on to confirm to the Diet that to recruit competent interpreters and to 
provide accurate and impartial interpretation in the criminal cases of foreigners 
were important in order to realise a just and unbiased investigation and trial. 133 
Consequently, at the official policy statement level, the two contradictory (at least 
in the short term) concerns over the efficiency in crime control and protecting the 
rights of the foreigners being investigated have been embedded in Japan's 
criminal justice administration. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Justice claimed that judicial interpretation could 
possibly be an instrument for protecting the interests of Japanese nationals abroad. 
In 2000, Yasuoka Koji, Minister of Justice, told the Diet that ensuring accurate 
interpretation in judicial process was important not only for securing the human 
rights of foreign residents in Japan who were questioned as suspects, but also for 
the foreigners as witness. He then suggested that accurate and just interpretation 
in Japan's criminal justice process could allow the Japanese government demand 
that foreign countries justly treat Japanese nationals in their own judicial 
processes. ' 34 The so-called Melbourne Case, in which Japanese tourists were 
convicted by the Australian court for smuggling illegal drugs from the country 
they had visited before arriving in Australia, is a case in point. The defendants 
I 12 Minutes No. 3, LAC/HOC, the 145th Session, 15 March 1999 (H 11), p. 14. 
133 Minutes No. 14, LAC/HOC, the 145th Session, 27 May 1999 (H 11). pp. 5-6. 
114 Minutes No. 2, Budget Committee, HOC, the 149th Session, 8 August 2000 (H 12), p. '14. 
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argued that inaccurate interpretation misled them, making them unable to fully 
.1 
defend themselves. 135 
b. Guaranteeing the accuracy of interpretation 
While acknowledging the considerable importance of judicial interpretation, the 
investigators and the judiciary also admitted in the 1990s that it was extremely 
difficult to organise consistent ways for ensuring the accuracy of interpretation. 
One possible way to ensure accuracy is to make an audio recording of an 
investigation or public trial. The degree of acceptance of the need for audio 
recording varies between the criminal justice institutions. Even though it 
acknowledged the need for such measures, in 1988 the NPA did not have any 
particular systematic ways to ensure the accuracy of interpretation during an 
investigation. At that time, only in exceptional cases did the police ask a suspect 
to submit a written testimony in the foreign language she/he commands and attach 
it to the official investigation protocol, in which the testimony was translated and 
written in Japanese. ' 36 The rejection of audio recording partially changed a 
decade later. In 2000, the police stated to make audio recordings of part of an 
investigation in order to prove to third parties that the suspect agreed with the 
contents of the investigation protocol. At the end of the investigation, the 
investigative officer would read out to the suspect the protocol that the officer had 
compiled from the testimony of the suspect, and then obtain the suspect"s consent 
'35 M izuno, 'Gaikokuj in j iken to tsOyaku mondai'. 
136 Minutes No. 11, LAC, House of Representatives (HOR), the 109th Session, 16 September 1988 
(S62), pp. 4-5. 
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that the contents of the protocol were accurate. This became a common practice 
in preparation for the possibility that the accuracy of interpretation could be 
contested at a later stage of the criminal justice process. 137 The MOJ admitted in 
1998 that it did not have reliable ways to ensure that interpretation during 
investigation was accurate. 138 Nevertheless, the Ministry was not considering 
making audio recordings of interrogations, claiming that the transcription would 
be time-consuming. 
139 
c. Public certification of the capability (? f interpreters 
Certifying the capability of judicial interpreters was discussed at the Diet after 
1999 as another possible way to ensure improved accuracy of interpretation. At 
the end of the 1980s, neither the MOJ nor the SC expressed any interest in 
certification. 140 Similarly in 1997, the MOJ thought that such public certification 
was premature 
141 
and untimely. 
142 However, in 1999 when he acknowledged the 
significance of judicial interpretation, Prime Minister Obuchi stated that the 
Cabinet would examine the necessity to establish a public examination of 
interpreters, and a law that regulates court interpretation. 143 In 2000, the Minister 
of Justice confirmed that his Ministry had started to consider a bill for the public 
137 Minutes No. 11, Local Governance and Police Affairs Committee, HOC, the 147th Session, 18 
May 2000 (H 12), p. 16. 
118 Minutes No. 3, LAC/HOC, the 143rd Session, 22 September 1998 (H 10), p. 19. 
139 Minutes No. 3, LAC/HOC, the 143rd Session, 22 September 1998 (H 10), p. 20. 
140 Minutes No. 11, LAC/HOR, the 109th Session, 16 September 1988 (S62), pp. 8-9. 
141 Minutes No. 5, LAC/HOC, the 140th Session, 27 March 1997 (H9), p. 9. 
142 Minutes No. 8, LAC/HOC, the 14 1 st Session, 4 December 1997 (H9), p. 9. 
Minutes No. 14, LAGHOC, the 145th Session, 27 May 1999 (H 11), pp. 5-6. 
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certification of judicial interpreters. ' 44 For this purpose, the MOJ sent law 
scholars to the United States (New York, New Jersey and Florida) and to Sweden, 
Gennany and France to conduct research on the public certification of court 
interpreters. The Yomiuri Shinbun reported in January 2002 that the government 
and the ruling parties had decided to make a new law concerning judicial 
interpreters (shiW tsfiyaku). 145 However, no bill on the certification of judicial 
interpreters had been submitted to the Diet by 2003. 
Ethical guidelines will be an important part of the public certification of 
the competence of judicial interpreters. A judicial interpreter can be biased 
because, for example, of social relations within the migrant community between a 
suspect/defendant and the interpreter. In that case the neutrality of the 
interpretation may be compromised. There were cases, in particular in the early 
1990s, in which the interpreter (who was from the same country as the foreigner 
suspected of an offence) was not particularly sympathetic to the suspect, possibly 
because of a difference in social backgrounds. There were also instances in which 
the interpreter had vested interests, ' 46 such as the case in which the Urawa District 
Court acquitted the defendant in 1991, reported earlier in this chapter. The police 
had asked the flatmate of the suspect to interpret, even though this flatmate had 
alleged that the suspect set fire to the flat. Even if it was not deliberate, a judicial 
interpretation could be biased if the interpreter did not know what she or he was 
supposed to do and what not. Ohki and others argue that defence counsel should 
... Minutes No. 2, Budget Committee, HOC, the 149th Session, 8 August 2000 (H 12), p. 34. 
145 Yomiuri shinhun, 5 January 2002, cited in Aftrants'-nello, No. 48, April 2002, p. 11. 
146 Tsuda and Miyawaki, 'Gaikokujin keiji tetsuzuki ni okeru tsuyaku honyaku ishl sots6 no genjo', 
p. 40. 
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remind the interpreter to refrain from giving the suspect advice that is of legal 
character. 
147 
As far as the research for this study has been able to identify, JapaWs 
criminal justice institutions maintain that enough has been done about the ethical 
aspects of interpretation. The police told the Diet in 2000 that there was no legal 
requirement to bind private interpreters to protect information learned during 
interpretation. Nevertheless, the police would ask interpreters to sign a written 
pledge not to disclose such information. 148 In addition, the police would instruct 
interpreters at workshops on the importance of protecting secrets learned during 
interpretation. The MOJ would instruct judicial interpreters professional ethics at 
the TAyakunin semind (Workshop for Interpreters) and on other occasions, while 
each Public Prosecutor's Office does the same in its daily practice. Regarding 
court interpreters, each must take an oath before she/he begins interpretation, 
which binds her/him to interpret sincerely. In case an interpreter committed 
perjury, she/he will be held criminally responsible. ' 49 
(4) Current Status of the Language Barrier and the Remaining Issues 
This chapter described how the language barrier problem emerged in Japan during 
the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s and the responses by various 
147 Ohki Kazuhiro et al., Gaikokujinjiken keiji bengo manyuaru (Foreigner criminal case manual 
f6r dqlýnce law 
' j, ers) 
(Tokyo: Gendai jinbunsha, 1997), p. 86. 
148 Minutes No. 11, Local Governance and Police Affairs Committee, HOC, the 147th Session, 18 
May 2000 (H 12), p. 15. Suzuki Ken considers that the police should still be responsible for 
supervising private interpreters. Suzuki Ken , 'Kanagawakenkei minkanjin tsayaku ga s6sa 
torishirabej6h6 o r6ei (Private interpreter for Kanagawa Prefectural Police leaks information 
obtained from investigation)", Migrants'-Net, May 2000, No. 27, p. 16. 
149 Minutes No. 6, Accounting Committee, HOC, Post-session meeting. the 149th Session. 20 
September 2000 (H 12), p. 28. 
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actors to address these problems. These developments can be surnmarised in 
terms of the following three aspects. First, the number of judicial interpreters has 
increased, which is reflected in the frequency of use of interpretation. In 1988, the 
rate of interpretation against the entire public trials for foreigners was 29.0 percent, 
and in 1991 this rose to 49.7 percent. The rate of interpretation increased 
afterwards, to 62.2 percent in 1992, and hit a peak of 85.4 percent in 1997.1ý" 
Research for this study has been unable to identify corresponding figures for the 
police and public prosecutors. In 1988, among the police investigations of 
foreigners suspected of an offence, 40 percent of them were carried out without 
interpretation. 151 Second, in terms of the quality of interpretation, the Japanese 
state appears to have managed to maintain legality and legitimacy of 
administering criminal justice to foreigners suspected of an offence. This is in 
contrast to the beginning of the 1990s when the investigators failed, at least on 
two occasions, to convince the judiciary that the investigation was legal. Third, 
with regard to the building of a new legal framework for addressing the language 
barrier problem, the Ministry of Justice has begun research for a bill on the public 
certification of judicial interpreters. 
Even though there is a consensus among lawyers that interpretation has 
improved in the last decade, there is nevertheless some room for further 
150 General Secretariat, the Supreme Court (GSSC), 'Ts6j6 dai isshin ni okeru tsOyaku honyakunin 
no tsuita gaikokujin jiken no y6zai j inin (chisai, kansai) (Convictions at Ordinary First Instance 
Trials at District and Summary Courts in which Interpretation was Given)', GSSC, A nen ni 
okeru keiJ ij iken no gaikyo (General situation of criminal cases for the year X)'. H(is(ijiho. various 
years. 
15' See p. 263 of this Chapter. 
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improvements. 152 Firstly, there is an uneven distribution of the availability of 
interpreters and defence counsel in Japan. In other words, those who five in 
smaller cities and rural areas are less likely to have access to an interpreter 
compared with those who live in the large cities where more interpreters should 
be available. Likewise, speakers of the languages whose entire speaking 
population is relatively small may not be able to find the interpreters as frequently 
as other languages, such as English. Meanwhile, some defence counsels estimate 
that the cases in the greater Tokyo area occupied about two thirds of the entire 
rainichi gaikokujin cases in which interpretation was requested, 153 which may 
suggest that the availability of interpreters are limited outside the large cities. 
A second point of concern is that defendants may not be able to assess the 
capabilities of interpreters prior to or during a public trial to refuse an interpreter 
who appeared to be incompetent, to claim objection to, or demand correction, of 
the mistakes the interpreters appeared to have made. 1 54 Tanaka argues that this 
potential could be addressed if both the court and the defence were flexible. 155 
6. Conclusion 
The first objective of this chapter was to describe and analyse three points about 
the language barrier problem: (i) how the language barrier emerged; (ii) how the 
language barrier affected the Japanese state; and (iii) how different actors in Japan 
152 Daiichi Tokyo bengoshikai, Zoku gaikokujin no horilsusodan Q&Ajireihen (Legal aaYisefor 
foreigners in the Q&A. format volume 2. - case studies) (Tokyo: Gy6sei, 1998), p. 182. 
153 Tanaka Hiraku et al., op. cit., p. 11. 
15' Hashiba, "Kokusaijinken kijun kara mita keijitetsuzuki ni okeru gaikokujin nojinken", p. 63. 
155 Tanaka Yasur6, 'Gaikokul in jiken ni okeru saikakuna h6tei ts6yaku no j Issen to tekiseina 
sosh6unei'. p. 156. 
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responded to the language barrier problem. There are a number of findings that 
this chapter has made towards answering these questions. 
Section 2 showed how cases involving Thai migrant women were 
frequently detected in Japan in the early 1990s and how they revealed to the 
Japanese society the existence of a language barrier problem, and how this 
problem also applied to foreigners in Japan from other origins as well. The 
section also reported the existence of violence against those migrant workers by 
employers and others involved in the migration industry. 
Section 3 showed that the shift in composition of the origins of foreigners 
in Japan in the last decade symbolises the two contrasting dynamics in Japan's 
international relations in the last century, namely the imperial world order and the 
Cold War order on the one hand, and the progression of globalisation and the 
ending of the Cold War on the other. This is the case because of two distinctive 
characteristics of the foreign population in Japan. The presence of Koreans and 
Taiwanese in post-war Japan is testimony to the international population 
movements for which Japan had created structural conditions in the first half of 
the twentieth century. Subsequently, international migration to Japan in the last 
two decades has been influenced by Japan's post-war economic hegemony in East 
Asia, as shown in Chapter 4. 
Section 4 presented legal and political implications for the Japanese state 
of the language barrier problem. The legal implication is that inaccurate or biased 
interpretation may hinder the Japanese state from convicting a foreign defendant. 
This could mean that the criminal justice administration failed to identifv the facts 
that constitute a crime. The political implication that flows from the above Is that 
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the Japanese state might have partially failed in legally convicting defendants 
through which the state maintains domestic order. Such a situation could have 
appeared as if the operation of the criminal justice system, a 'domestic and 
political' sector of the Japanese state, was to a certain extent constrained by the 
language barrier. This is a challenge from international labour migration as a 
force of globalisation. 
The extent of the language barrier problem in Japan was evident, as 
reported in Chapter 5, in official acknowledgement by the police: at the end of the 
1980s, 40% of the rainichi gaikokujin suspects were interviewed without 
interpretation. The Japanese state took the following measures in order to reduce 
the shortages in interpreters: training police officers; recruiting interpreters from 
the private sector; and improving the remuneration of private sector interpreters to 
attract them to the job. In addition to these measures, the Japanese state also took 
several steps to improve the quality of interpreting. All of those measures were 
designed to make legal decisions by the court justifiable: evidence had to be 
collected legally through accurate and neutral interpretation and the 
suspect/defendant should be given the opportunity to defend herself/himself 
against any charges. Not only were there these measures carried out by each 
institution of the criminal justice administration carried out, there were also 
interactions within different state institutions, as well as between civil society and 
the state, in addressing the language barrier problem. The chapter reported that at 
least in two cases. the investigation had failed to convict a suspect because of 
problems with interpretation. After a stem warning from the court, the 
investigation changed its practice. In another example, some of the civil society 
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actors led by the defence counsel exerted a certain degree of influence on the 
judiciary to prepare the translation of legal documents required during 
investigation and public trial. Furthermore it was also found that the judiciary 
was acting in compliance with at least one of the international human rights 
covenants, namely with regard to the bearing of interpretation costs during public 
trial. Turning to the parliamentary debate, after an initial attempt in 1988 that 
drew only a limited degree of political attention, the debate from 1997 to 2002 
over the language barrier problem resulted in: (i) confirmation in 1999 by the 
Justice Minister and endorsed by the Prime Minister in the same year that accurate 
and impartial interpretation was indispensable for controlling crime and protecting 
the rights of foreigners suspected of an offence; and (ii) the emergence of the 
possibility whereby public certification of the competence of judicial interpreters 
can be legislated. 
To recapitulate the answers to the questions for this chapter: (i) the 
language barrier emerged in the early 1990s, when the configuration of the foreign 
population in Japan was substantially changing; the emergence of the problem 
itself thus highlights a transition of Japan's international structure from the Cold 
War order to globalisation and post-Cold War order. (ii) The language barrier has 
been a constraint on the operation of Japan's criminal justice administration, both 
in terms of the resources available to the institutions involved, and also of 
legitimacy for the exercise of penal power. In this respect, the following 
assessment of the language barrier problem by a judge is indicative. Judge 
Tanaka wrote that the emergence and increase in the number of criminal cases 
requiring interpretation demanded that all lawyers involved in criminal procedure 
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reconsider the foundations of criminal trial. 156 (iii) Japan appears to have 
managed to reduce the magnitude of the language barrier problem (it would 
probably be impossible to eliminate it entirely) by recruiting and training judicial 
interpreters. Even though each branch of the criminal justice administration 
tackled the problem mainly by itself, there were also interactions within the state 
institutions, and between civil society and the state. 
The second objective of this chapter has been to consider the implications 
of Japan's response to the language barrier problem in relation to the three 
questions presented at the outset. Answers to these questions are shown below. 
(1) With regard to its capability to operate in the face of globalisation, the 
Japanese state largely managed to overcome the challenge posed by the language 
barrier. This shows that the state reformulated its function within the 
globalisation process; hence it is not necessarily in retreat, as advocates of the 
Hyperglobalist thesis of globalisation would claim. This study has gauged the 
Japanese state's capability in responding to the constraints from the forces of 
globalisation. While the above assessment was made in aggregate terms that 
cover the entire population to whom the language barrier mattered, whether and in 
what way was the Japanese state was effective in responding to the language 
barrier issue as a force of globalisation, in terms of the distribution among the 
foreigners in Japan, will be considered in Chapter 6. 
(ii) Concerning the relation between civil society and the state in Japan, the 
chapter found that it was contingent on the context. In certain circumstances civil 
society actors contributed to raise awareness in the Japanese society about the 
156 Tanaka Yasur6, op. cit., p. 191. 
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language barrier. However, other sectors in civil society were also able to work 
with the state institutions to reduce the negative consequences of the language 
barrier as a manifestation of globalisation. 
(iii) Japan's national identity has changed as a consequence of Japan's response to 
the challenge from international labour migration as a force of globalisation. The 
introduction of judicial interpreters implies that the Japanese state has 
acknowledged (if grudgingly or unwittingly) that attributes of the population it 
governs are, at least in terms of the languages used, no longer *homogenous. ' The 
introduction of judicial interpretation is an extension of citizenship to the foreign 
population, which constitutes an 'emergence of a multinational state. ' 157 
'-" Ahmet lcduygu, 'Citizenship at the Crossroads: Immigration and the Nation-State, in Eleonore 
Kofman and Gillian Youngs (eds), Globalization: Theoty and Practice (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 
150-162, P. 152. 
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CONCLUSION 
The aims in this final chapter are fourfold. The first is to present the answers to 
the research questions set out in the introductory chapter. The second is to 
discuss the delivery of collective goods in contemporary Japan within the context 
of the increasing degree of international labour migration as a force of 
globalisation. This issue was omitted in Chapter 5, for it was subsidiary to the 
discussion in that chapter. The third is to demonstrate the significance of this 
study's contributions towards knowledge in the field of International Relations 
and International Political Economy. The fourth is to indicate possible future 
research directions. 
1. Answers to the Research Questions 
Having conducted the empirical studies in the previous two chapters, it is now 
possible to present the answers to the research questions set out in Chapter 1. 
CHAPTER 6 
(1) Research Questions and Answers 
a. In what way is international labour migration aforce ofglobalization? 
Chapter 4 of this study found that the increasing interconnectedness between 
interdependent political economies creates structural conditions for international 
labour mobility in which individual prospective migrants make decisions to move. 
In other words, capital mobility contributes to the creation of structural conditions 
for international labour migration. in this sense recent international labour 
migration reflects Japan's re-integration with East Asia after the ending of the 
Cold War. 
b. In what way is the language barrier a manifestation of international labour 
migration as the currently ongoing process ofglobalisation? 
Chapters 3 and 4 made it clear that the language barrier reflects the shift in 
Japan's international structure from the imperial world and Cold War orders, to 
globalisation and a post-Cold War order. Whereas the presence of Korean and 
Taiwanese residents during the Cold War years has had much to do with Japan's 
behaviour in the international sphere in the imperial world order, the current 
labour migration is a manifestation of the globalisation process in East Asia. 
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c. What is the language barrier, and who will be affected by it? 
Chapters I and 5 showed the following: (i) the language barrier refers to 
difficulties in communication and the subsequent legal and political problems that 
occur within the process of the criminal justice administration of a migrant 
receiving country. (ii) An inability to resolve the language barrier means that 
there are possibilities where a foreign defendant could be convicted on a false 
grounding. The language barrier thus affects both those foreigners who are 
subjected to the penal power of the migrant receiving state, and those who enforce 
criminal justice on foreigners. 
d. Who in Japan responded to the language barrier problem? Was it only slate 
officials in the criminaliustice administration, or civil society actors as well? ff 
civil society actors were instrumental to the response, how did they interact with 
the slate actors? 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that both the state and civil society actors responded to 
resolve the language barrier problem during the 1990s by recruiting and training 
judicial interpreters. Civil society actors' relations with the state actors were 
manifold: whereas some cooperated with the state actors, others raised alanns. 
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e. Was the Japanese state capable of responding to the language barrier problem 
as aforce ofglobalisation? 
Chapter 5 pointed out that the Japanese state was able to reduce significantly the 
extent of the language barrier problem in comparison to its status at the time of 
the emergence of the problem. Whereas less than 40 percent of police 
investigations of foreign suspects were carried out without interpreters at the end 
of the 1980s, in the late 1990s, more than 85 percent of public trials of foreign 
defendants were conducted with interpreters. 
Consequently it is possible for this study to argue that the Japanese state 
was capable of responding to a challenge from the language barrier as a 
manifestation of international labour migration, and did not 'fail' in its reaction to 
the new international environment brought about by globalisation. This counters 
the assertion of the Hyperglobalists (such as Ohmae, for example) that 
globalisation will result in the demise of the state, or its retreat from world politics. 
This study thus empirically supports the argument of the Transformational ist 
thesis of globalisation, namely that the globalisation process involves a 
transformation of the form and the working of the state. 
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2. Delivery of Collective Goods within the Context of Globalisation 
The capability of the Japanese state to adapt to a new environment, and then to 
apply its law to foreigners within its territory can be taken for granted if an analyst 
assumes that the state is by definition automatically capable of extending its 
power throughout its territory. However, as has just been shown above, this 
study takes the view that the forms and capabilities of the state transform over 
time, in particular within the globalisation process. This finding carries some 
significance with regard to the socio-political relationship between the population 
and the state in a society. In order to identity such significance, this section 
considers the following question: while the capitalist economy and the state are 
being reconfigured, and the constituent of the state is changing under globalisation 
(one of the main questions in globalisation, as referred to in Chapter 1), is it 
possible to expect some sort of mutual relationship to develop in a way similar to 
(but not the same as) the formulation of a nation state? This question is well 
worth considering in Japan today, because the language barrier problem in legal 
cases, not only in criminal but also in civil cases, continues to be of importance to 
both foreign and Japanese residents, as the potential for an increased number of 
migrants are anticipated in the coming decades. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, developments in social forces can change the 
configuration of political institutions. That is how citizenship rights were 
1 The notion of citizenship carries a potential problem of 'structural exclusion and Inequality. ' 
Hence the question to be asked within the context of globalisation can be 'how to Include 
non-citizens in domestic decision making', rather than replicating the existing notion of citizenship 
beyond the state border (Hazel Smith, 'Why Is There No International Democratic Theory? ', in 
Hazel Smith (ed. ). Democrao, and International Relations: Critical Theories and Problematic 
Practices (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 2 1)). 
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institutionalised as nation states were built since the eighteenth century, including 
Japan's post-war reform. Likewise, the recent international labour migration, in 
particular the cases of Thai migrant workers in the early 1990s, caused at least 
two kinds of challenges to the Japanese state, namely the transterritorialisation of 
administering criminal justice, and the transterritorialisation of ensuring the safety 
and well being of the population. In the following section, the Japanese state's 
response to these two challenges are considered. 
(1) Transterritorialisation of Administering Criminal Justice 
With regard to the transterritorialisation of administering criminal justice, the 
following three points can be drawn from the findings of this research. The first 
is about the extent to which the language barrier is an external force to the 
Japanese state. The language barrier has its roots partly in Japan's political 
economy itself, and is partly a consequence of actions that were taken outside 
Japan, as Chapters 3 to 5 have shown. In this sense, the language barrier carries 
transterritorial character., similar to other forces of globalisation. The following 
interpretation of the characteristics of the language barrier is thus possible. In 
the case of contemporary Japan, the 'extemal/economic' sectors of the state such 
as the METI have contributed to economic globalisation in East Asia, 2 and that 
policy was implemented by some parts of Japanese businesses whose capital was 
internationally mobile. As has been shown throughout this study, international 
2 Glenn D. Hook; Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes; and Hugo Dobson_japan's International 
Relations: Politics, economics and securin, (London: Routledge, 200 1 ), p. 195. 
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labour migration is a consequence of a complex combination of factors operating 
under globalisation, in which capital mobility plays an indispensable role. Since 
the increase in foreign offenders followed the above-mentioned labour migration, 
it is possible to characterise that the criminal justice administration 
('intemal/political' sector of the Japanese state) undertook the tasks that derived 
from the actions that the other ('extemal/economic') sectors of the state had 
undertaken beforehand. The argument of the Transformational ist thesis of 
globalisation now becomes relevant. It has been argued that globalisation and 
reformulation of the state proceed together. 3 To contextualise the findings of 
this study into the above theoretical claim, it is possible to argue that different 
sectors are responsible for the state's diversified adaptations to the globalisation 
process, probably with some time lag. 
The second point refers to the relation between the language barrier and 
state sovereignty. The interpretation in the above paragraph may make more 
sense in relation to the following claim. Through the introduction of interpreters, 
the sphere of influence of Japan's criminal justice administration, where the state 
can justify its 'open exercise of state power ,, 4 expanded from Japanese nationals 
and Japanese speakers, to cover non-Japanese speakers. Without the interpreters, 
the Japanese state was unable to legitimately apply its criminal law to 
non-Japanese speaking foreigners, despite the fact that these foreigners were 
physically present within its geographical territory. Hence the introduction of 
3 Linda Weiss, The Myth qf PovverlessSlate: Governing the Economy, in Global Era (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1998), p. 209; Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theolý. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 170. 
4 It6 Shigeki,,, Yhfis(j retsqjitsu: kenjis(jch(j no kais(i (Observing strict neutralitý,. - a public 
prosecutor-general's nienioir) (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1988), p. 158. Ito was the Public 
Prosecutor-General from 1985 to 1988. 
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the judicial interpreters means that the territorial distinction where the lavý of the 
Japanese state is applicable is blurring, but is not necessarily detrimental to the 
state. In other words, the Japanese state 'recovered' jurisdiction that was 
temporarily unavailable after the discovery of the language barrier problem, 
despite the Japanese state officials operating within Japan's geographical territory. 
The third point is concerned with the relation between the language 
barrier and the constituents of the Japanese state. The introduction of judicial 
interpreters rendered another consequence, if unwittingly, to the constituency of 
the state. The introduction of judicial interpreters in the criminal justice process 
signifies that the Japanese state has acknowledged that it has to equip itselfwIth a 
ruling tool that suits non-Japanese nationals and the non-Japanese speaking 
population. In other words, the Japanese state admitted that the population of 
Japanese society is no longer solely made up of Japanese nationals and a Japanese 
speaking population. Japan has incorporated foreigners in its constituents, if not 
as nationals with full membership of the polity. In this respect, Japan's national 
identity has clearly changed to include foreigners. 
(2) Transterritorialisation of Ensuring the Safety and 
Well Being of the Population 
The previous subsection has shown that the Japanese state was able to respond to 
the challenge from the transterritorialisation of administering cnminal justice. In 
contrast, as far as the research for this study has been able to identifv, the state's 
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response to the transterritorialisation of ensuring the safety and well being of the 
population is limited, as the following suggests. 
The relation between the enforcer and target of legal control of the state, 
in particular the administration of criminal justice, is complicated by the 
globalisation process, as the following chronological comparison indicates. First, 
during the imperial world order, the development of a capitalist economy largely 
coincided with the territory of the nation state. Even if the development of the 
national economy was linked with the colonial economy, the operations of the 
home economy and the colony were geographically distinct, and this meant that 
the extent of the state's legal control usually dovetailed with that of each nation. 
Second, in contrast to the above, within the globalisation process, political 
economies that are closely associated with each other (often through trade and 
foreign direct investment) are still distinct in geographical terms; but in societal 
terms, the distinction between the interdependent political economies is less 
clear-cut than it was under the imperial world order and during the Cold War. 
International labour migration is one of the important contributing factors to such 
development. 
Just as in the other economic activities that operate within the 
globalisation process (capital flow, telecommunication, the Internet, and 
environmental destruction, for example), economic actors in international 
population movements (who are often non-state actors) move ahead of regulation 
by the state and other international institutions. The fact that human traffickers 
were able to drive trafficked women into debt bondage is clearly an example 
304 
CHAPTER 6 
where economic actors operate in advance of the working of the state actors, or 
take advantage of any political vacuum. 
The existing study into operation of the human traffickers indicate that 
the traffickers take advantage of the lacunae in the social relations between the 
migrant sending and receiving countries to control the migrant women under debt 
bondage. First, the Japanese state does not know much about the traffickers, as 
it is often difficult for the state to detect traffickers unless it decided to investigate 
them. Second, the trafficked migrant women do not know much about social 
and political institutions in Japan. Third, the traffickers tell the migrant women, 
or the trafficked women learn, that their stay in Japan is 'illegal. ' The second 
and third points above could lead the trafficked women to consider that rescue 
will not come from the Japanese state. The traffickers threaten to, and 
sometimes actually do, use violence against the trafficked women in order to 
ensure the women's compliance with the traffickers' demands. Such beliefs held 
by the trafficked Thai women that there were no alternatives, or that there was no 
one else to seek help from, likely to have contributed to the actual use of force in 
the cases for which they were convicted. 
In the public trials of Thai migrant women cases, the defendants did not 
contest the fact that they were responsible for the death or injury of the 'victim. ' 
However, at the same time, the defendants pleaded that they had suffered from 
physical and psychological violence before committing their own offence. and 
wanted at least this fact to be acknowledged, and hopefully taken into 
consideration when the legal decision was made. The court decisions for the 
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above cases have been thought to be dismissive of such claims (excluding one 
case that ruled that the offence was excessive self-defence). 
The above shows the following: illegal brokers and employers inflicted 
violence upon 'illegal' migrant workers while both sides were present in the 
Japanese territory. Those migrant women will be held responsible for 
irregularity in their immigration status, but they should also be entitled to the 
rights stipulated by Japanese law, including bodily safety. The entitlement to 
security and the responsibility with regard to the offence, should not automatically 
cancel each other out, simply because the suspect was an 'illegal migrant'. 
While Sakanaka's remark cited in Chapter 3 comes very close to this point, the 
Japanese state did not address the above violence by the migration brokers. For 
the Japanese state, this constitutes the deficit in delivering collective goods within 
globalisation, namely ensuring the safety and well being of the population. 
(3) Globalisation and Multiple Identities of a Person 
The observations in the previous subsection lead to another question with regard 
to the Japanese state's response to globalisation: despite the fact that the Japanese 
state was able to respond to the transterritorialisation of administering criminal 
justice, why was it not able to act in a similar way in the case of the 
transterritorialisation of ensuring the safety and well being of the population? In 
other words, why was it not possible for the state to bring those who were 
responsible for the above violence that preceded the commission of injurý or 
murder by the defendants in the cases referred to above? Considering the 
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findings in this research, the following two factors could have contributed to the 
lack of the response, in addition to the resource constraints: first, an assumption 
that there is no need to consider the safety of foreign residents, in particular 
'illegal' migrants; second, the lack of understanding that differences in ethnicity 
and gender could render threats to individual safety in the ways that are different 
from the mainstream Japanese population. 
The first assumption above, if it actually existed, is questionable, because 
authority and responsibility should balance each other in politics. This point 
becomes further pertinent when the fact that the notion of reciprocity has been 
weak in the Japanese polity is taken into consideration. For the rulers in 
Tokugawa feudal society, the notion of responsibility primarily meant to be the 
one to the central government, rather than the one to the population they ruled. 5 
Such a situation was possible then, but today nation-building can only be 
legitimate when it entails a dialectic between the formulation of rights of the 
mainstream population and those of the minority. Hence the need for the 
reciprocity of obligation and rightS6 is increasing today as globalisation increases. 
As for the second point above, it is possible that the Japanese state is not fully 
aware of the significance of gender when articulating the need for ensuring the 
5 Takeshi Ishida and Ellis S. Krauss, 'Democracy in Japan: Issues and Questions', in Takeshi 
Ishida and Ellis S. Krauss (eds), Democracy in Japan (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
1989), pp. 3-16, p. 5; Michael Young and Constance Hamilton, 'Historical Introduction to the 
Japanese Legal System', in Curtis J. Milhaupt, J. Mark Ramseyer, and Michael K. Young (eds), 
Japanese Law in ('onte. w. - Readings in Societj% Economy and Polilics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), pp. 2-10, p. 3. 
6 Will Kymlicka, ('ontemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Second Edition) (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 359-365. 
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safety and well being of an individual person, in particular migrant women in 
Japan. It is known that women experience violence in different ways f7 rom men. 
Consequently, this study speculates that one possibility for the Japanese 
state to address the issues of the transterritorialisation of ensuring the safety and 
well being of the population can be to consider the safety of the foreign 
population more seriously than it appears to do so at the moment. The notion of 
the security of individuals, in particular the security of migrant workers, might be 
uncommon, but not unknown: 8 this study therefore assumes that bodily safety is a 
basic entitlement that should be available for all the population in a society 
regardless of her/his status. In other words, attention should be paid to at least 
the following three points: first, the changing constituency of the state requires 
reconsideration of entitlements of the population ('post-nation state citizenship'). 9 
Second, such reconsideration would require the state and civil society to take 
gender and ethnicity seriously, 10 because foreigners and women have been 
excluded from the notion of citizenship due to the association between citizenship 
rights and military service and other activities in the 'public' sphere in civil 
society in the making of the modem nation state. ' Third, following correct 
' Wendy Chan and George S. Rigakos, 'Risk, Crime and Gender', British Journal of Criminology, 
42,2002, pp. 743-76 1, p. 743. 
8 Alan Dupont, East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenge to Securit * i, 
(Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 200 1), p. 229; Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations 
Theot?,, p. 125. 
9 Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European Integration. - Towards Fortress Europe: ' 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 149-150. 
10 R. B. J. Walker, 'The Subýject of Security', in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), 
Critical Securiti, Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 1997), pp. 61-8 1, p. 69. 
'1 Jill Steans, Gender and International Relations: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polio. 1998), p. 
7. 
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procedures is different from rectifying injustices that existed prior to the carrying 
out of those procedures. 12 
To recapitulate the discussion in this section so far, the *deficif 13 in the 
delivery of collective goods within the globalisation process exists in the 
following two senses: first, the Japanese state has acquired the power to enforce 
criminal law legitimately to foreigners in its own geographical territory. Such 
authority should be balanced with its responsibility to the population. In other 
words, foreign residents should be entitled to the provision of safety (individual 
security 14 ) by the state (in addition to the contributions of civil society actors). 
This is certainly one way of responding effectively to the change in the 
constituency under the globalization process. This study has seen that the 
Japanese Constitution provides grounds that the Japanese state could protect the 
rights of migrant workers as long as they are present within Japan's territorial 
jurisdiction. Second and related to the above, the state should take gender and 
ethnicity more seriously, as these have not been incorporated in the notion of 
citizenship, including that of the modem Japanese state. It is worth noting that 
differential treatment by criminal officials could occur unwittingly. 15 If the 
above-mentioned safety is established, the Japanese state should be able to strike a 
better balance between its authority and responsibility. 
12 Barbara Goodwin, Using Political Ideas (Fourth Edition) (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 
1997), p. 39 1. 
13 Richard Devetak and Richard Higgott, 'Justice Unbound? Globalization, states and the 
transformation of social bond', International . 4.9airs, 75(3), 1999ý pp. 483-498, pp. 488-489. 14 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 363-364, Dupont, EastAsia Imperilled, p. 229; Ian 
Clark, op. cit., p. 125. 
15 Cavadino and Dignan, British criminologists, argue in their discussion of the operation of the 
English penal system that biases manifest in the operation, even if subjectiveIN 'unintended. ' 
Michael Cavadino and James Dignan, The Penal Sjstem. - .4n lntroduCtiW7 (Second Edition) 
(London: Sage, 1997), Chapter 10, pp. 267-290. 
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Such problems, however, are not unique to Japan, because in many 
countries it is often undocumented workers 'rather than the criminals who traffic 
in them who are [ ... ] considered by govern-ments as the lawbreakers and as threats 
to national security. ' 16 Because that is of significance in many countries today, 
the above violence against migrant workers (lack of security of individuals) merits 
serious consideration, in particular with regard to women and children. 
3. Significance of the Study 
The contributions that this study makes to the understanding of migration, 
globalisation, and the state are as follows: 
(1) Migration 
This study has shown that international labour migration is a force of globalisation 
in the following three respects. 
a. International labour migration to contemporary Japan is primarily led by 
non-state actors, in contrast to post-war labour migration to Western Europe and 
North America, both of which were state-sponsored projects (and also the 
war-time state-sponsored labour migration from Korea and China to Japan). 
b. Migration reflects an increasing degree of interconnectedness between 
interdependent political economies. International labour migration is therefore 
" World Population Monitoring 199 -. - International/I ligration and Development, p. 139, cited in 
Dupont, op. cit., p. 159. 
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an indispensable part of the global political economy; it is thus not a 'deviance" 
from world politics, as was seen in Chapter 1.17 
c. As the impact of the language barrier shows, even on a small scale. migration 
demonstrates a change in territoriality and constituency, and that the subsequent 
challenges are more visibly and politically charged than other globalisation forces 
such as trade and capital mobility. 
(2) Globalisation 
This study has been able to support the existing theory of globalisation, namely 
unevenness in its impact in terms of time, location and other factors as follows: 
a. The impact of globalisation affected different sectors of the Japanese state with 
a time lag (globalisation of capital in the 1970s affected the then MITL, 
international labour migration hit Japan's criminal justice administration in the 
1990s). 
b. The availability of judicial interpretation is unevenly distributed within Japan, 
even after the improvements made by the late 1990s, depending on the 
geographical location of foreigners and the first languages they command. 
" Aristide R. Zolberg, 'International Migration in Political Perspective'. in M. Kritz, C. Kellý and 
S. Tomasi (eds), Global Trends in Migration. - Theory and Research in Iniernational Population 
Movements (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1981). pp. 3-27, pp. 6-7 
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(3) The State 
This study has managed to extend the coverage where the Transformational i st 
thesis of globalisation proved to be plausible in the following terms: 
a. Geographical area - by pointing out that globalisation and subsequent state 
transformation occurred in East Asia. 
b. Issue area - by discussing the causes and consequences of international labour 
migration as a force of globalisation. 
4. Possible Future Studies 
The chapter concludes with six suggestions for future studies that could possibly 
draw on the findings of this research, because they touch upon certain key issues 
that will be important to study in International Relations, International Political 
Economy, the Japanese state and the East Asian region, and on the globalisation 
process. The first is to account for, analyse and explain further the details in 
which decisions to introduce judicial interpretation were made in Japan's criminal 
justice institutions and the Diet since the 1990s. The second is an empirical 
study to document, analyse and explain the developments in professional training 
for the judicial interpreters and the impact of such training upon Japan's 
administration of criminal justice. This training is primarily to assist 
improvements in the quality of interpretation, but it could potentially influence the 
public certification of the interpreters, and also reinforces Japan's current policv 
towards the language barrier problern. For the above first and second kind of 
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studies, access to those who compile and implement the policy will be necessary 
in order to obtain the details of the above deliberation process. 
The third suggestion is to account for the manifestation of the language 
barrier in immigration control and the correction stages, and the responses made 
to address the problem. Such a future study could cover an analytical lacunae 
this research identified, while the author was able to obtain the data on the 
language barrier problem from the courts and defence counsels, that was more 
difficult with immigration control and the prison. To conduct such a study, 
research methods similar to the current study should be applicable, but there will 
be a need to collaborate with people working in the relevant institutions. 
The fourth suggestion is an international comparison of the causes and 
consequences of the language barrier and responses in South Korea, Taiwan and 
Japan. Such research might be able to discover some similarities in the 
responses to the language barrier problem in the three countries. Such a 
comparison between the three countries is possible, because they share largely 
similar experiences in accepting migrant workers since the 1990s, while there is a 
certain degree of difference in the criminal justice institutions that deal with the 
language barrier problem. Moreover, the above comparison will be valuable, 
because similarities and differences in the state transformation in East Asia as a 
consequence of the progression of globalisation should become evident. The 
methods and the sources employed in the current research could be valid for this 
study and an understandings of the historical background of the similarities and 
differences in economic development as well as in the state institutions will be 
313 
CHAPTER 6 
necessary. Collaboration with researchers who command at least English and 
Korean/Chinese will also be indispensable. 
The fifth suggested area of study is to identify, analyse and explain the 
causes and consequences of the language barrier in Japan in situations other than 
in the criminal justice process, and the responses various actors. Language 
barriers in such contexts as medical care, emergencies (fire, earthquake, typhoon, 
for example), and civil lawsuits matter to foreign residents, because the lack of 
sufficient communication could threaten the safety and well being of the foreign 
residents in both the short and long term. To conduct such research, it is likely 
that attention should be focused on the activities of civil society actors and local 
governments, rather than the central government. This future study might be 
able to find out that language barrier problems in the above aspects have been 
acknowledged by civil society actors, and probably also by some local 
governments, and that those institutions have addressed the language barrier to a 
certain extent. If the above was the case, that could reinforce the argument in the 
current research about the capability of the Japanese state in the face of a 
challenge from globalisation. 
The final suggestion is to investigate into whether and how the Japanese 
state has tried to improve the welfare of migrant workers, in particular in terms of 
security from crime and violence. This is necessary because the current study 
has found that the contemporary Japanese state could do much more to address 
the transterritorialisation of security of individuals, including that of foreign 
residents. Attention should be paid to the measurers for preventing physical and 
psychological violence committed to inigrants, and to modifications in the 
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immigration policy to reduce the room where the unauthorised migration industrN 
could take advantage of undocumented workers. 
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